Whenever a large storage hydropower development is mooted, the first question that comes up for discussion concerns the downstream benefits and how one should monetize such benefits. But large hydro projects meant exclusively for exports have many components besides downstream benefits. One question raised time and again is why our neighbor should benefit from the hydropower that we produce. It is just like Germans asking why Americans should be riding BMWs that their company produces; but the Germans don’t ask such questions.
The ill-fated West-Seti Hydropower Project brought about a similar, though predictable, debate. Even after 14 years of trying, investors were unable to raise money from the financial markets. Eventually, their license was revoked. At one time, West-Seti appeared to be taking off, although there seemed to be little progress on the ground. Project offices were smashed and some officers beaten up.
There was a flurry of NGO activity around the proposed dam site telling people how bad the project was for the area. With West-Seti gone, no one visits the area and Nepali people continue to live in darkness. Now, local leaders and some people living in the area want the Project to be completed by the government, apparently by Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA).
Some 150 kilometers west of the proposed West-Seti dam site, a hydro project about one-thirtieth the size of West-Seti has been under construction for the last six years. Yet it’s nowhere near completion. It might be another year (or two) for the project starts generating electricity. This is the pace of NEA infrastructure projects. Even if the government were to start the project now (assuming that close to US $2 billion of financing is easily available from friendly countries), a person my age will certainly not get to see it generating electricity in our lifetime.
Likewise, Arun III was aborted 18 years ago just when the construction was about to start. As of today, it’s still uncertain when construction work on the project will begin. Those opposing Arun III for various reasons, purportedly for the country’s good, closed their NGO business no sooner than the World Bank headquarters issued a communiqué stating that it is finally withdrawing its aid commitment to Arun.
Kaligandaki would have gone down the same road if community leaders of Sri Krishna Gandaki VDC of Syangja district had not driven away the Kathmandu-based NGO activists. One can only imagine the situation of load-shedding today if Kaligandaki had gone Arun’s way.
Not just hydropower projects, other large-scale endeavors have had to face similar problems. Take the Melamchi Drinking Water Project. After early hiccups, the World Bank, the project’s major co-financier, was the first to drop out, followed hot on the heels by Swedish Development Agency; the Norwegians too opted out. Asian Development Bank (ADB) kept its promise and stayed the course in spite of continued threats in project site and frequent written complaints by Nepali NGOs to Bank’s Accountability Unit.
According to these NGOs, by pursuing Melamchi Project, ADB was doing great injustice to the people of Melamchi area. Now, it has been 12 years since the ADB first approved the loan to Melamchi. The project is still struggling and the costs incurred due to the inordinate delays will ultimately have to be borne by Nepali people.
As a nation we are yet to develop a consensus on the best use of our enormous water potential. Ironically, we seem to prefer spending long hours every day without electricity. While we are still in a state of confusion, a study commissioned by the World Bank challenges—with evidence—most of the long-held beliefs on Himalayan watershed and river systems. The yet to be made public report has been shared in bits and pieces with a few key people in the region. Here are a few of its highlights.
According to the report, one, high dam in any of the river basins does not reduce flood risk downstream. Two, high dam and the resultant regulated water flow do not add much value to irrigation downstream either. Three, high dams do not control sedimentation. Four, hydropower is most significant benefit that any high dam can provide.
The report graphically shows that none of the worst floods in Bihar were the result of increased water flows in Koshi basin. Upstream water storage, no matter how tall a dam, would not prevent the recurring floods in the plains. There has to be an entirely different strategy for flood management through proper drainage systems, land zoning and most important of all proper early warning system to minimize human tragedy. This is where the cooperation of all the countries in the Ganges basin is necessary. To be precise, if we want to minimize human tragedy then Ganges water cannot just be a bilateral issue.
The report concludes that the annual precipitation in the Ganges basin is about 1,200 billion cubic- meter (BCM), of which Ganges runoff is only 500 BCM. Most of the rainwater seeps into the ground making underground water a viable and cheaper option for irrigation-on-demand in the plains.
Interestingly, most of all possible dams in the Ganges river systems (including the 23 large ones) can hold no more than 18 percent of the annual flow. This is paltry compared to what goes into recharging the underground water. All past debates focused on the likely downstream benefits, but new data indicates that maximum benefits are “under-stream”!
If we are to believe the WB report then hydropower development is the only significant benefit that Ganges water can provide. This is the benefit Nepal is losing out on by allowing drainage in the Bay of Bengal even as we continue to debate the upstream-downstream benefits and whether or not Nepal should export power.
rameshorek@gmail.com
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