In the history of the British Monarchy, the Interregnum refers to the tumultuous years between 1649 and 1660 when England flirted with several forms of republican governments before reverting to monarchical order. Apparently, the changeover from traditional sovereign to popular sovereignty is not without its fatal flaws.
Antonio Gramsci uses the term to denote the predicament of the people during the complete absence or widespread unacceptability of authority and identifies it as a social malaise with pathological indications: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”
The Gramscian observation is sometimes also translated into English in a little more suggestive manner, “The old world is dying away, and the new world struggles to come forth: Now is the time of monsters.” Monsters are creatures grotesquely deviating from the normal shape, behavior, or character. In Nepali politics, they can be Marxist-Leninists. They can be Maoists. They can also be Madhesbadis. Played too long, even the role of the victim can turn into a miserable creature.
The Marxist-Leninists—a group that unashamedly champions assimilative politics of Mahendra—have sound reason to be fearful of change. They had prepared themselves for a unitary republican order where president would be an elected constitutional monarch and everything else in the polity and society will remain the same. The country is headed toward federalism. The most that Maoist ideology can permit is a competition between like-minded political parties. Eruptions of ethnic aspirations, and the desire for self-rule among the masses, mean that diversity and pluralism have to prevail over dialectic materialism. No wonder, Maoists feel that they have become victims of circumstances.
Madhesbadis had to be republicans—monarchy and federalism could not go together. They have to be pluralists too, because there is no other way of keeping the unity of a multi-cultural society intact. Secularism is essential to guarantee freedom of religion, which is a fundamental condition for the institutionalization of democratic polity. In comparison to compulsions of Mahendrabadis of Marxist-Leninist variety and the Stalinists of the Maoist line-up, Madhesbadis should have been the natural vanguard of New Nepal for their own existence. However, some Madhesbadi leaders have turned the practice of playing victim into a fine art for their personal benefits. Nothing else can explain their ambivalence upon two crucial issues of the day: Indian machinations in the country and assertions of administrative autonomy by the Nepal Army.
THE IMPERIOUS NEIGHBOR
It is not yet clear whether the caretaker government requested the Indian Prime Minister to send a special envoy or appointment of Shyam Sharan was merely an expression of neighborly anxieties. However, Sharan’s engagements in Kathmandu left no one in doubt that he was in town with an important mission.
Sharan called upon President Rambaran Yadav. He met the caretaker prime minister. His confabulation with the army chief has not been independently corroborated. He had meetings with all other usual suspects: the Maoist stalwarts, the Nepali Congress leaders and the UML officials. He must have been extremely tired of car rides at the end of his two-day trip. He was spared the effort of traveling to the residences of Madhesbadi leaders however.
All Madhesbadi politicos of any significance were called at the Indian Embassy to pay their respect to the honored guest from the neighboring country. In developing countries, it is not unusual for powerful diplomatic missions to periodically ask their favorites to lick the salt of loyalty. However, most top-notch Madheshbadi leaders emerged in national politics of Nepal despite Indians, not because of them. Indian political patronage is linked with their security interests and welfare of Gorkha soldiers. Madhesis are peripheral to their core concerns. That reality once prompted BP Koirala to declare that people of Tarai origin were true custodians of Nepali nationality.
In the year of the 60 th Anniversary of the signing of Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950, it is important to remember that the agreement does not empower India to be arbitrators of Nepali politics. The Mahendrabadis and the Maoists accepted the role of Indian interlocutors at different times for their own benefit. Madhesbadis need to chart an independent course. It was pathetic to hear that even a leader of Mahanta Thakur’s standing had to meekly troop into a diplomatic mission with his brood to be received into audience by a foreign envoy. Meanwhile, the envoy paid his respects at the private residence of a political has-been at Maligaun.
It is obvious that at least part of the Madhesi reticence in supporting the emergence of a Maoist-led coalition owes its origin to Indian pressures. It is now time for Madhesbadis to emerge out of shadows of a diplomatic mission that will dump them the moment they manage to reach to an understanding either with Mahendrabadis or Maoists. Madhesbadis would need to learn to become independent political players and not be just a bargaining chip in shadowy games being played in Kathmandu.
THE INSOLENT ARMY
It is unfortunate that some Madhesbadi leaders of today have been associated with the two governments of Sher Bahadur Deuba in the past when the strength and the budget of the defense forces ballooned and the army turned into more or less an autonomous institution almost free of political control. Like UML stalwarts, politicos of both factions of Madhesi Janadhikar Forum lack the moral courage to establish the principal civilian supremacy. However, unlike the UML, they gain nothing by kowtowing to the Bhadrakali brass.
Madhesbadis have a point in opposing wholesale integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army. They are also justified in staking a claim that special recruitments from Madhesis are necessary to transform the former royalist force into a proper national army. But they need to understand that a competent and legitimate authority after the formulation of a new constitution and fresh elections would have to first frame a defense doctrine of the country. The federal republic of the future may even decide to curtail the numerical strength of the army to pre-insurgency levels. Hence, it is politically inopportune to let Nepal Army get away with the fresh recruitment drives.
Maoists are at fault in announcing for the enrollment of new combatants. Madhesbadis need to oppose all such moves on matter of principle. But democratization and professionalization of the Nepal Army are important components of the stalled peace process. The Bhadrakali brass should not be allowed to get away with its decisions just because the defence minister of the caretaker government has no political strength to confront the defense forces.
With NC enfeebled, only Madhesbadis are capable of steering Maoists into the mainstream and keep the military under tight civilian control. However, to perform any of those two duties of the interregnum, Madhesbadis have to learn to stand on their own two feet and throw away the Indian crutch. Beyond a point, crutches are invariably a liability in democratic politics.
cklal@hotmail.com
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