On January 15, 2026, senior leader Gagan Kumar Thapa was elected President of the Nepali Congress unopposed during the party’s second Special General Convention held at Bhrikutimandap in Kathmandu. The Special General Convention was convened with the backing of over 60 percent of general convention delegates. Election Committee Coordinator Sitaram KC announced the results at 12.30 am. Along with Thapa, the convention unanimously elected other office bearers including Vice Presidents Bishwa Prakash Sharma and Pushpa Bhusal, and General Secretaries Guru Raj Ghimire and Pradip Paudel. Several Joint General Secretaries were elected under cluster based representation.
The convention followed a political deadlock after talks with then Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba failed. Earlier, the party’s Central Committee had suspended Thapa, Sharma and Joint General Secretary Farmullah Mansur. Despite disciplinary action, the Special General Convention proceeded to elect a new party leadership.
On January 16, 2026, the Election Commission formally recognised Gagan Kumar Thapa as President of the Nepali Congress and updated its records with the details of the office bearers elected from the Special General Convention, concluding that the event was conducted in accordance with the law and the party statute. Acting Chief Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari stated that the commission relied on three grounds for its decision. First, the party statute allows 40 percent of general convention delegates to demand a Special General Convention. Second, the statute establishes general convention delegates as the supreme authority of the party, making their decisions binding. Third, there was no recorded dissent over the demand for a Special General Convention.
With this decision, all resolutions passed between January 11 and 14 gained legal recognition. The recognition of Thapa’s faction transformed an internal dispute into an institutional schism, reviving memories of party splits in 1953 and 2002.
The decision did not resolve the crisis. Instead, it formalised a split, with Sher Bahadur Deuba and his supporters forming a rival faction. They rejected the legitimacy of the Special General Convention, calling it unconstitutional and coercive. Deuba maintained that he remained the legitimate president elected by the 14th General Convention and accused the Thapa camp of engineering a party takeover through institutional manipulation.
Behind the inattention
Since mid January 2026, the Deuba faction has pursued legal challenges against the Election Commission while mobilising supporters through parallel meetings and threats of street agitation. This created a situation of dual authority within the party, affecting electoral coherence and political stability ahead of the March 2026 elections.
Historically, the Nepali Congress experienced major splits in 1952–53 due to leadership disputes between B P Koirala and Matrika Prasad Koirala, and again in 2002 during the Maoist insurgency when Deuba dissolved the House of Representatives and was expelled from the party. His faction later reunited with the party in 2007.
The January 2026 split represents a convergence of generational revolt, institutional decay, and contested geopolitical narratives. Long term factional rivalry, leadership authoritarianism, crisis mismanagement, and erosion of internal democracy contributed to the crisis.
Public trust had already weakened due to unstable coalitions and governance failures. The Gen Z uprising of September 2025 accelerated this decline. Protests against corruption and censorship toppled the K P Sharma Oli government. The Nepali Congress emerged divided and weakened.
Gagan Thapa became the symbolic face of reform, appealing to urban and educated voters with a discourse focused on accountability and institutional reform. Critics alleged his rise was externally engineered, citing past WikiLeaks references and foreign funded democracy programs. These claims remain contested, with no evidence of organisational control linking Thapa to the Gen Z movement.
The period ahead remains fragile. A Thapa led Nepali Congress seeks to capitalise on youth support, while Deuba’s camp challenges legitimacy through courts and protests. Prolonged litigation risks paralysing the party and deepening systemic instability.
The Gen Z protests of September 8 and 9, 2025 were the most violent in recent Nepali history. Triggered by a social media ban, protests escalated into nationwide unrest. At least 76 people were killed and over 2,100 injured. Prime Minister Oli resigned, the army intervened, and former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in as interim prime minister. Elections were scheduled for March 5, 2026.
Despite initial optimism, the interim government faced deep legitimacy deficits. Key protest demands remain unmet, including accountability for police violence, anti corruption prosecutions, legal safeguards against digital shutdowns, youth employment reforms, and comprehensive compensation for victims.
In January 2026, Netra Bikram Chand and Gen Z leaders agreed to cooperate in a joint political movement. Earlier, in March 2025, pro monarchy violence in Kathmandu highlighted further instability, including attacks on media houses and public institutions.
Nepal recorded zero terrorism related fatalities through 2025, continuing a trend since 2021. However, concerns remain over radical Islamist groups, foreign funding, and Nepal’s placement on the Financial Action Task Force grey list in February 2025.
Nepal’s central challenge remains restoring democratic legitimacy, rebuilding trust, and preventing chronic instability. The March 2026 elections will test whether disruptive public energy can be channelled into democratic renewal or whether the cycle of instability will persist.
The author is Research Associate at Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India
