Just look back at the past five years. In January 2005, there was a sense that the king might take over, but few could have predicted the November 12-point agreement. 2006 started with protests in Kathmandu, and the royal regime’s municipal elections. Even as Nepal appeared set for a prolonged confrontation, the regime crumbled with the People’s Movement. As 2007 began, there was the residue of the euphoria generated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) but the dissent over the interim constitution from Madhes, and its anti-Maoist slant, threatened to rock the entire edifice of the peace process. After two election postponements, few were willing to take a bet that elections would happen as we started out in 2008, and even fewer could have guessed the kind of Maoist electoral wave we saw subsequently. Hints of a Maoist-army confrontation had begun appearing with the recruitment row at the beginning of 2009, and polarisation was visible – but could one guess that Madhav Nepal would become PM and run a government that has lasted more than six months?
This is a country of uncertainties. But if the recent past, and present trends, are any indicator, 2010 will be a game-changing year. The present drift cannot last for another twelve months and something will have to give. While hoping that this is a year of institutionalised democracy and peace when we get a new and progressive constitution, an equally likely scenario is that of a renewed, possibly violent, confrontation. Things will get worse before, if at all, they get better in 2010.
The fundamentals
Here is the rub of the problem.
The Maoists are strong – stronger than many other parties put together. They have 240 members in the House, a substantial mass base, the PLA and YCL, a party organization capable of reconciling internal differences and penetrating across social spheres, a lot of money, and multiple front organisations. Along with this fact of capability is intention. The Maoists remain committed to a programme of radical state restructuring – which includes federalism, land reform, ‘democratisation of Nepal Army’, a strong presidential system, an ‘equal’ relationship with India, and multiparty competition where limited parties will get to function freely. To achieve these goals, the Maoists have adopted a path of popular mass politics, but with degrees of violence when necessary.
The other side is weak and discredited – which is why they have had to gang up together like in this 22-party coalition. Riddled with internal contradictions, fear of the Maoists is the only glue that holds the coalition together. Their weak domestic base means they rely on international (read Indian) support and do the army’s bidding. Their commitment, in principle, is to ‘liberal democracy, pluralism, non-violence’. The ‘democratic’ camp has some genuine leaders who believe in socio-economic transformation but fear the Maoists will impose another kind of ruthless dictatorship and need to be challenged. Most constituents in this camp though would like to see minimal changes in the present state structure. They are willing to allow a degree of ‘decentralization in a unitary structure’ and leave the army untouched. A few parties in this alliance would be happy to reinstate the monarchy and a Hindu state, and revert to a narrow hill elite dominated structure.
It is this fundamental dichotomy that explains the lack of consensus on power-sharing, constitution making, and the peace process. Non-Maoists feel if Maoists are allowed back to lead the government, before they are ‘reformed’, they will be even more ruthless, and use the state to push a totalitarian agenda. Maoists feel cheated out of the formal power structure and see this period as similar to the 2002-2005 interlude – as preparing the ground for a further rightward drift.
On integration and rehabilitation, the problem is both of timing and nature. Non-Maoists insist that the question of the PLA should be settled before the constitution is written, and that this is essential to level the playing field. There is resentment among them that Maoist bargaining strength, on the basis of the PLA, has increased even as the state has been funding them. The Maoists have made it clear that they would agree on integration and rehabilitation only if they are sure the constitution will be written – or possibly after it is written. In the Maoist worldview, the PLA was critical in bringing the ‘progressive’ changes of the past few years. They will not agree to get rid of the PLA at a time when they feel others have ganged up against them, and are preparing for a confrontation.
An additional problem is how to go about it. At best, non-Maoists are willing to offer token integration, as individual citizens, to a few thousand former combatants. This will be a hard-sell for Prachanda. For the Maoists, PLA integration into the NA is useful only if it adds to their political strength and helps change the nature of the ‘feudal army’ – it is not an employment guarantee scheme. They would rather use these soldiers in the party structure. Till there is a symbolic recognition of the PLA, unit-level entry, and space for some commanders, the Maoists will not co-operate on integration. And that works just fine for those in the non-Maoist camp and NA who do not want any integration at all.
This divergence is also playing out in the CA committees. From federalism based on ethnicity or ‘nationality’, executive model, nature of judiciary, land reform, rights to local communities and symbolic reframing of the national symbols to constitutional guarantees and pace of affirmative action, Maoists and non-Maoists have differences. These are not intractable but add to the trust deficit, with Maoists accusing the others of wanting a ‘status quoist’ constitution, and the Maoists facing flak for pushing a constitution for a ‘People’s Republic’.
Confrontation or peace
What we are witnessing at present is thus a battle to decide the precise balance of power, the nature of the state, and who will control the future state. If this is the fundamental dichotomy, it could play out in different ways this year.
