Although there are eight members in SAARC—each struggling with different levels of growth, different political systems, and different ideologies and economic systems—South Asian regionalism is centrifuged around India. India’s dominance is so profound that it wouldn’t be wrong to say that when India catches cold the rest of South Asia sneezes. India claims 73 percent of South Asian territory, 79 percent of its population and 80 percent of its GDP. It shares boundaries with all SAARC countries, bar the Maldives. India’s internal policies have a ripple effect on other countries of the region. The hike in the price of onion in India leaves Nepali meals devoid of the vital ingredient. India’s policies on refugees have direct implication on Bangladesh. India’s nuclear policies prompt Pakistan to reassess its own nuclear and security measures. By regional cooperation, one assumes a certain level of interdependence between the countries. However, when all the network lines in the region are so heavily dependent on a single node, can there ever be true interdependence? In South Asia, individual bilateral relations with India assume more importance for some countries rather than a regional cooperation mechanism. As a result, even though South Asia can claim to be a distinct cultural space, economically, it is one of the least integrated regions in the world. How are we to change that?
To put it in perspective, any working regional mechanism calls for a strong leading force that is ready to bear certain institutional costs. More importantly, a regional power hub lays down the rules of the game—and then is expected to live by them, thus providing strong incentives for others to cooperate. At the start, it might also be called upon to pump in economic resources almost unilaterally. To an extent, it has to acquiesce to the reality that others would tend to free ride at least for the initial few years, before rewards of cooperation becomes apparent. This process of confidence-building requires political and economic far-sightedness.
In the South Asian context, despite India’s increasing global clout and economic growth, no state would risk their independence by acquiescing to become its client state. Especially, since decolonization and independent statehood is a relatively delayed phenomenon in South Asia, nationalism and sovereignty continue to be dominant domestic agenda as well as a big foreign policy priority. South Asia is thus caught in a quagmire of neither having a strong unipolar system that can lead a regional grouping, nor an equal, balanced multipolarity which could forge a regional alliance for mutual good.
The most successful example of regional cooperation today—the EU—seems hopelessly idealistic. Yet, it was farsighted on part of the French and the Germans to come together to form an economic community that could mitigate their political rivalries by substantially investing in the new European future. In security terms, it helped in the containment of Germany, the policy usually summed up as “containing the elephant in a boat”. For Germany, European integration promised international rehabilitation post-Hitler. The push for regionalism was driven to contain an elephant in a boat of regionalism, which also benefitted the elephant’s global image. More pertinent comparison for India may be with other emerging powers. Unfortunately, in the case of South Asia, regionalism has been perceived by the smaller states as a tool to unleash the dominance of the Indian elephant rather than containing it; which has stunted its progress.
Experiments in regionalism have shown that strategic consensus is important for a common perception of exogenous threats. India and Pakistan were not too keen on the concept of regionalism until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the convergence of their interests; it helped them counter a common threat and strengthen regional security.
But in due course lack of strategic consensus has derailed the process of regionalism. Threat and perception of threat comes more from within the region than outside, which dissuades countries from affirming regional agenda—Indo-Pak contestations over Kashmir, Indo-Pak competition for a stake in Afghanistan, and terrorist attacks in India believed to have emanated from Pakistan are all examples of this kind of threat. For others in the region, India is mostly perceived, not as a security provider, but a threat. Bangladesh and Nepal have their own issues with India. This has been complicated by countries affirming to the “enemy of your enemy is your friend” doctrine and dismissing collective self reliance to ally with powers from outside the region in order to ensure their security and increase bargaining vis-à-vis India. The string of pearls phenomenon that is manifested in China’s footsteps into South Asia mostly via Pakistan but now more assiduously through Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka is indicative of this trend. However, the internal conflicts are so prolific that the China factor, at the end of the day, becomes only a footnote in the region’s chequered history.
In this light, the foundation principles of SAARC have also proved erroneous. As per Article X of the Charter, bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the group’s deliberations. The charter has failed to recognize that it is the bilateral political mistrust that has dwarfed SAARC’s evolution. Of course, intractable conflicts like India-Pakistan could be excluded but other more solvable issues could be discussed on the platform. The SAARC charter clearly states that regional provisions will not substitute bilateral commitments, so it makes more sense to discuss upfront those bilateral commitments that can supersede SAARC provisions.
As proven by South Asian efforts for regionalism, geography and socio-cultural proximity might not be sufficient to bolster trade. Comprised of countries ailing with feeble economic growth, civil wars and internal strife, South Asian states have difficulty shouldering the burdens of statehood let alone pushing for a regional agenda. We have come to a critical juncture: the stark choice is between uniting or perishing. Addressing the vast differences in growth rates; enhancing communication and transport connectivity; and most of all, convivial political engagement will be urgent to promote regionalism. Expectations of very generous concessions from India are unrealistic. As India climbs up the global leadership ladder, it is likely to focus more on its own economic development; India does not want to carry the baggage of South Asian regionalism. So the other states have to realise that they cannot disregard their own responsibilities by blaming India. Rather than waiting for India to push things in the SAARC, these smaller countries should instead be pushing India on vital commitments. At least, the ideational leadership could be provided by other countries.
Talking about India’s responsibilities, understandably, the Indian decision makers are at times caught between two extremes. Whenever they take an active interest in the region, other countries cry out ‘expansionist’. But when India lets things are they are, it is called ‘irresponsible’ and is asked to step up to the plate. However, that cannot be an excuse for status-quo. Peace and prosperity in South Asia is ultimately in India’s interest. India has often looked outside the region for strategic partnerships and favored other regional mechanisms such as BRICS, IBSA, EAS, ASEAN-plus. How long can it overlook South Asia, when the problems it faces like internal security, terrorism, migration, water issues, climate change, etc., are intricately linked to the region?
The writer is a graduate in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
Related story
5 home remedies to stop hair fall
