It was totally a new experience both to the army and political parties to face up to the new situation that emerged after political changes brought about by the historic movement of 2046 BS. In fact, the army was experiencing a strange situation after a long period in its history. It was a situation full of difficulties and dilemma, which manifested in different guises under the aegis of active monarchy. The army ready to commit itself to the democratic system of governance, acknowledging the ground reality of politics no matter how difficult it was for them to adapt.
In the aftermath of the success of Jana Aandolan I, the army was under compulsion to maintain some kind of allegiance with the traditional power center -- the palace -- while at the same time not failing to prove its loyalty to the new democratic set up. This had mainly two reasons: Firstly, it was not possible for the army to suddenly sever relationship with the palace due to its various compulsions and obligations. Secondly, the army continued to maintain partial relationship with the Narayanhiti Palace also due to provisions stipulated in the existing Army Act. Given the situation, it was essential to forge a new relationship between the democratic government and the army on the basis of mutual trust and understanding.
Late Girija Prasad Koirala took positive initiatives in this regard. He always assured army leadership both with words and deeds. Late Koirala was a liberal leader with helpful attitude. People who did not come into his contact believed him to be stubborn. However, once they came into contact with Koirala, they would get impressed with his politeness, simplicity and impartiality.
Late Koirala established similar relationship with the army’s top leadership. In my capacity as the defense secretary back in 2048 BS to 2051 BS, I helped create favorable environment for close contact and cooperation between the army headquarters and Defense Ministry. While it is a duty of the government to help a strong and organized institution of army in all possible ways, it is the duty of the army to demonstrate full loyalty to the democratically elected government. It was essential to remove suspicion and mistrust that existed between the government and army to achieve the goal then.
It is evident that the army fully cooperated with Koirala. Then army chief Gadul SJB Rana made an honest attempt to maintain cordial relations between the government and army headquarters. It would be no exaggeration to say that late Koirala’s able leadership played an important role in this regard.
The situation after Janaandolan II in 2063 BS, however, was completely different. The goal and aspirations of the Janaandolan II was much different. Late Koirala had tried his level best not to affect the institutional character of the army while bringing down the enthusiasm and aspiration of the Janaandolan II to ground reality. He concluded that the government’s relationship with the army should be managed on objective and practical ground so as to ensure that the morale of the army did not go down. He was clear that army with its morale down would not be able to maintain its institutional sanctity, strength and specialization. Late Koirala, therefore, adopted a policy not to chase the institution of the army on the basis of momentary outburst.
He, however, ensured that army respected human rights and abided by the laws of the land. Late Koirala’s clear and impartial policy based on ground reality boosted the army’s confidence. I feel that the army is gradually getting assured of its future now.
The months that followed the success of Janaandolan II were really difficult. It is clear that the then army chief and new army chief Rookmangud Katawal had fully cooperated with the then government, particularly with the prime minister.
Koirala’s take on compulsory retirement
There had been credible information that Koirala was under extreme pressure to introduce compulsory retirement to army’s top brass and middle-level officers.
The government formed after the success of Janaandolan II in 2046 BS introduced a policy to set the term of service and age limit in the civil and police service. The policies were gradually brought into implementation. Voices were raised from both the civil service and political spheres to implement similar policy in the army as well. Some other groups as well had exerted great pressure for the implementation of the policy in the army.
Koirala had directed to conduct a confidential study on possible effects of the implementation such policy in the army. I was the defense secretary then. A report prepared by the study team presented a grim picture that all senior army officers above colonels would get compulsory retirement if such policy was to be implemented. It appeared that this would cause qualitative and quantitative loss in the army, thereby creating problem in the army leadership. Despite tremendous pressure from various quarters, late Koirala did not implement the policy as that would not only have affected the efficiency but also the morale of the national army. Koirala took the decision for the broader interest of national security.
Did army try to prevent House declaration?
Rumors were rife that army headquarters was against declaring Nepal a republic. This is not true. I was the defense advisor to the prime minister then. General Pyar Jung Thapa was serving as the army chief. Koirala was set to present a resolution that would declare Nepal a republic.