One fairly frightening but not entirely unrealistic possibility is that of a confrontation. There are five power centres influencing politics at present – India, Presidency, Army, Old Parties, and the Maoists. The first four are together. Their calculations that the Maoists would become weaker or the party would split after leaving government have fallen flat. But instead of learning the right lesson, extremists who believe that the Maoists need to be ‘taught a lesson’ have gained ground. This in turn has fueled the dogmatists among the Maoists who insist the time has come to raise the pitch and move to the next stage of revolution. What would this mean?
The Maoists – for all their mass base and muscle – are not in a position to become the only hegemonic power in town. Kiran and company may think a popular mass offensive, combined with effective deployment of the YCL and sections of the PLA, will allow them to take over Singha Durbar – but there is little chance they can retain it. The polity is too fragmented; many ethnic groups have turned their back on the Maoists; the army will resist them; the NC and UML cannot be entirely discounted. But most importantly, this will mean taking on Delhi. India is not comfortable with a regime that is so strong that it refuses to be pliable to their interests. There is little chance it will let Kathmandu fall.
The question of the other side defeating the Maoists and winning decisively is even more remote. Even if there is strong political and Indian backing for a security offensive (which is what the far right and those arguing for presidential rule after May 28 seem to want), the Maoist structure has penetrated too deeply into society and spread into urban areas.
The state forces would need to shoot down hundreds of people on Kathmandu streets, decimate the leadership, and attack PLA cantonments. Such a bloody onslaught seems unlikely – it will generate resistance even within the political parties and alienate ordinary citizens; and the backlash from the international community will be strong. Even if the establishment goes ahead, the Maoists are not going to disappear. The right wing should remember that the Nepali state has a fraction of the strength of the Sri Lankan state, and the Maoists are not LTTE, given their mass base, legitimacy, and nation-wide organisation.
This scenario will push Nepal into a prolonged bloody quagmire, without a victory for either side. It would be lunacy, but give the irrational impulses and cut-throat competition that often guide our politics, a resumption of large scale violence and collapse of the peace process cannot be ruled out.
The other, more hopeful but unlikely, scenario is that of a renewed peace deal. This would mean all sides sitting together, admitting that the CPA was useful but instead of continuing with the fiction that it is reduced to, agree on a renegotiated agreement building on it.
Six issues have to be simultaneously dealt with in this new peace accord. The first is that of integration and rehabilitation, accompanied with some changes in the NA’s functioning and structure. To reassure all sides, the process could begin now, but it can be completed after the constitution is promulgated and before the next elections are announced. The second is a deal on federalism, executive model, and land where the established parties move beyond the staple 90s model and Maoists give up dreams of a totalitarian state. The third issue is an agreement to extend the timeline of the CA with an amendment if the deadline is missed. This is a political issue, and is too important to be left to lawyers to ambiguously interpret. The fourth issue is that of the role of presidency in the interim period. To give the Maoists a face-saver, and to avert a future constitutional crisis, this would mean an amendment that specifically delineates what the president can do/cannot do/ his rights when he feels a cabinet decision is inappropriate, and the mode of cabinet recommendation to a president. The fifth issue would require fundamental concessions by the Maoists – on property return, changing the structure of the YCL, and making a firm, principled commitment to pluralistic, non-violent democracy. They can add ‘people’s’ if it helps them sell the slogan to their cadre. And the sixth issue would be a change in the power-sharing arrangement where the state structure reflects the country’s political reality – which is that the Maoists are the strongest force – instead of continuing with the present farce.
The likelihood of such a deal is remote. Domestic polarisation is too deep. Maoists will think this means becoming a social democratic or a UML-type party; non-Maoists will see it as yet another instance of appeasement and not want to give up power. There are too many actors, and the days of GPK-Prachanda as the only two who matter, are over.
India, the only external actor with any leverage, is not interested in playing a constructive role either. Their underlying policy line is to preserve established interests and not make any concessions to the Maoists, unless the Maoists willingly agree to undergo ‘course correction’ and become weaker. In practice, this means – support status quo; embolden the presidency and army; engage the Maoists, give them nothing, wait for them to get frustrated, hope for a split; and then wait and watch for the ‘domestic balance’ to be restored. Delhi’s actions will strengthen the far right and the far left, not the moderates who are capable of negotiating such a peace deal.
Where does this leave Nepal in 2010? To be honest, no one knows. The present status quo will not and cannot last. There will soon be a crisis – which can either be the trigger for outright violence, or shake all sides from their stupor and force a deal. But the longer it takes for all sides to strike a deal, the prospects of a confrontation increase. A more violent conflict or a stronger, renewed CPA is our choice for this year. To paraphrase a senior politician, that means either becoming an Afghanistan or institutionalizing peace and a new federal democratic republican constitution.
(Prashant Jha is a journalist and political commentator based in Kathmandu. He contributes to various Nepali and Indian magazines and newspapers on contemporary Nepali politics and India-Nepal relations.)
Related story
11 years after CPA, conflict victims still await justice
