But these issues alone do not explain why India and China are increasingly jockeying for influence in Nepal. There was Tibet in the past too, and Islamic militancy is nothing new, though India feels its growing intensity. And Nepal has always cooperated swiftly with China and India on both of these issues.
Any suspected militant from a third country or even Naga rebel leaders landing at Tribhuwan International Airport (TIA) are promptly apprehended and swiftly and secretly handed over to the Indian authorities. And Tibetan refugees crossing the border into Nepal and Tibetan activists living in Kathmandu have been increasingly feeling the wrath of the Nepali state lately, especially post-Beijing Olympics. Nepal hasn´t, cannot and will not act against Indian and Chinese core security interests within its borders.
Why, then, have the Indians and Chinese felt less assured with Kathmandu lately and stepped up their activities? Another unexciting explanation offered is that with the monarchy gone, China feels less confident about its interests being safeguarded in Nepal and is, therefore, busy cultivating new loyalties.
Maybe so. But that misses two broader points.
First, since the advent of the multiparty system in Nepal in 1990, it was the political parties-- mainly NC and UML-- and not the monarchy, which addressed Chinese concerns in this country. And they did a pretty good job of reassuring Beijing. The late Girija Prasad Koirala, immediately after becoming prime minister in 1992, sent his personal secretary, Hari Sharma, to Dharmashala in India to deliver a somber message to the Dalai Lama: Though we are good friends and I sympathize with you at a personal level, as prime minister of Nepal I cannot help you in any way, and Nepal will not allow her land to be used against China. Maybe the language wasn´t this direct, but the message was clear.
Second, the perception that monarchy was Beijing´s best ally in safeguarding Chinese interests in Nepal has been overdone, and proven wrong historically. Yes, the monarchy once sent Indian soldiers stationed on the Nepal-China border packing, but more recently, every time the monarchy has tried to play the China card it has boomeranged. King Birendra´s attempt to purchase anti-aircraft weapons from China precipitated an Indian economic blockade in 1989 and the ensuing popular political movement in 1990 cost the monarchy its absolute rule.
Gyanendra foolishly tried to play the China card against India by proposing China’s membership of SAARC at the SAARC Summit in Bangladesh in 2005. In fury, India pulled the plug on the monarchy and China could not save Gyanendra, even if it had wanted, from being swept away by Jana Andolan II.
China actually knew the limitations of monarchy and it sent a high-level emissary to Kathamndu during Jana Andolan II, asking Gyanendra to mend his fences with the political parties. Perhaps Gyanendra had gone too far, and perhaps the advice also came too late.
China understands the limits of its influence in Kathmandu and India´s primacy here because of political, historical, cultural and geographical realities. It´s for that reason that Beijing has advised Pushpa Kamal Dahal, including during his latest visit to the northern neighbor, to improve his ties with New Delhi.
Besides their traditional security interests in Nepal, what explains growing Chinese and Indian assertiveness in Nepal is this: Changing geopolitical dynamics in the region and the growing and competing interests of Indian and Chinese business firms in Nepal.
IT´S THE GEOPOLITICS, STUPID!
With significant weakening of relative US power and resurgence of China and India as economic powerhouses, the world is set for geopolitical realignment.
When then US President Richard Nixon reached out to China in the early 1970s, setting aside the ghost of the Korean War, which saw the death of over 100,000 Chinese soldiers at the hands of American forces, he had, above all, one thing in mind: Containing the USSR. As the United States actively courts India today and nurtures its newfound friendship with the South Asian giant, one should have little doubt that its aim is to contain China. US President Barak Obama, currently in India, summed up the importance of this burgeoning alliance when he dubbed it "one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century".
China, would-be largest economy in the world and the only potential rival to US dominance, understands the implications of this partnership and is beginning to respond to it.
The Sino-Indian relationship, after beginning to thaw in the early 1980s, seemingly peaked in warmth in 2005 when both countries reached an understanding on the parameters for a settlement of their border dispute. Two things happened in 2006 to change the discourse in Sino-India relations. First, the United States and India signed the Civil Nuclear Agreement and second, the US, India, Japan and South Korea held their first joint military exercise. Today, India carries out joint military exercises with the United States more often than with any other country.
China is deeply concerned over these developments and has begun to display its resentment. It has reasserted its claim to Arunachal Pradesh and sent India a troubling message by starting to grant only "staple visas"-- a practice that was earlier applied only to people from Arunanchal -- to Indians from Kashmir also.
China has deep historical reasons to resent "alliances" aimed against it as it suffered great humiliation at the hands of multilateral alliances in the past.
During the Second Opium War (1857—60) it was an alliance of British and French troops that vanquished Chinese forces.
Again, during the Boxer Uprising in 1900, a period during which anti-Western sentiments in China reached a tipping point, and with encouragement from their Qing Dynasty rulers the Chinese launched widespread attacks on foreign missionaries and other Westerners, China suffered a huge blow at the hands of a multilateral alliance.
A joint foreign force of troops from Britain, Japan, France and the USA invaded Beijing, vanquished the uprising and formed a military base in the Forbidden City for over a year. “Although China was not colonized, in effect it became a semi-colony, with foreign troops free to roam its territory, the treaty ports resembling micro-colonies, missionaries enjoying license to proselytize Western values everywhere they went and foreign companies able to establish subsidiaries with barely any taxation or duties. China was humiliated and impoverished."
One Chinese idiom suggests, "The past should never be forgotten, since we can learn from the past." For the Chinese, forgetting the past means betrayal of self.
As China marches into the future with a deep sense of history, this country and its leadership are critically aware of the great geopolitical realignment taking place in Asia and its future implications.
Not that China is walking alone. It is courting countries from Africa to Latin America and is also beginning to explore new opportunities in South Asia to increase its influence in the sub-continent. It already has deep military ties with Pakistan and Myanmar, which India deeply resents, and has increased its strategic engagements with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Many Indian strategic thinkers interpret this as an attempt by Beijing to "encircle India" and tie it down in South Asia, clipping its global ambitions.
Chinese growing assertiveness in Nepal should be understood in this geopolitical context as well. India is naturally wary about China becoming more active in Nepal, which it sees as its last sphere of influence in South Asia and doesn´t want to let go.
INTEREST OF CHINESE AND INDIAN FIRMS
The growing and competing interests of Indian and Chinese companies in Nepal´s hydropower, telecom and constructor sectors are also setting the stage for friction between China and India. From the point of view of the would-be first and second largest economies of the world, business opportunities in Nepal may appear minor but that´s not the case from the perspective of individual business firms interested in these countries. A top Chinese official recently complained at a private meeting: "India is opposed to any commercial investments we want to make in Nepal." There are increasing indications that the supposed Chinese man who offered "help" to Krishna Bahadur Mahara in the leaked audio-tape represented a Chinese business firm with interests in hydropower and telecom deals in Nepal. This is the new frontier of our future challenge.
ameetdhakal@gmail.com
What Nepal can learn from China