King Prithvi Narayan Shah's famous 'yam between two boulders' quote reflects the great understanding of Nepal's security dilemma, even as far back as 18th century. This has remained a cornerstone of Nepal's foreign policy till date. Shah understood well that Nepal would always remain insecure vis-à-vis its powerful neighbors, that is, India and China, and urged to keep refining, adapting and adjusting Nepal's foreign policy in order to deal with its powerful regional neighbors.However, successive regimes in Nepal have looked to build ties with its powerful neighbors to bolster their own hold on power rather than to maintain the difficult balancing act outlined by Prithvi Narayan. This trend will continue in the foreseeable future, unless Nepal as a nation is ready to conduct its foreign policy as per the imperatives of 21st century dominated by the rise of India and China.
Nepal's foreign policy has been continuously operated more or less in a similar vein at least for the past two centuries. As a small and landlocked country, Nepal's foreign policy emphasizes maintaining sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the state. However, it has been challenged over its weak domestic structures which have been influenced by regional neighbors as is very much evident from the current political crisis.
Nepal's successive regimes have focused more on securing their own regime rather than focusing on balancing internal and external relations. During the Rana rule, Rana rulers established a good relationship with British India by acknowledging British Empire as the pre-eminent power in the region. This policy continued till the departure of the British from the subcontinent in 1947. While India was passing through its post-independence political transition, the Ranas established diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries to counterbalance India, which wanted Ranas to keep pace with political changes in the region (in other words, bring about political reforms) and seek international recognition.
During the Panchayat regime any threat to the monarchy was considered a threat to country's sovereignty and vice-versa. Thus survival of the monarchy became synonymous with state security. As a result, Nepal's foreign policy was designed to protect its territorial integrity by maintaining a balance between India and China, adherence to UN principles and being part of regional organizations. Its foreign policy was also especially formulated to mobilize international support and recognition with the purpose of fulfilling its political and economic requirements.
Two important events dominate foreign policy of the Panchayat period. First, under King Mahendra Nepal's foreign policy took a new turn as he started to become increasingly assertive. He deviated from his father's India-dependent policy and formulated an independent foreign policy by diversifying Nepal's relationship with other countries. King Mahendra recognized that Nepal's identity is dependent upon the calculated maximization of the unique attributes that distinguish the country from both of its giant neighbors. He saw solution to Nepal's identity crisis in Nepalism (a political system that differs in theory and practice from both Chinese and Indian), and non-alignment and diversification policies.
Second, during King Birendra's regime, regional security environment became increasingly tensed especially with annexation of Sikkim by India. To address this, he advocated principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He not only articulated it at the UN and other international forums but went one step ahead by declaring Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZoP) in 1975. A major objective of ZoP proposal was to neutralize India's influence in Nepal. The ZoP remained a major objective of Nepal's foreign policy till the establishment of multi-party democracy in 1990. But it did not figure prominently in our foreign policy articulation because India ignored it altogether.
Nepal's foreign policy acquired a new shape with promulgation of constitution in 1990. Its relations with India significantly improved. The democratically elected governments focused more on maintaining a balanced relation with both India and China. Similarly, Nepal brought democratization in its foreign policy. However, the successive democratic regimes of the period compromised with the Indian interest as is evident from various water treaties signed during this period which was inimical for Nepal's national interest.
During the period of political transition (2006-2015), Nepal's successive transitional governments have failed to maintain difficult balancing act as evident from Nepal's inability to successfully institutionalize its Federal Constitution, especially demarcations of state boundaries. Nepali politicians failed to understand that both India and China have pursued their policy regarding Nepal, not on the consideration of any particular political system or regime, but based purely on their own interests.
Learning lessons from the past, Nepal needs to adapt and readjust its foreign policy as suggested by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, keeping our geo-strategic reality in mind. Had he been alive, he would perhaps have articulated 'trilateral cooperation between Nepal, India and China' as foreign policy imperative of 21st century.
Nepal's interest is twofold in adopting this foreign policy approach. First, since the days of the monarchy Nepal has tried to follow equidistance policy, which is aimed more at distancing itself from India. The policy of equidistance, signing of Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in 1960 and Zone of Peace proposal were all aimed at balancing India.
On the other hand India does not want to lose Nepal from its 'sphere of influence' considering its geo-strategic location. This is one of the reasons why India continues to maintain an open border, and has a special relationship under Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. The compulsion of geography is such that Nepal's relations with India will remain close and interdependent. Second, Nepal needs to clearly spell out that trilateral policy is a political proposition, couched in economic and security logic. From the Indian perspective, it does not make strategic sense to involve China in a trilateral mechanism at the cost of its pre-eminent position in Nepal. The rationale for this lies in the fact that the proposition of the trilateral is not economic, but has strategic underpinnings.
If Nepal wants India to choose trilateral engagement, it will need to look at its special relationship embodied in 1950's treaty. The recently formed Eminent Personality Group should logically discuss this proposal to manage strategic rivalry of India and China based on our historical reality.
The proposal of trilateral strategic partnership should be pursued. We need to learn lessons from the disadvantage of attuning Nepal's foreign policy towards one particular state. It's time for us to learn how to play this game of maintaining difficult balancing act vis-à-vis our giant neighbors.
The author is an Assistant Professor at Kathmandu School of Law and co-editor of the book Geo-Strategic Challenges to Nepal's Foreign Policy and Way Forward (2015)
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