Although at the outset China's move appears to have been motivated with the intent to save its all-weather friend, Pakistan, from an awkward moment in the international body, and possible economic and diplomatic repercussions for freeing a leader of a terrorist group, there is more to it. First, China wants to downplay India's role in international arenas such as the UN. And there is also a clear signal to India that despite the high-level visits, lofty diplomatic rhetoric and increasing trade volume between the two countries, China still thinks of India as an adversary, and is keeping all its options open against India in case of disputes, whether diplomatic or military.The Chinese move can also be seen as embarrassing to Indian PM Narendra Modi whose international popularity is on the rise as evident from the success of the International Yoga Day, celebrated with much enthusiasm all over. By snubbing India's legitimate security concerns, the Chinese are downplaying the recent visit by Modi to Beijing by making him lose face (mian zi)—in Chinese culture, losing face is quite embarrassing. To make someone lose face is to make him/her feel worthless—and give his opponents at home and abroad a reason to criticize his foreign policy. Could it be that downplaying India's role internationally is a way for the Chinese to prove that it is the only worthy Asian power and India does not need to be taken seriously?
Will India swallow the humiliation, just like it has done many times in the past? The answer is certainly no because it has already initiated moves to emerge as a regional leader and to lessen the Chinese influence in the region. India realizes that China's actions across Asia is encouraging multiple alliances and in each alliance India is a key player, whether the emerging alliance between the US, India and Japan in the Indian Ocean region or a major balancer in the dispute between the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
China's newfound penchant for projecting its power in the neighborhood as a way to portray the ruling Chinese Communist party as a strong nationalist force has been counterproductive for its own security interests. (It is not uncommon for undemocratic regimes to try to gain legitimacy by playing the nationalist card. China did so in the past too, but then, it brilliantly managed nationalism at home with pragmatism abroad.) For example, even those countries in South East Asia that celebrated China's growth in the past and saw its rise as a way to limit Japan's influence in the region are now wary of it and want to see the continued presence of the US and India's greater role in the region. Surprisingly enough, South East Asian countries that suffered due to Japanese invasion during the Second World War are the ones that are supporting, some overtly, some covertly, Japan's call for collective security and military/naval modernization.
Furthermore, India's recent successful cross border military actions in Myanmar on June 9 to destroy the camps of terrorist/secessionist groups has projected a new image of India to the world—that it will not remain quiet when its security interests are threatened. And China naturally fears an India that is confident. Also, it is worth mentioning that losing Myanmar to the West and India is something China is yet to come to grips with because it has affected its strategy of "two oceans for development" and finding an alternative to the Malacca straits to ensure its energy supply in case hostilities break out in the region.
Also, the recent signing of a motor-vehicle agreement between India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal has been a major blow to China's South Asia strategy. The BBIN agreement between the four members of SAARC can rightly be seen as a first step toward developing an economic (and strategic) alliance. This effectively closes the fronts in India's immediate neighborhood that China hoped to exploit in case of war with India and forestalls China's greater role in SAARC. In the days ahead, if India plays its card well, BBIN will prove more important to regional integration and development (and most likely regional security) than SAARC has ever been. These are the factors behind China's move in the UN in favor of Pakistan.
All these events transpiring across Asia has implications for Nepal. We can no longer hope to be served by the diplomatic rhetoric of equidistance and equiproximity. It is already too late to overhaul our foreign policy. We mistakenly believe we need to be pro-Nepal and not pro-China or pro-India, but the situation we find ourselves in today requires us to clearly choose a side (or a development partner, if you will). Non-alignment and five points of peaceful coexistence all sound good in rhetoric; in real terms it means nothing in today's world.
Therefore, if we hope to develop and be treated with respect, Nepal needs to take bold initiatives and make its preferences clear. Neutrality is not a luxury we can afford in the emerging cold war in Asia, and our best interests are served only when we align ourselves with either of the Asian powers. History shows that all countries that developed in the last 60 years aligned themselves with a superpower; even China aligned with the US in the 1970s for its economic growth and military modernization. As a Chinese saying goes, standing on two boats at once (jiao ta liang tiao chuan) doesn't take you anywhere; we need to choose our boat for the journey ahead. We can only hope that our leaders will make the right choice.
trailokyaa@yahoo.com
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