There is no parallel concept is politics describing a government failure. The closest of such concepts we can think is failed state, which generally implies the breakdown of law and order, public unrest, ethnic strife, political infighting, army rule, official corruption, economic decline, widespread poverty, weakening of property rights, and, generally, the disappearance of central authority providing leadership—all of it or some combination of them.
The Fund for Peace, a research and educational organization based in Washington DC, has just published its Index of Failed States that shows Nepal ranked 25 from the top in the category of failed states. In this ranking, Somalia and Zimbabwe are listed as the top 2 among the world’s failed states, while Tajikistan and Iran are ranked 37 and 38, at the bottom red alert states. Among the regional countries, Burma and Sri Lanka are on the list for well-known reasons—political suppression, ethnic conflict—but Bangladesh making up the list is surprising.
For Nepal, however, its categorization as a failed state could be misleading. The Fund for Peace group basically perceives a normal state to be the one which is not at war with other states or is not facing internal insurgency. This particular objective of The Fund for Peace group is clearly stated in its preamble, which introduces the organization as one that works to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war.
The main problem Nepal is facing is the unwillingness, even hostility, of its political regimes, past and present, toward making substantive changes in the use of government power – in the way it has been traditionally exercised.
DIFFERENT KIND OF FAILED STATE
While the instances of external aggression, internal strife, and the breakdown of law and order are certainly the main reasons for undermining normal state authority—major inputs in the Failed States Index—these are not the main and much less the only reasons for placing Nepal in the category of failed states. At a deeper level, there exist social, cultural, and political forces that have combined to make Nepal’s political leadership utterly clannish, elitist, self-centered, and unmindful of the country’s larger interests. It wouldn’t be a bit of exaggeration if we characterize the State—conceived in the Nepali way—to be an institution run by the government, of the government, and for the government.
Looking at the ill-functioning of government institutions in Nepal—at the present time and also historically—what can possibly be the State’s raison d’être? Taking some examples from history at first, there is a well-known episode in the early 20th century of Rana Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher weeping at the inaugural ceremony of Tri Chandra College in 1918, saying that he had axed his own feet by allowing the college to open, most likely under British pressure. Similarly, eminent historian Dilli Raman Regmi writes in his book A Century of Family Autocracy in Nepal (1951) that Rana administration banned parents from sending their children to India for education, and even the reading of Indian newspapers and magazines was prohibited, as an instrument to keep people uneducated!
Later in the early 1960s, King Mahendra took over the government exercising his royal power, overthrowing the elected government of BP Koirala. King Mahendra—the most cunning and politically savvy in the Shah dynasty—knew that Koirala was charismatic, had wide public support, doing well to enshrine democracy, build public institutions, and develop the economy from grassroots. Instead of appreciating Koirala’s effort and exploiting his popularity to build a stronger and prosperous nation, Mahendra saw him as a bitter rival, trying to undermine monarchy. He used the army to subdue Koirala, which changed the course of Nepal’s history. The country has been in continual decline since then.
Probably King Birendra, who succeeded Mahendra in 1971, could have corrected his father’s mistakes. The new king, who ruled until his death in a royal massacre in 2001, had been educated at Harvard and Tokyo universities, traveled the world, and seen first hand the sorry state of the nation, especially the incidence of massive poverty and illiteracy. However, he had nothing to do with people’s problems and in fact he strengthened the monarchy’s hold on power and ran a medieval administration worse than his father’s.
The democratic revival of 1990 made no difference for the people at large, in terms of the quality of administration, provision of public service, and abuse of power by political elites. These new power-seekers ruling under the guise of democracy did almost nothing to assert people’s control of government operations and, on the contrary, they assimilated and hobnobbed with the stalwarts of previous regime. It is not so clear why the democratic administration did not go after these abusers; instead, they chose to rehabilitate them and helped them return to power, being fully aware of the fact that these old panchayat hands had a history of suppressing democracy and keeping the economy backward. My own interpretation of this bizarre piece of Nepali history is that these democratic leaders lacked confidence in the benefit of empowering people and felt safer aligning with old autocrats who continued to wield considerable power over the key institutions—army, police, courts, and bureaucracy.
Finally, coming to the last of recent claimants to political authority in the country—the Maoists—despite their ideology, rhetoric, and record of decade-old insurgency to establish people’s government, they also failed to run the government for the benefit of people, perhaps more miserably than earlier regimes. After all, securing people’s rights, ending corruption, expanding opportunities, and making public services accessible for the poor had been their battle cry. However, they performed no differently during their nine months in office and laid out no plans for the future. They wasted their time on esoteric issues like civil supremacy, foreign imperialism, and India’s hegemony, which they used as an escape from reality in the face of enormous challenges they faced on the ground.
GOVERNMENT AGAINST PEOPLE
Nepal’s current predicament—its speedy descent into the category of failed states—is almost entirely of its own making. Over the past half a century, Nepal has experienced no sizeable calamity—natural or manmade; no foreign aggression; no sustained civil strife; foreign blockade; or international sanction. Maoist insurgency was just a ragtag rebellion, which could have been suppressed quickly if the government of the time had so wished but it didn’t for self-serving purposes. Maoist insurgency was certainly not an instance of civil war, like those in Somalia, Sudan, or Nigeria. Also, India’s trade blockade of the late 1980s was a short-lived diversion, lasting about a year.
The main problem Nepal is facing in terms of improving governance, alleviating poverty, and laying the foundation for a prosperous economy is the unwillingness, even hostility, of its political regimes, past and present, toward making substantive changes in the use of government power – in the way it has been traditionally exercised. Regardless of the political coloring—monarchy, panchayat, democrats, communists—there is little inclination for risk-taking, which means an abundance of compromises for keeping the status quo. Otherwise, why would Maoists collaborate with GP Koirala for the ouster of monarchy when they knew Koirala had been staunchly anti-communist? The compromise was nothing more than a marriage of convenience and had little to do with the serving of public interest. If either of the parties had chosen to take risks on behalf of the people, they would have fought, not compromised, to set a new direction for the nation to evolve.
Nepal’s political history is littered with such compromises: Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher kept his job after the commencement of democracy in 1950, even when democratic rebels had fought a running battle for his ouster; BP Koirala compromised with King Mahendra by announcing “reconciliation,” which suggested as if he was apologizing for his advocacy of democracy; and democracy’s stalwarts of the early 1990s compromised with panchas to sustain its hold on power. Had the instances of compromises been substituted for victory or defeat—taking a stand for what the leaders believed in and was prepared to fight for—this would have helped produce a responsible regime. Looking at the past 50 years, it is impossible to say what led to the current mess in the country and who are responsible for it. Probably all of them—whoever have had anything to do with politics!
Unfortunately, the story does not end here. Political culture in the country will continue to be self-serving and risk-averse, in which case politicians are unlikely to be motivated to do more than what is needed for own survival. Principles and ideologies will be adhered to for the sole purpose of getting into power. But once in power, they will act and behave no differently than those who came before them, and this cycle is likely to be repeated. For example, we now have a Republic but, most assuredly, it will operate no differently than King’s panchayat or Congress’ democracy. This is so because of the political culture we have inherited; change of parties and personalities will make no difference.
sshah1983@hotmail.com
Related story
Depression, Anxiety Tied to Worse Outcomes in Heart Failure Pat...
