Dahal perhaps faces the biggest crises of his leadership. He is not only unable to decide about the future direction of the “revolution” or the road that his party should take, but his personal credibility, within and outside the party, has also done a nosedive. It’s sad that the man who led the decade-long war and showed the courage to persuade his party’s rank and file to join competitive politics has become so weak in such a short period of time and remains so discredited.
Nepali society is not known for showing kindness towards politicians - actually it’s lot more cynical than it should have been - but much of the discredit that Dahal has earned lately is his own doing.
This is bad for him, bad for his party and bad for the country.
Never forget that, unlike with the other parties, Dahal is chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), a party so centralized that Dahal monopolizes almost everything— finances, party organization, the PLA and the ideology. That’s why when Dahal catches cold, the party sneezes.
Four years into open, competitive politics, Maoist cadres remain one of the most disillusioned lot and they are beginning to ask: What have we achieved after so much of sacrifice and so many lives lost? Was this (current political system) worth fighting a bloody war and making so much sacrifice for?
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, and the whole Maoist party, have become a confused lot, lost in transition— from war to peace and from authoritarian ambition to accepting competitive, plural politics. Dahal knows revolution is no longer an option.
Maoist cadres’ sense of restlessness, their frustration and their tormenting sense of having achieved nothing are understandable. After all, they had taken up arms, risking their lives, to fundamentally alter society; to end all sorts of injustices; and to do away with poverty and inequality. Or at least so they were told and promised. And they believed that violence can and is the only way to fix society.
The leadership’s and their Supreme Commander’s response to the cadres’ nagging questions and growing disillusionment is lies and more lies. From Shaktikhor to the Khanna Garments close-door meeting, Dahal has tried to sell the same old lie that the revolution is “continuing”, the party is preparing for the last push, and victory is certain. Graffiti painted by the Maoist student wing this week at Trichandra College read: People’s War is continuing.
Dahal, and the whole Maoist party, have become a confused lot, lost in transition— from war to peace and from authoritarian ambition to accepting competitive, plural politics. Dahal knows revolution is no longer an option. Yet neither Dahal nor his party is willing to shun violence and fully accept peaceful politics. This is the main conundrum that the Maoist party faces today. And how quickly it manages to come out of it will define its future.
After the success of Janandolan II and the end of monarchy, Dahal had an opportunity to tell his cadres, and himself, that the war was over, and that the time for violence was over as well. He should have renounced war, led the party into peaceful politics, and shown zero tolerance against cadres pursuing violence. He had an opportunity to make politics a social service and lead political reform from up front, putting other parties under enormous pressure to change their ways also. But that was not to be.
The second set of crises for the Maoists party is lack of implementable ideas for social change or reform. Not that other parties have any either. If they had, people would not have elected the Maoists as the largest party during the constituent assembly poll. Let’s do a quick reality check of what praiseworthy things the Moaists did do while in power for about nine months. Let’s try to remember three things (just three) that the Maoists did far better or very differently than other parties had done. If you can recall three such things, the Maoists pass the test, if not they fail. The judgment is yours.
The third and biggest crisis facing the Maoist party at this point in time is the character flaw of its chairman, Dahal. By now it’s become amply clear that Dahal faces a major character deficit— he is manipulative and an incorrigible liar, and he is insecure. One of the senior Maoist leaders compared him with Stalin: Like Stalin, Dahal also doesn’t have his own ideas or vision and that makes him insecure. It’s because of this insecurity that he backstabs any leader whose public stature rises. This became apparent when Dahal back-stabbed his comrade, Baburam Bhattarai, telling party cadres in a close-door meeting that India was pushing Bhattarai as the next prime minister. Plain lie that it was, it was aimed at cutting Bhattarai down to size so that his own leadership would remain unchallenged.
The problem for Dahal is that his character flaw is becoming so obvious and is gradually alienating many of his once trusted lieutenants, as was reflected during the last politburo meeting, where a majority of the leaders spoke in favor of the political line championed by Bhattarai.
These leaders, along with Bhattarai, also strongly feel that Dahal showed immaturity while handling the former army chief issue and in mounting a public attack on India over the bogey of hegemony. But, make no mistake, Bhattarai doesn’t control the party machinery, nor can the disaffected leaders in the politburo mount a serious challenge against Dahal.
Thus, 15 years since the launching of the “People’s War” the Maoists have come to a point where there is a lot of confusion about the party’s future direction; cadres are disillusioned and frustrated, Dahal’s serious character flaws have come into play, taking a serious toll on the party, and the leadership is no longer cohesive. Tackling these and still charting a future course for the party is enough of a challenge for any party to take on.
ameetdhakal@gmail.com
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