Agreement no 3 of the 12-point agreement of Nov 22, 2005 reads "An understanding has been made to keep the Maoists armed force and the Royal Army under the United Nations or a reliable international supervision during the process of the election of constituent assembly after the end of the autocratic monarchy, to accomplish the election in a free and fair manner."
Article 21 of The Code of Conduct for Ceasefire agreed upon between the Government of Nepal and the then CPN (Maoist) on May 25, 2006 reads " Monitor of ceasefire by national and international monitoring teams shall be caused to be done on the basis of mutual agreement between both parties." Letters from PM Girija Prasad Koirala and Pushpa Kamal Dahal to UN Secretary General, dated Aug 9, 2006 reads "…requests the United Nations to provide its assistance as follows with a view to creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA) and the entire peace process." One of the requests is to "management of arms and armed personnel of both sides".
Based on these documents, Resolution 1740 (2007) established UNMIN with a mandate to: Monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel; assist in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements; and provide technical assistance to the Election Commission in the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere.
The above mentioned documents point to the necessity for a UN monitoring team to be established with the prime responsibility to monitor that all signatories to the peace process adhere by the agreed upon documents. The documents further point out that the main intent for monitoring would be limited till the election of the CA. The letters from the PM and Dahal start to deviate from the original spirit of the 12-point agreement by including the phrase "and the entire peace process." The UN mandate largely ignores the initial time restrictive spirit of the 12 point agreements. Moreover,the establishment process of the UNMIN had a critical flaw in giving it an open mandate and not reflecting the initial spirit of the 12-point agreement.
Now, let’s look at the UN mission’s conduct. And for that let me quote from the reports by European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) on Nepal’s Constituent Assembly election. According to the report, "The overall environment for the election, however, did not fully meet international standards in some areas including restrictions to the right of freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of expression…." "The campaign environment was tense across the country and there were numerous incidents of violence involving political parties. In this respect, a general climate of fear and intimidation prevailed in many parts of the country during the campaign period…" On human rights issue, the report states, "Human rights situation in many parts of Nepal remains highly problematic. There are frequent violations of human rights including incidents of extortion, excessive use of force and intimidation. In this regard, during the campaign period political parties and candidates did not always enjoy the full rights afforded by the principles of freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of expression due to lack of law and order and poor security environment across much of the country. There were numerous incidents of violence and a significant number of clashes between supporters of political parties as well as killings. The campaign environment has been characterized by a high degree of tension leading to campaign activities being restricted in some areas. All these incidents have contributed to a general atmosphere of fear and intimidation and at times seriously undermined the right to campaign freely. According to EUEOM observers there were complaints of widespread voter intimidation and some attempts at vote buying by political parties….."
The report further states, “The role played by party agents and party volunteers went beyond acceptable standards and at times their influence was too great at polling stations. There were also incidents of minors being allowed to vote and voter impersonation that were not adequately identified by polling officials and this problem was compounded by the poor quality of the voter register…."
A Statement by SRSG Ian Martin on May 27, 2008 reads " It (UNMIN) does not in any way control or even observe access to and from the cantonments, nor can it monitor the conduct of 20,000-odd personnel at Maoist cantonment sites and 96,000-odd Nepal Army personnel…"
Koirala told the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon "It should be the bounden duty of the UNMIN to manage the arms and the Maoists combatants in cantonments, however, the UNMIN apparently failed in discharging its assigned duties in Nepal... Surely, some how or the other the UNMIN must be held responsible in the Himalayan lapse that it was by all means..." when the latter paid a courtesy call on him on Nov 1, 2008.
Therefore, based on these observations one can safely say that, although the UNMIN arrived in Nepal on a very high note, with greatest of expectations, it failed to live up to the initial euphoria. It did have some positive influences. At least one side to the agreements abided by the peace agreements. The Nepal Army was confined to barracks. The Maoists too had to present a false facade of abiding by the peace. It provided a face saving exit for the Maoists from their senseless armed struggle against the state. Overall, it would be safe to deduct that the establishment of UNMIN was not as per the spirits of the peace agreements and that the UNMIN failed to implement its mandated tasks.
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