So far as I know there was a call from somewhere asking the army leadership to immediately stop the House declaration. But the army leadership declined. It is true that army headquarters was thrown into commotion on that day. Nevertheless, the army did not choose to challenge verdict of the people. I am fully assured of this.
It is true that army was on high alert keeping in view possible untoward incident. I also got information about this and immediately apprised the prime minister about the development. That’s about it. Other things are just an exaggeration.
Debate on whether to promote Katawal
It was heard that there were differences not only in political sphere but also within Koirala family on whether to promote then Lieutenant General Rookmangud Katawal as Chief of the Army Staff. There were rumors that Koirala was under pressure not to take the decision to promote Katawal.
In fact, it was a time full of confusions. The months that followed after the success of Janaandolan II were really difficult for the army. Both the political parties and people did not have positive impression about the national army.
The tenure of then CoAS Pyar Jung Thapa was coming to an end a few months after the success of Janaandolan II. So far as I remember, Thapa was retiring on September 9, 2006. And then Lieutenant General Katawal was also retiring a day after. Another Lieutenant General Bala Nanda Sharma was serving in the UN mission abroad.
Obviously, change in the army leadership was a matter of concern for all, especially in view of the special circumstances prevailing in the country. The issue of appointing a new army chief had turned not only to be sensitive but also a complex one. There had been efforts from some quarters to extend the terms of incumbent army chief Thapa as well. With this there were a total three contenders for the post of army chief.
Prime Minister Koirala did not have good health then. He was also passing through a great physical and mental tension. The prime minister and a few his confidants discussed the issue time and again. It was concluded that the extension of Thapa’s term would not be timely and practical. We had a choice to be made from between the remaining two.
Since Lieutenant General Sharma was serving outside the country there was less debate about him. It was but natural to find arguments coming for and against another Lieutenant General Katawal who was serving in the country.
It is essential to give due consideration to the established norms and tradition while appointing or promoting someone in the higher post of security agencies. Late Koirala took an objective decision for the institutional interests of the army without prejudice. He also did not go after the history of the person to be appointed for the post. It was capability and seniority that Koirala took as the yardstick. Finally, giving continuity to established tradition, the decision to appoint Katawal as the new army chief was taken. Following the decision to appoint Katawal as the acting army chief, then army chief Thapa stayed on a leave.
India’s objection to invite UNMIN
It is not true that India had objected to the government’s decision to invite UNMIN to facilitate the peace process. I feel that India had taken only partial interest on the issue. What India said then was that it also had experience in such matters. Senior officials at Indian Embassy in Kathmandu had apprised the Nepal government that they were ready to help if Nepal wished so. The diplomatic and top army officials had met the prime minister time and again. But all these were taken merely as friendly suggestions of India.
UNMIN’s role and relevance
There is no question about the relevance of the United Nations’s role in Nepal’s peace process. Moreover, the long experience that the UN has garnered by working in conflict zones in various parts of the world will certainly be beneficial to Nepal.
So far as the relevance of UNMIN is concerned, the terms and conditions that the government has outlined for UNMIN have not made it as powerful as other UN bodies. The role of UNMIN in Nepal is limited and has been overshadowed by major political parties and the government. Nevertheless, the UNMIN, keeping itself within the limits permitted by its mandates, should further work hard to make its role in Nepal more relevant and useful.
Koirala’s view on army management
Late Koirala had a strong desire to take the ongoing peace process to a logical end and lay the foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and independent Nepal. The success of the movement was a must not only for the country but also for the success of his political career.
In this context, late Koirala was very serious about drafting the constitution, concluding the peace process and managing the Maoist combatants. He rose above his partisan interests on issues relating to the peace process and constitution drafting.
It is now essential to implement the agreement on Monitoring of the Management of the Arms and Armies and other agreements reached between the government and the Maoists in presence of UN in the past. The management, integration and rehabilitation of the Maoists combatants should be given top priority. This should be done on the basis of mutual understanding and consensus among political parties. The rigid stance taken by political parties is not going to lead them anywhere near the solution of the problem.
Ramesh Jung Thapa served as the defense secretary and defense advisor to Girija Prasad Koirala.
(As told to Kosh Raj Koirala)
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