There are, at least, three interpretations as to why Dahal embraced Mohan Baidya, who believes that the whole peace process is a farce and wants the party to go for a revolt, and further alienated Baburam Bhattarai, who was pushing for a moderate line of peace and constitution.
First, not only have Dahal’s attempts to make up with India failed but India also continues to ignore his efforts, leaving him deeply resentful. Just before the Palungtar plenum, Dahal had said, in an interview with a national daily, that this party would pass a political line for peace and constitution and also that he would visit New Delhi after the plenum. He had even argued that he wanted the plenum to adopt a proposal for peace and constitution before his India visit so that people would not interpret it as adopted under Indian pressure.
Before the plenum, Dahal privately shared the optimism that his party’s effort to make up with India was paying off. “Our relationship with India is improving surprisingly fast,” he told one Western diplomat. But he had also conceded that he was talking to Delhi through “agency” people. And therein lies the rub -- each time he met the intelligence guys, be it in London or Hong Kong or Singapore, they only had more questions to ask. The fault lies with Dahal. With intelligence people information flows only one way—they are meant to gather, not give, information. He should have gotten that pretty much earlier.
The mood in New Delhi about the Maoists is still grumpy. When UN Under Secretary-General B Lynn Pascoe descended on New Delhi last month to gauge the Indian mood before coming to Kathmandu, he did not feel encouraged. “They argued that the Maoists were the main problem to concluding the peace process and writing the constitution,” said a senior UN official, adding, “Some people in New Delhi think the Maoists are the only problem.”
The second interpretation is that Dahal took the decision under enormous personal pressure, as time was running out for him.
At home, the benefit of the doubt that Dahal enjoyed for the last few years had disappeared. No one was willing any longer to give him that benefit. The NC and UML wanted action, not promises, toward completing the peace process.
The environment within his party was becoming increasingly hostile. Baidya, completely resentful about the peace process and constitution writing, was becoming more and more impatient and wanted Dahal to lead the revolt. Bhattarai, with whom Dahal´s relationship has sourced since the Khanna garment episode, has cultivated his own party line since then.
Dahal is still closer to Bhattarai in terms of political line but Baidya is stronger in the party. Moreover, if the political line of peace and constitution prevails, and the party’s radicalism is softened or shunned altogether, Bhattarai would sooner or later challenge Dahal’s leadership.
With Baidya, such a challenge is less likely to materialize; he is ideological to his bones, but lacks charisma and leadership qualities and is, therefore, less ambitious.
Dahal will now have to risk his life to avoid a revolt and strike a deal for peace and constitution. And if he succeeds in doing so, the Baidya faction is likely to split the party.
The third interpretation is that Dahal decided to tie up with Baidya for two reasons: One, to strengthen his bargaining position with the political parties and India, and second to keep the radical elements in his party from drifting away. If he had decided to go for peace and constitution, goes the argument, the mainstream parties would then have taken Dahal for granted and would be less willing to compromise on key issues that matter to the Maoists. Second, if he had not exhorted revolt, there was a possibility that the Baidya faction would stage a revolt within the party itself.
Where will the Maoist party go from here?
Whatever decision Dahal eventually takes — whether to go for a revolt or for peace and constitution—there is a diminishing possibility that the Maoist party will remain united and that the three leaders will stick together.
The Baidya faction, already suspicious that Dahal might eventually compromise for peace and constitution, as he has compromised on occasions in the past, will do everything possible to block a deal with the mainstream parties. The radical left, often sanctimonious and self-righteous, only cares about the purity of its ideology and hates any sort of pragmatism, which it calls revisionism. Dahal will now have to risk his life to avoid a revolt and strike a deal for peace and constitution. And if he succeeds in doing so, the Baidya faction is likely to split the party.
If Dahal decides to push for a revolt, knowing that it will bring disaster to both his party and the country, the question that arises is what will the Bhattarai faction do? Bhattarai has asserted in private conversations that there was no way a revolt would succeed in present-day Nepal — the domestic power balance and the regional and international environment are heavily tilted against it. The Bhattarai faction could, therefore, disassociate itself from the party in the run up to a revolt or at a critical point when defeat stalks the revolt.
Either way the Maoist party seems headed for implosion as it is impossible to imagine a situation where Dahal, Baidya and Bhattarai can stay together and work for a common cause. This will be bad for the party, and for a young democracy, especially when you think of the enormous contribution that the Maoist party can make for the progressive, democratic transformation of Nepal.
ameetdhakal@gmail.com
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