Following WWII, a federal-state concept emerged among newly-independent, or newly-formed countries; it gained momentum throughout the 1970s, and became the generally accepted norm following the fall of communism, and the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Hoping to solve long-term conflict resolution both developing (e.g. Brazil, India, Indonesia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nigeria, and Ethiopia) and developed countries (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Spain and Italy, among others) have adapted federalism.
Unfortunately, federalism experiences in the developing world have generally been less than satisfactory. Of the 92 post-colonial countries created following WWII, exactly half of these countries’ leaders chose a form of federalism as their government following independence. By the late 1980s, only six of the forty-six states were considered legitimate models of federalism. Fourteen countries maintained some form of power sharing arrangement between the national and sub-national governments, and five countries categorized themselves as having a federalism form of government, but did not have meaningful power sharing agreements. Today, a federal government governs over 40 percent of the world’s population living in 26 of 193 countries. On the list of 26 are several large and complex democracies including the United States (50 states), Germany (16 states), Brazil (27 states), India (28 states and seven territories), Mexico (32 states).
MANY FORMS OF FEDERALISM
While numerous forms of federalism exist, no two forms are identical. The characteristic common to all federalist systems is some form of power-sharing agreement or understanding between at least two distinct government bodies within a state. This distribution of powers differs from the unitary power structure characteristic of ethnically homogenous, Western European, nations-states governed from a single power center. Over time and with increased demands to recognize distinct ethnic groups, federalism has emerged as a popular solution to manage and solve ethnic differences and conflicts. Power-sharing agreements between national and sub-national governments ideally will improve representation and political efficacy among numerous and diverse groups of citizens.
Finding the balance between federal and state powers is important. Neither a hierarchical (top-down) model of power, nor an oligarchic (center-periphery) model of power, is conducive to federalism. Ultimately, a balance must be struck among governments regarding individual unit autonomy – their ability to decide, implement and enforce local laws – and the federal governing structure. A sufficient degree of competition between the individual units and the federal government must exist, yet must also be balanced by a sufficient level of cooperation between the units and the government. The collective power of individual units must also be balanced against the powers of the federal government to avoid government coercion.
While an ethnicity-based form of federalism may address the demands and desires of individual ethnic groups, history and research reveal that implementing formal government structures based on ethnicity can also contribute to what Tatu Vanhanen describes as “institutionalized” ethnic conflict.
Even with a balanced power-sharing agreement between the center and units, and an adequate description and designation of authority and powers among governing units in the state, a supportive political and social climate must exist in order for governance to succeed. Government officials at all levels must understand and accept the procedures adopted by institutions to make and implement laws and rules. Likewise, citizens must be confident that the institutions and processes of government will allow them to voice concerns, mobilize support and take action, to address the social, economic and political concerns and challenges facing them and their communities.
Understanding and testing a new constitution not only requires citizen acceptance but also citizen involvement and participation – “civil society is vital to the idea of federalism.” As noted by John Locke (1965) and Alan Seligman (1992), federalism did not emerge until the “idea of civil society became the cornerstone of western politics.” In many cases and for a variety of reasons, less-than-democratic, developing countries generally have very weak or non-existent civil societies.
One of the primary factors contributing to a lack of citizen involvement is high rates of poverty, requiring individuals to spend the majority of their time and energy each day providing the basic necessities for themselves and their families. While an ethnicity-based form of federalism may address the demands and desires of individual ethnic groups, history and research reveal that implementing formal government structures based on ethnicity can also contribute to what Tatu Vanhanen describes as “institutionalized” ethnic conflict.
PITFALLS OF ETHNIC-FEDERALISM
In a cross-national study of 183 countries measuring the levels of ethnic heterogeneity and domestic ethnic conflict in each country, Tatu Vanhanen (1999) finds a statistically significant correlation between the number of ethnic divisions in a society, and the likelihood of ethnic conflict. The study also attempts to delineate between “institutionalized” ethnic conflict and violent ethnic conflict. Vanhanen (1999) considers the number of political parties and ethnic-organizations formed along ethnic divisions, and develops an index to measure and compare the level of institutionalized conflict present in each society.
The study reveals a correlation between ethnically divided societies and violent, domestic ethnic-conflict and an even stronger correlation between ethnically divided societies and institutionalized conflict. Institutionalized conflict among various ethnic groups considers the level and number of ethnic political parties and organizations. An increase in the number of small political parties with narrowly focused platforms is a common outcome of a government organized along ethnic lines. A condition, that tends to encourage tension and conflict instead of cooperation and peace. According to Daniel Elazar, “ethnic nationalism is probably the strongest force against federalism. In fact, “ethnic federations are among the most difficult of all to sustain and are least likely to survive.”
Research reveals several cautionary points to consider before selecting ethnic federalism to resolve ethnic tensions in a multi-ethnic society. These points include: (1) ethnically divided societies may lead to greater ethnic conflict in heterogeneous countries; (2) the formation of many, new, ethnically-based political parties and the resulting ramifications are important to consider; (3) the likelihood that ethnic federalism may contribute to a loss of national identity, instead of strengthening unity among individual groups; and (4) ethnic federalism poses several challenges to development plans and strategies.
A development strategy that promotes even and gainful development in all regions of the country and encompasses as much of the population as possible is preferable to a development strategy that preferences one (or some) regions over others, or one in which certain groups benefit economically while other groups gain little or nothing.
Keshav Bhattarai is Professor of Geography & Darlene Budd is Associate Professor of Political Science & Director of International Studies at University of Central Missouri, Missouri, US
bhattarai@ucmo.edu
dbudd@ucmo.edu
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