It is time for an objective assessment of what went wrong, and how we got here. We have gotten here because everything started to go wrong right after the CA election.
The first blunder happened just after the CA election when Maoists denied late Girija Prasad Koirala (GPK) the presidency. As the president of the second-largest party in the parliament, and also for his historic role in the peace process and abolishing monarchy, GPK rightly deserved to be the first president of this newest republic.
Many Maoist leaders have admitted the mistake that he was denied a chance, but for the record, let me quote here what Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal told Republica the day GPK passed away.
“Frankly speaking, Sitaula [Krishna Prasad] suggested that making Girijababu the first president and a Maoist leader the prime minister would make it easier to settle all the issues. The negotiation went on for one-and-a-half months. We were guided more by the ideological and class perspectives [meaning why should we accept this bourgeois leader as our first president when we have fresh public mandate?].
We had won the elections unexpectedly, and thought that we could win everything in the days ahead. In retrospect, we think we could have easily led the country to a solution if we had compromised at that time. Now this is a matter to be evaluated by the people and the history.” (Republica, March 21, 2010)
As GPK was denied of this historical opportunity to lead the country as the first president, the relationship between Nepali Congress and Maoists, the two parties that had played an instrumental role in the signing of the 12-point agreement and taking forward the peace process, soured. As did the relationship between the top leaders of the two parties, mainly GPK and Dahal.
The turning point in the crises, however, came after the sacking of the former Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal by Dahal in the capacity of prime minister. By then, the trust between the Maoists and other parties was so low and suspicion so deep that 18 parties, who represent the majority in the parliament, asked President Dr Ram Baran Yadav to intervene. President Yadav stayed Katawal’s sacking, precipitating Dahal’s resignation as the PM.
As Katawal’s sacking was uncalled for, so was Dahal’s resignation. Talking to Republica, on the day of GPK’s demise, this is what Dahal said: “When we entered the army chief row, he [GPK] continuously suggested to me that I should not get into that controversy. He telephoned me in the morning and in the night. He called me every hour. He telephoned me many times in the day when I took action against the army chief. But we had already readied the plan against the army chief. He said that the move would backfire. He also sent Sitaula [Krishna Prasad] to my place to communicate the matter properly.”
Maoist Chairman Dahal has also admitted, not explicitly though, that he made mistake in sacking the then army chief: “At present, when I recall those days, I realize that he [GPK] was worried as he was like our guardian. Time and again he advised me not to get into controversy since the army chief was retiring in three months. Many times he tried very hard to convince me... He said asking him for clarifications was enough. You have asked for clarifications. This is enough for now. You can also send him a warning letter. At that time, we looked at the matter only from the perspective of the party’s struggle. When I recall it, I now feel that it requires a review.”
Clearly, today’s political crises is, to a large extent, Maoists’ doing.
After Dahal’s resignation, it should have dawned to all political parties that this tricky transition was unmanageable unless all of them came together. But that wasn’t to be. For GPK, it was the opportunity to revenge Dahal for his betrayal. For CPN-UML, and Madhav Kumar Nepal, it was time to hit the jackpot of premiership that they had never dreamt of. Bijaya Gachchhadar saw it as a great opportunity to backstab Upendra Yadav and become the deputy prime minister.
Having just resigned, Dahal himself didn’t realize how radically the balance of power had shifted away from his party in the parliament. Perhaps he was too naive to the game of parliamentary politics. Instead of making efforts to reach out to the major parties to cobble a new coalition, based on genuine realization of the mistakes he had committed in the past, Dahal kept on threatening the parties against forming a non-Maoists coalition. His rhetoric for civilian supremacy and insistence that the president must first correct his “mistake” dampened any possibility for reconciliation and consensus among the major parties, thus irrevocably setting the country into a confrontational path that has gotten us here.
Now at stake is the gain of Janaandolan II itself. The idea of Janaandolan II, the reason why so many Nepalis came to the streets risking their lives was this: Maoists would give up violence and accept democracy and the mainstream parties will correct their past mistakes – incompetence, corruption, nepotism, exclusionary politics and lack of accountability – and work to strengthen democracy.
Now the Maoists seem to be less interested, if at all, in democracy. That is why they are not playing by the rules at all, nor do mainstream parties seem interested in strengthening democracy so that people living at the margins also get its benefits.
The manner in which the Maoists are demanding for removal of this government neither is constitutional (which means tabling a no-trust motion in the parliament) nor consensual (where you convince other parties why this government has to go for the larger interests of the country). Brandishing khukuris and lathis, while concealing their more lethal weapons, they are rapidly backsliding into their old ways.
Patience seems to be running out among the mainstream parties as well. “I think confrontation is inevitable now. We are tired of Maoists’ threat and blackmail. If they can, let them capture the state. If they fail to do so, we shall negotiate with them on a more realistic ground,” said a top NC leader.
ameetdhakal@gmail.com