Baidya was also instrumental in getting through the highly controversial resolution of ‘Prachandapath’ (PKDism) during the Maoist rebellion that put PKD on a par with authorities like Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. However, the association that stood the test of time from CPN-Mashal days to Ekata Kendra to CPN-Maoist to the present UCPN-M era is taking its last breath now that PKD seems to have made up his mind, albeit cautiously, to abandon the line of revolt, something Baidya terms as surrender and revisionism.
Born in Pyuthan in a middle class Brahmin family of Pokharels (Baidya is not his real surname and Kiran is his given name by the party- a common practice among hard-line communists), the enigmatic former school teacher with an introvert nature enjoys the allegiance of a considerable segment of the party. He believes that the objective, strategies and tactics of “people’s war” days should not be changed; hence, he opposes Dr Baburam Bhattarai’s ‘peace and constitution’ line, which has been recently adopted by the party. Even Mohan Bikram Singh, the veteran communist leader, and equally dogmatic one, describes Baidya as someone ‘unable to objectively analyze the situation and formulate pragmatic/timely strategies.’
In fact, Baidya very much personifies a classical communist mindset. He lives in a make-belief world of his own and blames leaders of respective communist regimes, and not its doctrinal deficiencies, for everything that went wrong with global communism during last two decades; he believes that communism is just too flawless to fail! That is why he attributes his party’s success to the superiority and correctness of its ideology, and not to the shortcomings of the socioeconomic order or weaknesses of its opponents. He holds the view that texts of Marx, Lenin and Mao are to be applied literally, without modifications. He also presumes that communists can achieve their goal only through violent struggle, and not by peaceful means. However divorced from reality, his views and interpretations had endowed his followers with inspiration and guidance.
If hard-line communism has thrived in this country, it is not without reasons. Except one, that is political oppression, all conventional conditions that may breed ultra-left extremism such as poverty, hardships, unemployment, lack of education, bad governance, corruption, political instability, economic disparity and social exclusion that continued to exist even after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Other third world countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Peru, succeeded in quelling similar insurgence through a coordinated approach of armed action, rapid economic development and political reforms.
In Nepal, army mobilization was late and short-lived and was not backed by political consensus. Everything from political instability and dirty power games of politicians to the rugged mountainous terrains shielded with forests and scattered settlements made it extremely difficult for them to trace and fight the guerillas. The apathy of Nepali Congress, which ruled during most of the insurgency period, toward socio-economic change and its intra-party fights, corruption, lackluster performances and weak organizational capabilities, rendered it unable to politically counter the rebellion. Similarly, police operations devoid of political prudence and adequate intelligence like Kilo-Shera-2 and Operation Romeo carried in the rebel strongholds of Rukum and Rolpa during the initial phase only fuelled the insurgency. Also, the secret patronage the Maoists received from India and the then king Birendra, for whatever reason, helped them grow stronger.
While India provided them sanctuary during the insurgence, the late King vetoed against the cabinet proposal to mobilize army against them. And finally, the gradual shift of CPN-UML, the communist mainstream of the country, from communism to social democracy practiced without adequate deliberation, provided Maoists with large numbers of hard-line cadres who, dissatisfied with the party’s ‘ideological deviation’ were looking for their ‘true’ home to join.
The underground Maoists were the principal force to make the uprising of 2006 a success. With their superiority in the might of money, muscle and militancy over their rivals and the advantage of having a private army, they also emerged as the largest single party in the constituent assembly (CA) polls that followed. However, ideological shortcomings and violence aside, their newfound weaknesses that include bitter intra-party fights and corruption have shrunk their popularity and organizational base in recent times.
So far PKD, the uncharacteristically shrewd revolutionary-turned-pragmatist, has, by hook or by crook, impeded Baidya’s faction from reverting to revolt. But with the expiry date of CA extended for the last time drawing close, he has only two choices left- either to align himself with Bhattarai and embrace peace even if that may split the party or to follow Baidya’s line of revolt and let the House dissolve without writing the constitution and concluding the peace process. He can no longer make false promises and fool both.
In hindsight, Baidya was never happy with any of the peace endeavors his party agreed to undertake. He was arrested in Siliguri by the Indian police for ‘possession of firearms’ on 30 March 2004, a time when the Indian brokered 12-points accord to be signed later between the seven party alliance and the Maoists was being shaped. Shortly before, CP Gajurel, another hard-line leader, was arrested in Chennai on charges of passport irregularities. That both remained in Indian jails until the party was all set to sign the comprehensive peace accord of 2006 cannot be mere coincidences. The two even accuse PKD of having collaborated with the Indians in nabbing them lest they would oppose the change of course.
During the initial stages of the peace-building, Baidya could not garner much support for his views but he steadily pursued his line. The near isolation of the Maoists in national politics, some thrust upon them by both internal and external forces but much of which was self-inflicted, and the compromises they have to make during last few years provided Baidya with opportunities to justify his line. In each successive plenum of the party from Balaju to Kharipati to Palungtar, he succeeded in furthering his cause. Whether or not PKD is willing and/or capable to handle Baidya so that the course of peace and constitution is carried through is difficult to say.
Even with his Machiavellian skills PKD will find Baidya a force to reckon with, now as well as in the coming general assembly of the party, whenever it is held. That is why those who held PKD responsible for the stalled peace process and disdained him have suddenly started to pray for his success in his rivalry with Baidya.
Fellow singers pay tribute to late Baidya