History repeated on September 10 when the CPN-Maoist, led by Mohan Baidya, presented the Bauram Bhattarai-led government with a list of demands, 70 points long. The irony was surely not lost on Bhattarai who had presented a similar list—comprised of 40 points—in 1996 to then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. Deuba, still a prominent politician in Nepali Congress, seemingly got the last laugh thanks to Baidya and his followers. In a recent statement, Deuba suggested that it would be difficult for Bhattarai to address even a single point on the list; given the extent of recent political deadlock, he may indeed be right.
The demands put forth by the CPN-Maoist were fairly predictable, and focused largely on decreasing India’s influence in Nepal. From the Karnali Hydropower project to oversight at Tribhuvan International Airport and development investment, the message was that the government must distance itself from India or risk the CPN-Maoist returning to the jungle. The CPN-Maoist has, of late, been threatening a return to arms, which again harkens back to 1996 when the then CPN (Maoist) started their ‘people’s war’ shortly after the government failed to meet the 40-point list of demands.[break]
One crucial difference between today and 16 years ago that warrants serious consideration is the function of ideology within the larger socio-political landscape. In 2006, when the CPN (Maoist) relinquished its struggle for a single party state and joined forces with the political status quo, it ceased to be a revolutionary entity and became a political entity; its revolutionary ideology fundamentally shifting out of necessity. In a way, the party was subsumed by the very system that it was attempting to overcome. However, despite this absorption, the party has in many ways continued to conduct itself as an ideological revolutionary force over the past six years, wielding their influence in a manner that has led to further polarization within the political system.
This is not to suggest that the other parties were but hapless bystanders in this process. Indeed, of late NC and CPN-UML cadres have staged their own strikes and held the political process hostage much like the Maoists. Instead, it suggests that the parties have diverted starkly from the type of long-term consensus building that is necessary in a party-based political system with a multitude of interests. If Nepal hopes to move forward and build a better country for its citizenry, there must be a conscious return to this type of consensus building. In short, the time and opportunity for ideology has passed.
Despite this reality, the CPN-Maoist’s 70-point agenda is an ideological document, the presentation of which brings a renewed uncertainty to Nepal’s political landscape. The country’s post conflict transition is tenuous at best; any return, or threat of return to conflict could be ruinous. Answers to Nepal’s problems and political gridlock will not be found in extremist action. Instead, politicians must seek to forge a new consensus, a consensus that brings all representative voices to the table to propose legitimate avenues of compromise that will move the country forward.
Such a new consensus will rely, in part, on the following. One, a return to war must be avoided at all costs. If this means taking a cautionary step back from India with regard to state relations it should be considered. Unapproved investments and excessive airport oversight may indeed be places to start.
CPN-MAOISTS AGENDA
Two, the CPN-Maoist must recognize that their list of 70 demands is unreasonable. If the government is willing to consider discussion on some, then the party must step back on others. Three, the Maoists must accept that the time for ideology has passed. Nepal’s diversity alone suggests that single party rule is not feasible. This is not to suggest that class-based agendas have no place in Nepal; it is to suggest that those agendas must be approached through different channels.
Four, similarly, NC and UML need to be more amenable in bringing the Maoists to the table, and to joining the table themselves. Debates on ethnic federalism in particular must recognize the need to address class differences and inequalities in Nepal. And five, all the parties must recognize that achieving 100 percent of their respective agendas is not feasible. Such acceptance will form the basis for a new consensus.
These five points could provide the foundation for a new, more inclusive discussion in Nepali politics. Importantly, both sides must make an equal effort to reform their expectations in Nepal’s new political landscape. If the country is to pull itself back from the brink, ideological differences must be set aside in favor of pragmatic compromise.
The author is a development professional and researcher based in the US. He works actively on transitional justice issues in Nepal.
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