Rejecting Bhattarai’s line, Dahal’s report echoes the voice of his dogmatic and hardliner Vice-chairman Mohan Baidya- who has always stood against the abandonment of armed revolt and subsequent mainstreaming of the party; while Baburam Bhattarai, the architect of Chunwang karyadisha, had advocated for peace making and constitution writing. As the karyadisha adopted in 2005 paved way for peace process, Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a republic, pleads Bhattarai, the unfinished job of constitution writing and peace making must now be completed. He opines that a deviation like the ‘people’s revolt’ will only invite counter-revolution. Bhattarai is also against unnecessarily antagonizing India while Baidya has been vehemently anti-India from the very onset; Dahal’s anti-Indianism has been an ‘on now and off then’ affair, depending on its usefulness.
Relationship between Nepali Maoists and the Indian establishment was at its best when the two teamed up to overthrow the monarchy in Nepal. Maoist leaders including Dahal enjoyed safe haven, albeit covertly, in India during 8 out of 10 years of their rebellion. Indians also helped them assume power in 2008. However, when they discovered that the Maoists were trying to play the China card or become closer to it, and also that they were not fulfilling many of the crucial commitments as signed in the peace accord they had brokered, they became enraged.
The main objective of New Delhi behind bringing Nepali Maoists into peace process was to create a demonstration effect on their own ever growing Maoist movement- to inspire them to follow suit. It didn’t happen; on the contrary, Indian Maoists condemned their Nepali counterpart for the ‘surrender’ and stepped up their violence. Similarly, as the establishment of a one-party communist state through takeover of national army was not only against the peace deal it was also against Indian interests, Dahal’s attempted purge of the Nepali army in May 2009 with an intention to seize power seriously alarmed and annoyed India. Although his subsequent resignation from office was a cumulative outcome of series of his own misadventures and miscalculations that included the miscarried purge of the army, Dahal blames India for most of his failures. His constant public bashing of India ever since (including the recent declaration of India as ‘principal enemy’), has only soured the relationship; covert efforts to mend which haven’t met with any success. Consequently, the powerful southern neighbor has successfully maneuvered to stop Maoist’s comeback to power.
Dahal’s new karyadisha is therefore the reflection of his fury and frustration more than the dictates of time and history; besides, it also mirrors the new power-equation emerging within his party. In triangular contests, the revolutionary-turned-pragmatist who promises everything to everyone had, in a way that best suits him, played Baidya and Bhattarai, turn by turn against each other, taking advantage of their polarized political lines. The most popular candidate among the populace besides being the most acceptable one for the Indians for premiership, Bhattarai has now emerged as a great threat to Dahal’s ambitions that needs to be subsided. And who other than Baidya who has considerable hold in the party, who is ideologically just opposite to Bhattarai and who is neither ambitious nor presentable enough to challenge Dahal in his contest for Prime-minister ship, would prove a better ally to weaken and isolate Bhattarai?
Till as recent as Palungtar plenum Dahal had refrained from taking side between the two. He skillfully put aside Baidya’s line of revolt during the Kharipati plenum some two years back while during the preceding meetings of Funtiwang, Mysore and Lawang, he stood against Bhattarai’s line. After the Lawang meeting Bhattarai was even put under house arrest and condemned as an Indian fifth columnist. All those actions and allegations were lifted by Chunwang baithak; however, this time such a rapprochement seems unlikely as the hot seat of Prime-minister has now come between the two.
The new karyadisha and his fresh alliance with Baidya will certainly provide Dahal with edge in his intra-party power struggle; but the question is, isn’t he- who possesses first hand experiences of running both guerrilla warfare and prime minister of the country- aware of the overwhelming risks, dangers and challenges of his new karyadisha? As he has neither fixed an exact date to launch, nor a modus operandi of his ‘revolt’, it appears that he is trying to avoid it; but in its entirety, the report gives the impression that he means it. If he thinks that, just because the revolt will be staged in the capital and not in the mountains of Rukum-Rolpa, it will bring quick and positive results unlike during the ‘people’s war’ (1996-2006), he may be wrong. Poor ability of non-Maoist parties to politically counter the revolt, poor effectiveness of routine administrative measures to contain it and possibility of counter-productiveness of military mobilization (including foreign assistance in military operations) - may have added to his optimism, but odds far outnumber his chances of success.
First, because in case of revolt, all forces- even the likes of Jhala Nath Khanal- will be forced to unite to counter the Maoists in whatever way they can; Kathmanduites, especially the middle class, will defy their ‘revolt’ the way they defied their indefinite general strike in May 2010; declaration of emergency by the President or introduction of Martial Law can hardly be ruled out; Maoist cadres (combatants included) STILL are a poor match before the armed forces, particularly the army; bringing masses from the neighboring districts of Kathmandu Valley under coercion or under other parties’ banners won’t work this time; geo-political and international situation aren’t favorable for a Maoist revolt- India, along with major international players will support the incumbent force while China is unlikely to come to their rescue; this time no more safe haven (like India) or strongholds (like Rukum-Rolpa) will be available to hide into safety; their leaders and cadres are now publicly known figures to operate in disguise or go underground like in the past; and last but not least, a rank and file weakened by in fights and corrupted by acts of greed and crime (as admitted by Dahal himself in his report) can hardly accomplish a revolutionary undertaking.
Nepali people are sick and tired of political agitations. They have had too much of it; now they want peace, stability and development. ‘People’s revolt’ without people is bound to turn into a ‘cadre’s revolt’, which will be suicidal to the cadres although painful to the people as well.
The Maoists: To Revolt or Not to Revolt!