Generally, reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants is carried out in two different contexts: either it follows a decisive military victory or a political settlement, as is the case in Nepal. In each context, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants is a political as well as technical process, with a common universal objective of changing the identity of ex-combatants from rebels into civilian or state security actors. Concurrently, it calls for economic and social support and interventions. Reintegration and rehabilitation programs often clearly emphasize economic aspects such as providing vocational training and entrepreneur skills, but overlook the social aspects like family and community acceptance, psycho-social support and wider social reconciliation. If rehabilitation of the verified ex-combatants takes place in the near future, what could be the challenges in their transformation from ex-combatants into civilians? Will voluntary retirement without social support ensure their successful adjustment in the society?
Changing the identity of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) combatants to civilians should be a central agenda of the rehabilitation program. However, it is a long-term and complicated process with strong economic as well as social dimensions, and calls for collective effort of ex-combatants, PLA, the families of ex-combatants and communities. Designing and delivering rehabilitation package like vocational skills and entrepreneurship training alone cannot guarantee successful rehabilitation. Many ex-combatants and their families will need long-term psycho-social support as well as facilitation and interventions to ease their relations with the people in the community with whom ex-combatants might have had a difficult relationship during the conflict. Social reconciliation is an imperative of rehabilitation. Lack of social reconciliation means the local community might harbor deep-seated grudges against the ex-combatants as the people who pose constant threat to public security. An environment not conducive to social reconciliation might prompt many ex-combatants not to choose the option of returning to their communities. For example, the majority of the Verified Late Recruits and Minors (VMLRs) have not had a comfortable transition from the cantonments to their communities in the face of deep social stigma and lack of trust between local communities and VMLRs.
Social acceptance of ex-combatants and their interaction and relationship with host communities will play an important role in identity transformation. Without community sensitization and reconciliation, psychological support, life skill development, and re-knitting of the social fabric torn during the conflict, ex-PLA soldiers will have an extremely difficult time to restart their lives as civilians. On the other hand, the communities that will have to receive returnee ex-combatants will be reluctant to accept the ex-fighters and to acknowledge their new identity unless communities benefit from wider rehabilitation program and have some sort of a say in the rehabilitation program. However, these issues have been marginalized in the ongoing debates over army integration and rehabilitation. Lack of deliberation on how to benefit as well as involve receiving communities in the rehabilitation program is a crucial issue that calls for a maximalist approach. A maximalist approach necessitates rehabilitation is linked to the post-conflict economic recovery and developments plan and strategies in ways that benefits all of the conflict affected people and places both individual ex-combatants and local communities at the centre of the rehabilitation program.
Creating job opportunities for rehabilitated ex-combatants is critically important to facilitate the process of new identity formation. However, in this sluggish economic environment, employment opportunities are rare and those available are stiffly competitive. Compared to public sector, the private sector will have a bigger role in creating employment opportunities for the PLA combatants. The private sector might have some reservations in hiring the ex-combatants who had seen it as ‘class enemy’ in the past. Rebuilding the confidence of the private sector through the creation of an enabling environment through the improvement of public security can bolster their willingness to employ ex-combatants as well as other conflict-affected youth.
If the ex-combatants feel the rehabilitation package is not likely to result in economic opportunities, few will take up this option. In case of Nepal where economic opportunities are increasingly dwindling, it will not be surprising if majority of PLA ex-combatants prefer integration over rehabilitation package. It will also be naïve to believe that extra cash will result in creation of livelihood opportunities and effective rehabilitation. Money alone cannot turn someone into a successful entrepreneur. What will an ex-combatant do if he/she spends cash benefits unproductively and, at the end of the day, finds himself stuck in the rut of poverty? This will simply bring ex-combatants to the same socio-economic situation which pushed them into the armed conflict. Likewise, if the voluntarily retired ex-combatants find it difficult to secure their livelihood options and to be accepted into local communities, their remobilization by radical as well as armed group is inevitable. Thus this will be against the idea of ‘positive peace’.
Another option of voluntary retirement of ex-PLA men and women is not akin to retirement of a government official or a security personal. It is a retirement of a trained combatant who has spent a significant portion of his life in warfare and in cantonments. Therefore as soon they come out, their socialization and community acceptance can be a big challenge. Money alone cannot buy trust and establish social relationships; neither can it heal the social stigma that an ex-combatant would face during transitioning to civilian life.
If voluntary retirement is granted without some sort of psycho-social support and community sensitization, the difficulties in social adjustment will most likely alienate the ex-combatants from the wider societal processes. The alienation can have deleterious effect on the society and can easily catalyse into new form of socio-economic grievance. To put it differently, if cash incentives are not accompanied by proper monitoring and follow up as well as wider social reconciliation processes, cash alone will suffice. Perhaps more importantly, if some of these ex-combatants are remobilised by radical/armed groups, cash incentive may only serve as ‘seed money’ for a new wave of violence in the future.
The writer is a PhD candidate at the Center for Peace Studies, University of New England, Australia and can be reached at dbsubedi@hotmail.com
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