The hindering of essential supplies along Nepal-India border brings back the memory of similar situation back in 1989 when Indians had curtailed the flow of goods and petroleum products under the pretext of the expiry of bilateral trade agreement. Back then, India closed down all but two of the 21 bilateral trade routes between Nepal and India and 13 of 15 transit points on its border with Nepal for international trade.Under international law a landlocked country has the right to only one transit route to the sea, so leaving two routes open technically disproved the argument that India was 'blockading' Nepal. Now, under the pretext of not addressing India's security and strategic interest in Constitution especially on federal structure, India has imposed an 'unofficial blockade', thus preventing Nepal from officially lodging a complaint.
The events are not only reminders of the 'blockade' but also present striking similarity on the structural flaw. Back in 1989 parties were protesting against the rule of party-less Panchayat system and in the lead up to the fall of the system India had refused to provide essential services. This was cheered by the parties as being a morale booster for their agitation. But little did they realize that the embargo was not against a particular system but rather against the state, which they later inherited.
The same political parties now are in a position similar to the Panchayat rulers. They have failed to recognize that the Indian support being lent to them was not out of desire to be a messiah of democracy. Instead it was continuation of New Delhi's policy to prop up anti-establishment forces in Nepal. Our policymakers failed to understand that since India's independence in 1947 its policy in Nepal is consistent—it is not in favor of particular political parties in Nepal. It has brought royalists, rightists, and leftists to power. Currently it has been trying to bring regional Madheshi parties at the center of Nepal's power circles.
India has only strategic and security concerns in Nepal and in future if political parties could not ensure these concerns, India would not hesitate to use its leverage with the Nepal Army. With due respect for the democratic movement that ushered in more liberal and open environment for expression and politics, little seems to have changed in terms of structural set-up.
We failed to understand how the domestic political structures and international politics operate. This has resulted in an anarchic situation, as we are unable to bring domestic structural transformation in line with international structure. The actors have changed but their roles remain the same. Politicians, bureaucrats and academics looked for their own survival and were co-opted in the existing structure without genuine effort at structural transformation. Thus, the net outcome remains the same; domestic political anarchy could threaten Nepal's territorial integrity and relations with India and international community.
Power wielders in Kathmandu after 1990 did little to create substantial economic autonomy by encouraging domestic industry. Rather, the unbridled drive for privatization and unchecked flow of foreign investment did little to promote national capital. The rulers in new dispensation after re-establishment of democracy promoted passive consumerism which was quenched by the foreign goods imported especially from India. Little did they realize that the double dependence of economic and political legitimacy on India would eventually come back to haunt them.
In the last two decades little effort was made by Kathmandu to diversify its relationship with the larger world. We have never harnessed the potential of our geo-strategic location to diversify our trade and build on connectivity with China and preferred to remain India-locked. No doubt, Nepal has deep engagement with India in the areas of economy, trade and transit, security, water resources and border management. It thus seems to have conceded that maintaining close ties with New Delhi was tantamount to its very survival.
The approach should have been to maintain 'strategic autonomy' by developing political economy whose base is not dependent on external actors. Also, the political actors including politicians and bureaucrats seem to have forgotten that New Delhi has never tolerated any force in Kathmandu that it deems detrimental to its interest.
The current crisis is result of both New Delhi's hegemonic policy in Nepal and Kathmandu's lack of pro-active diplomacy. Instead of communicating in an uninhibited manner, the crisis has invited mutual suspicions. In the absence of a cohesive voice, Kathmandu failed to communicate its position to New Delhi. New Delhi's desire of maintaining its dominant presence in Nepal is also responsible for this.
Political actors in Kathmandu tend to surrender to the southern neighbor, especially for catapulting them to power, without realizing that they are going to inherit the same structure. Nepali actors have continued to undermine Nepal's sovereignty and equality and at the same time India's security concerns. Had there been a structural transformation, Nepal would not have had to witness a repeat of 1989. The transformed structure would have produced a different set of actors with different set of results. These actors would have known how to use 'carrot' and 'stick' to manage domestic and international anarchy.
There is increasing 'trust deficit' between Nepal-India bilateral relations, but this could have been managed with the right structural set-up. This crisis should be a reminder for the necessary structural transformation.
The authors are assistant professors at Kathmandu School of Law
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