The media has lately been reporting on the 60 versus 90 Megawatt controversy on the Upper Trishuli 3-A (UT 3-A) hydropower project. The reporting argues that the addition of the third 30 Mw Unit will entail not only a project cost escalation of about US $45 million but also a three year project commissioning delay that would mean a further loss of 1.4 billion units. These are, no doubt, quite valid arguments. In the prevailing environment, the fear that this cost increase may go to pad the pockets of decision makers and project contractors is also not invalid.
Unfortunately, this 60 versus 90 Mw UT 3-A controversy has been brewing for over two years. Though belated, the need to see the other side of the coin in a balanced and rational manner is important. While the average annual energy of 60 Mw UT 3-A is projected at 490 GWh, the 90 Mw UT 3-A is estimated to generate 638 GWh, an addition of 148 GWh. However, like all run-of-river hydropower plants, this additional energy from 90 Mw UT 3-A will be produced during the wet months. And it is true that dry season energy is valued far more than the wet season energy.
This additional 148 GWh of wet season energy from the third 30 Mw Unit will need to be weighed against the benefits that could accrue. In technical parlance, this wet season cheap energy is dubbed ‘rubbish energy’. But policy makers, in the long term interests of the country, would need to devise ways and means to utilize this ‘rubbish’ but cheap energy. One such way is the installation of the electrolysis-based urea fertilizer factory. In 1984 when the Japanese government envisaged the 225 Mw Saptagandaki project, a similar debate on what to do with surplus ‘rubbish’ energy surfaced. The Japanese recommended an electrolysis-based urea fertilizer plant of 275 metric tons/day capacity at Hetauda (as the plant would require flue gases produced by the cement factory there). The plant required 76 Mw of power supply on a continuous 24-hour basis but would close down for three months in the critical dry season.
In other words, despite the three months’ shutdown, the plant was found viable because of the availability of cheap ‘rubbish’ energy. Unfortunately, this urea plant got buried when the mighty 402 Mw Arun-III shoved aside Saptagandaki project. Nepal is, thus, credited with having killed three birds with one stone: urea plant, Saptagandaki and Arun III. With heavy import of fertilizers, Nepal is now seriously mulling over the need of such fertilizer factories. Dang, where cement factories are now mushrooming, could be the most appropriate district for such fertilizer factories. The electrolysis-based urea fertilizer factory in Nepal is a must as more and more run-of-river projects with rubbish energy are under construction. In the interest of the country, our decision makers need to be proactive and innovative. For too long, we have been singing export hymns only!
All planned major maintenances of hydropower plants are done in the dry season when the river flow is low. In the case of 60 Mw UT 3-A with two 30 Mw Units, when a unit is taken-off for maintenance then river flows to the tune of about 14 Mw of valuable dry season power will be unnecessarily spilled. The installation of a third 30 Mw Unit will prevent this waste of valuable dry season energy. Such benefit and ease of maintenance has been envisioned in the lower 69 Mw Marsyangdi that has three 23 Mw units. Similarly, the 144 Mw Kaligandaki-A has three 48 Mw units thus allowing major maintenances without spilling valuable dry season energy.
The other important benefit to the country of upgrading the Upper Trishuli 3-A to 90 Mw is the upgrading of the planned lower cascading 37 Mw Upper Trishuli 3-B to 55 Mw. The average annual energy from this 37 Mw Lower Trishuli 3-B is about 296 GWh and the upgrading will add another 100 GWh for the system.
Similar to the present UT 3-A 60 versus 90 Mw debate, the presently operating 36 Mw Bhotekoshi underwent a similar vetting when the Ministry of Water Resources was awarding the License to the American company, Panda Energy. Compelling arguments similar to UT 3-A to de-rate the 36 Mw Bhotekoshi was overruled with the simple logic of ‘maximizing available resources’. Instead of the approved 36 Mw, the American developer quietly installed a 45 Mw plant and after much ill-feeling (threats to withdraw US garment quota for Nepal) the controversy ended in a win-win for all. The overrated 45 Mw Bhotekoshi is now pumping valuable wet season rubbish energy to the starved system.
CONCLUSION
Thus, while the argument of 30 Mw third Unit entailing project delays and cost escalation is valid, decision makers would need to see the other side of coin also. Optimization of water resources, flexibility in planned maintenance, automatic upgrading of tailrace 37 Mw Upper Trishuli 3-B to 55 Mw and utilization of wet season cheap energy for Nepal’s own uses in urea fertilizer factories are as valid. It may not be out of place to cite the under-construction 30 Mw Chameliya project. Chameliya’s average annual generation is about 184 GWh and its projected cost inclusive of transmission line is about US $75 million. Upper Trishuli 3-A’s third 30 Mw Unit will add 148 GWh at a cost of about US $45 million. It is hoped that common sense will finally prevail and Nepal’s decision makers will not be short-sighted!
The author is former general manager of Nepal Electricity Authority and a water resource expert
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