Neither happened! Radical communist parties don’t break or change overnight. It takes a lifetime for them to transform, no matter how many times they might promise to change. In fact, the main political problem of contemporary Nepal is nothing other than the gap between Maoists’ promise to transform and unwillingness or inability to keep the promise.
The arrangements for the plenum were spectacular; however, with all the astounding preparations the event could neither produce for the party men nor did it provide for outsiders any clue on its future course. On the contrary, it only helped perpetuate the uncertainty. Of the three top leaders who submitted their proposals during the plenum, hardliner and dogmatic vice-chairman Mohan Baidya pleaded that karyadisha (course of action) adopted by the landmark Chunwang Baithak (mainstreaming and giving up the violence) be reversed to go for a fresh ‘people’s revolt’. He also proposed to change the Chunwang contention that says ‘feudalistic forces spearheaded by monarchy’ are the principal enemy by declaring India as Nepali people’s (read Maoists’) principal enemy.
Meanwhile, another vice-chairman and architect of Chunwang karyadisha Dr Baburam Bhattarai argued that since the karyadisha has reaped great benefits for the party, it deserves to be continued. He also opines that constitution-writing and concluding the peace process should be preferred to rebellion. On the other hand, chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, a revolutionary-turned-pragmatist who promises everything to every body echoes Baidya’s assertion that India is the principal enemy but falls short on endorsing his stand to go immediately for a ‘people’s revolt’. He, however, says that if the party’s opponents will create hurdles in writing a “people’s constitution” or in concluding the peace process or in sending his party (read him) to power, armed rebellion will be inevitable.
Dahal had been criticized by both Baidya and Bhattarai as a leader having no clear karyadisha of his own who adopts a sarsangrahabadi approach (a communist jargon denoting opportunistic compromises) to remain in office. Although the ideological distance between Baidya and Bhattarai is far greater than what it is between Dahal and either of them, the two feel that they had been fooled by the shrewd, tactical and power-hungry chairman. This has forced them to form a momentary alliance against the chairman. The triangular political and personal tussles continue.
An editor of a leading daily, believed to have insightful information of the Maoists, writes that the plenum failed because it could not reach a consensus on how to deal with India without unnecessarily antagonizing the powerful southern neighbor as mooted by Bhattarai, or declaring it ‘principal enemy’ as advocated by Dahal and Baidya. He also blames the modus operandi of classical communists to declare one or other as principal enemy for the stalemate because for Maoists the whole search for a villain naturally ends up at India, at least for now.
In fact, the main problem with Maoists is that they suffer from an obsessive compulsive disorder to literally follow all communist protocols from declaration of principal enemy to seize power through bullet (even if they had already been to power through ballot). To seize power, they attempt to purge the national army (albeit in vein). Every now and then they threat to launch an armed revolt. In private, their leaders tell the cadres that the peace deals they had been signing is meant not to honor but to fool their opponents and now that the gains from those deals had been exhausted they can be scrapped anytime. During discussions on the draft constitution, they outright reject pluralism—the very essence of liberal democracy.
Radical communist parties don’t break or change overnight. In fact, the main political problem of contemporary Nepal is nothing other than the gap between Maoists’ promise to transform and unwillingness or inability to keep the promise.
These signs are the dawn of a stormy day. They are not trifle matters like the hangover of war or violence at the level of some local cadres, or sporadic acts of property capture of an absentee landlord or the seasonal extortion drive of some affiliated bodies. They are the inconsistencies and double talk ever present in the words and deeds of responsible and top leaders; therefore they have made others wary and suspicious of the Maoists.
All political forces – both domestic and foreign – have been giving Maoists benefit of doubt on the question of the latter’s commitment toward democracy; however, their patience is running out. Yet there are reasons to REMAIN optimist. Since the last four-and-a-half years, Maoists are engaged in electoral and democratic exercises despite their rhetoric to the contrary and despite their bullying on all fronts and forums: Polls, the House and the streets. Also, at the end of the day, they have been showing flexibility on most of the disputes despite their earlier stubbornness on the issue. And, most importantly, their recent plenum witnessed a free and democratic debate that even challenged the leadership of an all-powerful chairman without any fear or attempt of purge—a great departure for a regimented communist force.
Communist parties that resist ‘revisionism’ of any kind take long to change and longer to transform. For example, CPN-UML, which after 18 years since the propounding of ‘people’s multiparty democracy’, after 20 years of practice in liberal democracy and electoral politics and after 16 years of exercise in rule-based changes of government, is yet to attain the metamorphosis. In case of Unified Maoists, a party more radical than CPN-UML at any given time and a party having its own private army, the transformation will be much slower and more turbulent.
Late Girija Prasad Koirala took initiatives and pains to bring Maoists into the political mainstream, a laudable act on the face of it. However, for his personal and political gains, he turned a blind eye toward any safeguards required. As the Indian-brokered peace deal signed between the seven parties and the then underground Maoists mainly aimed at the abolition of monarchy, it lost its relevance for both sides as soon as the monarchy was gone. The absence of common grounds among different actors in general and between Maoists and non-Maoists forces in particular has given them room for deception, bigotry and arbitrary and self-serving interpretations with regard to peace process and political goals.
Now, Maoists (and their opponents as well) have three options – one, to revert to armed revolt, which will be painful for others as well, but which will be suicidal to the Maoists; two, to transform, which Baidya and his brainwashed followers won’t let happen, at least in the near future; and three, to buy time, for time alone can cool the hot-blooded militants, paving way for the much sought after political consensus and national reconciliation. However, the last course will also protract the ongoing political instability, but this is the price Nepali people have to pay as compensation for a flawed peace process.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
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