An interesting feature of Chinese culture is its emphasis on face/honor (mianzi). Giving face (gei mianzi) and losing face (diu mianzi) are at the heart of dealings the Chinese have among themselves and with foreigners. The recent remark made by the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Lu Kang on October 28 regarding Nepal is a perfect example of China giving face to Nepal and both face and space to India.When asked, "It is reported that China and India are having talks on stabilizing Nepal's situation. Can you confirm that?" His reply was, "We hope that all relevant countries can work together and hold amicable consultations so that a consensus favorable to all parties can be reached." And on October 29, Lu, when asked about China supplying us with fuel, replied, "At the request of the Nepali side, the Chinese government has decided to provide a certain amount of fuel as emergency assistance to Nepal, so as to help the Nepali side alleviate problems caused by fuel shortage. A working group from Nepal was in China for discussions on trade in oil products with the relevant Chinese counterpart." (And this was a day after Nepal had signed a deal with China for fuel supply).
Nepal counted on China for fuel and denying it fuel would make Nepal lose face, so it granted us 1.3 million liters of fossil fuel in humanitarian assistance. But then it was quick to add that there remains a possibility of China holding talks with India on Nepal's crises, meaning, as of now, it has no intention of making India lose face (feel humiliated) in Nepal. This means that China is confident that if it talks to India, then India will agree to resume us fuel supplies thereby giving it face. Or, in case India does not agree, then also, by bringing in India, it will be giving India face. And for anything that happens afterward (read: if China supplies us fuel), it is solely India's doing and responsibility.
Now, if we are to analyze this not-so-unexpected Chinese reaction to Nepal crises, we can draw two interesting conclusions: one, China views Nepal as falling in India's sphere of influence hence it has no interest in upsetting India's role in Nepal. Or it is yet to decide on a strategy that establishes its stranglehold in Nepal without antagonizing India and by appearing to please both India and Nepal, it is buying time (read: Analyze Nepal's situation objectively which probably also figures finding out what the agitating parties in Tarai really want, their ties with India and what reactions its commitment to sell fuel to Nepal will have on the agitation and the political equation in Nepal). What's more interesting is that there are enough examples to prove both these hypotheses.
From Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s to Wen Jiabao's brief stopover in 2014, all visiting Chinese leaders have suggested that we maintain good ties with India. And at a time when China is embroiled in territorial disputes with many ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) members, it is not in China's interest to upset India in South Asia. India's 'Look East' policy and India's willingness to work with Vietnam—one of the countries that China has territorial disputes with—to drill offshore oil in the disputed section of the South China Sea make China see India trying to gain foothold in South East Asia. To prevent India from capitalizing from its deteriorating relations with ASEAN and cooperate with India on stabilizing Afghanistan so that it will not be a safe haven for Xinjiang separatists, China would not want to challenge India in its own backyard. Hence it does not want to involve itself in Nepal; therefore its openness and willingness to deal with India vis-à-vis Nepal crisis.
If we go by the second hypothesis, which also cannot be dismissed outright, we get a different picture altogether. Slowly but surely China has penetrated all aspects of Nepali society—be it government, academia, media, bureaucracy, the security forces or the political parties. With its Confucius Institute, which works as a front to control the academia; junkets to journalists; inviting even those from the home ministry to attend classes specifically designed for the security forces; extending the quota for security forces to attend classes/training in China; even managing to have Chinese taught to young officers of Nepal Army at the premises of the Army Headquarters; and maintaining "party-to-party" relations with almost all political parties of Nepal, including the ones currently agitating in Tarai these days; all these are indications of China making its presence and influence felt in all aspects of Nepali society.
Chinese presence and influence is everywhere, it's just that it's not flaunting it, something the Indians like to do in Nepal. However, given the tight-rope it has to walk in balancing its relations with India, it is yet to challenge India directly in Nepal. Perhaps it is waiting for anti-Indianism to flare up and a potential political crisis in which it can play an important role (again subtly) and get the concessions it wants in Nepal or have its interests, both real and imagined, taken care of.
It wants to portray itself as being forced to get involved in Nepal, again, thereby, shifting the blame for its active presence in Nepal on Nepalis themselves—and on India."We gave you the time to sort out your differences with Nepal, but, you did not and we had no option left to get involved there." All sorts of theories will be used to justify its presence/influence in Nepal: from averting a humanitarian crisis to trickling down effect Nepal's crisis will have on Tibet. And when that happens, it will use Nepal as a bargaining chip (or a trump card, if you will) in its future dealings with India.
Therefore in the short run, we have no option but to view ourselves less as equals and just a bargaining chip in our dealings with India and China. But in the medium run, if we play our cards well, we can have both of our neighbors take us seriously.
One sad aspect of Nepali society is that we are poor. It is not our economic poverty that makes others not take us seriously; it is rather our intellectual poverty that makes others look down on us. Instead of going gaga over China's guarded/non-committal response to our plea of help, we should be devising a scenario in which both our neighbors take us seriously and would not seek to involve the other in our bilateral affairs. And it is possible.
The times call for a thorough review of our foreign policy. In our effort to please our two neighbors we have not been able to engage meaningfully with our two other friends and development partners—the US and Japan. We should look to make ourselves important to their economic interests in Nepal, for instance by inviting their companies to invest in hydropower and infrastructure. We need to make ourselves important to their regional strategic objectives by modernizing our defense. If this can happen, neither of our neighbors nor the world can take us lightly. But to achieve that we need to first rid of the "small" and "helpless" country syndrome. The crisis is the right time for meaningful engagements with the US and Japan, so that we don't have to face such crises in the future. As the old adage goes, let's not put all our eggs in one (or in our case) two baskets.
Going back to China, when the Chinese want to tread carefully or find the expectations difficult to fulfill or to delay working on something, the Chinese language allows for a vague/non-committal answer- hao shuo (rough translation, sounds possible, but this does not necessarily mean it will be done). China's reaction to Nepal's plea is exactly that- hao shuo. It's just that we are not interpreting what's being said correctly.
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