The process of mobilization was as follows: The government of Sher Bahadur Deuba made the decision to mobilize the NA following the Solu attack. Subsequently, the National Security Council recommended the mobilization to the king, who was head of state and supreme commander of the army at that time. The royal palace promulgated the ordinance, which was duly endorsed by the parliament later. Thus it was that the NA was mobilized according to the procedures set in the constitution of the time. It is important for the military, as the important instrument of state power, to be mobilized as per constitutional process.
The NA faced various challenges during the 1990s, the gravest of which was the misunderstanding of its deliberate distance from the fighting. Many reasons are given to this supposed reluctance to engage the Maoists, but it was mainly the lack of understanding of the procedures of deployment of a military. Besides this misunderstanding, the NA also faced financial problems, with Bhadrakali (Army HQ) finding it difficult to receive the money it required for proper functioning from the annual budget.
After 1991, for the first half decade or so, the army got sanctioned 15 percent less than what it demanded from the budget. For the next three or four years, it got 20 percent less than what it asked for, and then the figure went down further to 25 percent for the next three years. The salaries, allowances, rations, etc accounted for nearly 80 percent of the budget, and those could hardly be adjusted. And so it was the training and modernization which was affected by the studied decrease in military expenditure. Interestingly, the money set aside for the Nepal Police, with fewer personnel and comparatively lower needs of organizational maintenance, climbed steadily even as that of the NA declined.
Starting in the early 1980s, the NA proposed the formation of division as a fighting formation compared to the brigade-level fighting formations, existing at the time, to meet the international standards. This expansion was spread over two decades to end in the early years of this decade as part of its modernization plan. The newly formed divisions would be deployed in each of the five development regions. Unfortunately, after 1991, this modernization plan was seriously hampered solely due to insufficient financial support.
The army must not receive step-motherly treatment it received in the 1990s from the political class. There is no point in having an army if we do not want to feed, clothe and arm it well. Nor is it useful to have an expensive army if you do not want to use it when the situation demands.
Then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) presented their 40-point demand to the government in February 1996 and went underground when the government didn’t meet their demand to start their insurgency. Initially, the insurgency was active mainly in Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan and Jajarkot of the mid-west. For reasons known to only the politicians of the day, the government deployed only the police force to combat the insurgency. The NA, organized, trained and equipped to fight the insurgents was mobilized only after 8/11, 2002.
BRIGADE TO DIVISION
In September 1997, the army brass had proposed a plan to the government, to launch a division-sized force, the first of its kind in Nepal, in the badly-hit insurgency area. This division was to be commanded by Major General Prajjwalla SJB Rana, who later became the Chief of Army Staff. Somehow, this NA proposal got leaked into the media, and amidst the brouhaha the mid-western front suddenly went quiet. The possible deployment of the NA had brought insurgents activity in the area to a halt!
The divisional staff officers were selected, the brigade commanders, the battalion commanders as well as the company commanders received their operational orders. The troops were earmarked, the operational plan and the logistical plan were formulated, and the training began in earnest. This was the first time that the soldiers started hearing about the Divisional Operational Orders, because till then the highest formation had been a brigade only. Maj Gen Rana was the Inspectorate General of the Army at the time and his office became the Divisional Tactical HQ. All other officers at the Army HQ looked at the Divisional Staff Officers with envy.
There used to be regular briefings for the parliament’s State Affairs Committee at the Army HQ. Even the prime minister, the home minister, the defense and the home secretaries, including the inspector generals of the police force and the officials of the National Investigation Department, used to attend the briefings. Despite the briefings, meetings and preparations, to the army’s dismay, the government decided to deploy only the police force to fight the insurgency. The NA was never allowed to flex its muscles.
Had the government decided to launch the army in Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan and Jajarkot, at that time, as suggested by the army leadership, matters would not have taken the turn they have. The insurgency was still at an infant stage, the rebels were badly organized and poorly-armed. Sending in the police to fight was like fighting the fire with a bucket and water while keeping your modern fire-fighting equipment locked in the shelf.
All the preparedness and training went to naught. With the lack of government interest in its deployment against the insurgency, the NA went back to its normal routine. The troops earmarked to go to the mid-west reverted back to their parent formations. Soldiers with training to fight an insurgency were deployed instead to palace duty, national parks, and airport duty. The army had stood ready for deployment, and even today it faces criticism for having fiddled while the country caught fire. It was the politicians in command of the state who fiddled.
DON’T BE EMBARRASSED!
Whether we need the army or not is an important question that needs a separate article, but the decade of insurgency has already provided the answer. The appropriate question is: What should be the proper size of the army? There are several factors which dictates the size of Nepal’s national army, factors such as vital national interests that need guarding (the border, national parks, installations), development works, the terrain, the law and order situation, disaster relief operations, United Nations peace support operations, and so on.
With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, there is an apparent peace in the country. ‘Apparent’ because many parties and groups have decided to arm themselves to the teeth, leading to more murders, kidnappings and extortions. The situation in the Tarai and the eastern hills is hardly encouraging. The government must take positive steps to deter the attacking of police posts and the looting of arms by unlawful armed elements.
Sri Lanka raised the strength of its army from 100,000 to 200,000 in order to subdue the LTTE. Later, the army commander said he needed nearly 300,000 troops to maintain peace. A small force of the US and the Coalition Forces defeated the much bigger Iraqi army, but more ground troops were required to maintain peace afterwards. Thus the apparent peace in the country must not lead to a hasty decrease of the size of Nepal’s military. The security situation has to be properly analyzed.
Upkeep of the army is of course a costly affair, and so it is important not to have an army larger in size than the above-mentioned factors dictate. However, once the number is finalized, the polity must support the NA financially as well as morally. The army must not receive step-motherly treatment it received in the 1990s from the political class. There is no point in having an army if we do not want to feed, clothe and arm it well. Nor is it useful to have an expensive army if you do not want to use it when the situation demands.
France is an exemplary republic, but it was one of the first to utilize military pomp to highlight their national prowess. The British public still enjoys Trooping of the Colors during their queen’s birthday. Our neighbors all parade their military for the world to watch, and the rivals to quiver. Why should Nepal be embarrassed of its soldiers, who are as committed to the motherland as every other politician, activist, lawyer, teacher or bureaucrat?
There is no doubt that Nepal needs an army because of the various challenges it faces. So let us give it enough of a budget to clothe it, feed it, equip it, properly accommodate it, and arm it. And there should be no compromise in recruitment standards just to please some political party. For its part, the NA will train properly, build up its motivation levels, and remain well-disciplined under civilian leadership. Beyond the cloud of confusion and prejudiced opinion, the soldiers of Nepal are ready to play their role for any future task that might be placed on their path.
(Writer is former spokesperson of Nepal Army.)
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