On deals like this, the Maoists have so far been poor givers and great takers. Petty self-interests of their opponents or inter- and intra-party divisions among their opponents have provided them space and opportunity to take more and give less. During the early years of post-insurgency, it was the lust for power of the all powerful NC leader late Girija Prasad Koirala; now it is the excessive dependence of a power-hungry prime minister Jhala Nath Khanal and his cronies on them for survival that the Maoists are exploiting.
Their smartness aside, there are a number of reasons as to why the May 28 deal was agreed mostly on Maoists’ terms. First, NC’s lack of adequate internal coordination was evident even at the negotiation table. The fact that majority of NC people were in favor of the extension of the CA at any cost that the Maoists knew in advance, thanks to the characteristic loose talks and naivety of the NC folks, also impinged on their bargaining power. Finally, the unexpected last minute demands of Madhesi parties, which consumed a great deal of the remaining time, energy and patience of the NC negotiators, led them to surrender. As the CA would expire within minutes, terribly exhausted and nervous NC negotiators opted not to press for details and specifics that would have taken some time to work out.
However, despite the success, Maoists have now entered the thorniest path of their journey. On one hand, any attempt to execute the deal, especially the peace part, will fuel the ongoing in fights that can even cause their break-up; on the other hand, failing to implement the deal will worsen their already battered credibility.
Therefore, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (PKD) – the pragmatic but unpredictable Maoist supremo – has to make some hard choices now. He has to choose between a peace loving populace and a hard-line pro-insurgency camp within his party led by Mohan Baidya, between peace-building along with constitution-writing and the so-called people’s revolt, and between democracy and a one-party communist dictatorship. Whether he resorts to duplicity and opportunism like he used to do in the past, or he lives up to his commitments, both verbal and written, made before and during the five-point peace deal will be his test now.
If, as ever, he dilly-dallies the peace process and repeats on August 28 the same old pleas and arguments thus begging for another extension of the term of CA, nobody other than those belonging to his party and some splinter groups of his coalition partners will oblige. So, it is now or never. ‘Ever revolutionary’ Baidya and his blind followers may never comprehend but PKD fully understands what disasters a constitutional vacuum and an aborted peace process will bring to them. Therefore, he has no choice but to gear up the hitherto non-starter peace process to, at least, an irreversible point besides playing a supportive even if not a lead role in formulating the first draft of a democratic constitution before August 28.
This time there seems to be some silver lining. This time PKD has initiated some actions, albeit minor in nature, toward peace such as the decision to do away with the dual security arrangement for Maoist leaders. Similarly, the special committee on peace has made public a three-week calendar of operations to implement the peace process.
The ‘fundamental task’ of the peace process as stated in Point No 1 of the deal broadly means the implementation of a time-bound plan of action for integration of some Maoist combatants into Nepal Army (NA) without affecting the functional and professional standards of the latter, and voluntary retirement and rehabilitation of the rest in society—the term cannot be interpreted otherwise. Among the various issues of integration, the most disputed one so far, that of numbers, will not be a big problem now as ‘between the lines’ of contending proposals suggest something between seven and eight thousand as agreeable to all stakeholders.
Regarding modality, a directorate under the command of NA that will be a mix of different forces has already been agreed by all concerned; however, the Maoists’ demand to deploy them for border security will not be compatible with the broad national security policy and international practice. Similarly, Maoist demand to create matching ranks for their combatants in NA to the one they held in the ‘PLA’ is simply not possible. Therefore, on both issues – area of operation and rank harmonization – the Maoists have to be flexible. On norms part, some of the eligibility criteria for entry, such as educational qualifications, marital status and age bar may be waived or relaxed while others like physical fitness cannot be traded as they form the very basis of competency and professionalism of the army.
Anyway, these issues are not big deals now that the nation has decided to integrate the rebels into the national army, in a compromise to bring peace after 10 long years of bloody insurgency. The question is whether the Maoists will honor their obligations of the compromise or not. Yes, tasks such as categorization and segregation of combatants into integration and rehabilitation groups may not be completed within three months but once the process starts, it can be rolled over to the next three months provided the Maoists stick to the course.
So far the Maoists have either used the integration of combatants into national army as bargain chip for more concessions or used it to seize power by taking control of the latter. Every time they set newer and unfair conditions to fulfill the commitments they had already made and every time they changed their goal posts. And all this happens mostly because of their divided house. Enough is enough. Peace-building cannot and should not be allowed to become hostage of their intra-party wrangling. If some of them are regretting to have joined the peace process, they are free to revert to rebellion and face the consequence but peace-building cannot be accepted anymore as a bargain tool, come what may.
It is not all dark. This time there seems to be some silver lining. This time PKD has initiated some actions, albeit minor in nature, toward peace such as the decision to do away with the dual security arrangement for Maoist leaders. Similarly, the special committee on peace has made public a three-week calendar of operations to implement the peace process. Each and every such development has been bringing to PKD more challenges and hindrances from the Baidya faction. So let us pray for him. May his attempt be genuine and absolute. May it be powerful enough to overcome his in-house obstacles.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
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