Managing ex-combatants
Unlike the Constituent Assembly (CA), the Special Committee, the body with the political-constitutional mandate for the Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation (SIR) of the Maoist Army Combatants (MACs) was dissolved after completing its work at the end of 2069. Of the 19,602 MACs verified by the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), 1,400 (70 officers and other low-ranking personnel) selected for integration into the Nepal Army (NA) are now undergoing training. Those who chose voluntary exit with cash payments have returned to civilian lives. The seven main cantonments and 21 satellite camps along with the weapons in containers are now safely in possession of the State. As such, a vital part of Nepal’s peace process has been completed. Why did SIR succeed amidst the faltering politics in Nepal?
REPUBLICA
Political leadership
Management, Integration and Rehabilitation (MIR) of rebel army combatants are vital to post-conflict peace building. The success of the whole peace process rests on this. Successful MIR depends on many things, but political leadership is the key. SIR of the MACs could not have succeeded without it. Coordinating role of the Prime Ministers, ability of the members of the Special Committee and their access to top party leadership was vital. Willingness of the leaders to listen to the professionals and go beyond narrow political dogmas and party positions were also important. Of course, cooperation of the new NA leadership, goodwill of the international community and supportive role of India contributed positively too. Why did these things come together in SIR while not elsewhere in Nepali politics?
Intellectual ownership
With many internal conflicts and growing interest and role of the international community in their resolution, a large body of research is available on MIR of rebel army combatants. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are the most frequently used tools. As these concepts were developed in one set of circumstances but as the nature of each internal conflict and terms of their resolution are different, successful SIR of the MACs called for skillful application of the toolkits available internationally or taking of national ownership through the application of new ideas.
It was a miracle that nothing untoward happened when UNMIN left and Secretariat was supposed to start the monitoring.
In Nepal, initially the Maoists did not want to hear of DDR while other parties rejected any SSR. So, the DDR-SSR debate delayed the Integration and Rehabilitation process. Had the SIR been completed quickly as envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) or at least prior to the CA election, Nepal’s politics would have moved forward or at least not encountered the problems it is facing today. This author has argued all along that the DDR-SSR debate would take us nowhere and identified numbers, norms, modalities and ranks as the core issues on which agreement was needed. (See Integration and rehabilitation, The Kathmandu Post May 19, 2010).
Amidst such delays UNMIN’s mandate was terminated. Gradually discussions both inside the Special Committee and outside started moving beyond the DDR-SSR mantras with greater focus on core issues. The cantonments were handed over to the Special Committee. A separate NC directorate with four core functions was proposed to accommodate the MACs. The Technical Committee was transformed into the Secretariat and one of its members, a retired Lt. General of the NA with experience in UN peace keeping was appointed the Coordinator. The homework on rehabilitation and Cash-for-Peace (payments for MACs wishing to leave the camps voluntarily) packages started in earnest. A 24-7 Situation Centre was established at the Secretariat and teams composed of the NA, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and the MACs replaced the UNMIN monitors. A new code of conduct for the MACs was also finalized.
A lot of work was done and even more significantly, the fear that the whole peace process would unravel after UNMIN left was disproved. But there was no real progress on the ground. As I have argued elsewhere (The New Spotlight, Sept 30, 2011), even at the end of 2011, the state was spending a lot of its vital resources while the MACs suffered the indignities of life in temporary camps, as well as an uncertain future. Handover of cantonments made headlines but there was no clarity on the chain of command and reporting. It was a miracle that nothing untoward happened after UNMIN left and Secretariat was supposed to have started the monitoring work. But the Secretariat had been unable to fulfill its core TOR, ascertain the actual number of MACs in the camps and prepare profiles for integration and rehabilitation. Discussion on weapons had not even started. Politicians expected input from experts to move the process forward while the secretariat leadership was happy to wait for instructions. No wonder the deadlock on core issues continued.
The author was a member of the Secretariat of the Special Committee for the Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army
This is the first of a two-part article.
Related story
Let’s live in peace and embrace diversity
