Something that has always perplexed me is the causes behind the emergence of armed outfits like the Maoists rebellion in 1996 and the ongoing sprouting of armed outfits in the Terai region. Is it due to oppression and deliberate negligence of some communities or ethnic groups by the establishment? Is it due to continuing tussle, if any, between bourgeois and proletariat classes? Is it due to economic backwardness and poverty? Is it due to geographic factors?
A recently revised paper (Geography, Poverty and Conflict in Nepal, HBS Working Paper 07-065) by Lakshmi Iyer, Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, and Quy-Toan Do of the World Bank’s Development Research Group, not only empirically investigates the causes of conflict in Nepal but also looks at the causes behind the intensity of violence after its onset. They argue that the level of poverty/economic backwardness is the strongest predictor of the onset of violence in Nepal. Their research shows that a 10 percentage point increase in poverty is associated with 25-27 additional conflict-related deaths. Meanwhile, it also shows that geographic factors are significantly associated with the intensity of violence after its onset.
The causes of conflict in Nepal might be entirely different from the causes of conflict of similar nature in other countries. The increase in the number of PLA recruits and its sympathizers might have little to do with political culture and bourgeois-proletariat drumbeat started by the Maoists. The truth is that conflict is significantly higher in places with greater poverty and lower levels of economic development. The study shows that at any given time, poor areas are significantly more likely to experience the onset of conflict, contingent on the fact that they did not experience the onset in previous period.
There is some truth to the argument that the Maoists received backing from the oppressed and marginalized classes—the Maoists support base as is claimed by its leaders. However, this was a small fraction of their total manpower. They were able to coax recruits chiefly by offering the different ethnic groups assurances of economic development, political opportunities, and fair representation in policymaking, which they are finding hard to fulfill now. Their promises had more hollowness and little substance in it.
Contrary to existing arguments that geographic factors determine the onset of armed conflicts, Iyer and Do show that it is not significantly associated with the onset of violence in Nepal, i.e. the origin of violence has little to do with geographic factors. However, it did contribute to intensity of violence once it started. They show that geographic condition such as elevation and the presence of mountains and forests explain a quarter of the cross-district variation in conflict intensity. This means that increasing the supply of infrastructure is of vital importance if the government wants to decrease or quell violence. Note that the lack of infrastructure itself is not associated with the onset of violence; its absence increases the intensity once conflict sets in motion.
The Maoists recruited more militants from districts where the opportunity cost – the cost of next best alternative forgone – of recruiting new members was the lowest. People residing in districts that were socially and economically backward (irrespective of geographic landscape) were drawn into insurgency easily and earlier than residents from other districts because the opportunity costs of joining the armed rebellion was low for them and the economic and political gains for the Maoists was high. This is shown to be true not only by Iyer and Do, but also by research done by other economists like Collier and Hoeffler.
This has an important policy implication—policies aimed at increasing the opportunity cost of joining armed outfits should be of paramount importance in order to stop the onset of armed conflict. It can be done by investing in formal, informal and vocational education. This would potentially ensure that the returns to labor (wages) earned by engaging in formal economic activity is higher than the returns from joining armed outfits. Additionally, increasing employment opportunities and livelihood generation activities would also help to serve this purpose. This would potentially give rise to a tendency to deter – even by poorer communities –the emergence and spread of disruptive activities.
The study also shows that ethnic and caste polarization, land inequality, linguistic diversity and political participation are not significantly associated with violence. This finding raises questions over the real motive of the Maoists’ push for land redistribution reforms. Is it just a populist move to entice more voters or are they genuinely considering scientific land reform that would help accelerate productive activities? Furthermore, in light of this research, it is hard to believe if the Maoists’ rhetoric on the existence of the tussle between bourgeois and proletarians and the need to dismantle the former holds any ground. The Maoists are yet to clearly identify how big of a problem the bourgeois productive structure, if any, pose to economic activity.
The onset of conflict in Nepal is determined by economic backwardness/poverty and the intensity of conflict is determined by geographical factors. Policies should be designed to specifically address these factors rather than digressing on issues of relatively less importance and less significance to stimulation of economic activity in the ailing economy.
sapkotac@dickinson.edu
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