In Nepal’s case, which joined IMF in 1961, its choice for the country grouping has never been in doubt, which was to avoid any closeness with India, irrespective of whether such choice makes geographic sense or is meaningful economically. Current India grouping in IMF-and also at the World Bank--includes regional countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, with the exception of Nepal which, surprisingly, is grouped with unimaginably remote geographic locales with no economic ties with it whatsoever—Fiji, Tonga, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
Looking at other international groupings and platforms, Nepal’s choice has never been in doubt—avoid any association with India and minimize bilateral relations to no more than diplomatic niceties, devoid of warmth and appreciation, whether this be deserved or undeserved. The logic of keeping a distance from India is simple. Nepal does not want to be mistaken as an extension of Indian territory which, in many ways, it still is—open borders; racial mixtures; cultural similarities; and, most importantly, economic-lifeline provided by its access to Indian market, both on formal and informal basis.
Maoists’ challenge: As of now, there is no firm evidence that India has any intentions of annexing Nepal, contrary to the perception that has fed Nepali nationalism. In almost all cases, India has viewed government changes in Nepal as Nepal’s internal matter, not affecting India’s interests in a significant way. For example, if India would have wished its own brand of government system operating in Nepal, it would have compelled King Mahendra in 1960 to reverse his overthrow of a democratically elected government.
Some three decades later, in 1989, India unilaterally placed a trade embargo against Nepal, which had a ruinous effect on living conditions of the population that depended on India for essential supplies and for contacts with third countries. It is widely perceived that trade embargo was used to support the on-going democracy movement in Nepal but as far as I see, this is plainly false. India hadn’t missed democracy in Nepal for three decades and nothing new had emerged since then to encourage it to help restore democracy in Nepal. The only reason for India’s trade embargo was Nepal’s acquisition of military supplies from China, which was a clear violation of its peace treaty with Nepal.
Lastly, looking back at the events of 2005-06 when monarchy came under seize by the opposition forces led by the Maoist rebels, India had no doubt that opposition to monarchy was justified and that a change in regime will be a progressive step and beneficial for the people of Nepal. At the same time, India saw the risk that the perceived level of momentous change would unlikely be smooth and stabilizing, especially when the struggle was spearheaded by a radical group of communist ideologues. A preferred course of action for India would have been to side with the King—however unpopular and autocratic he may be—and end the rebellion with an armed intervention. And this could have been justified on the ground of protecting its own security interests.
Despite the compelling reasons for saving the institution of monarchy, Indian policy makers didn’t exercise this option and let the events in Nepal unfold the way it did—quite similar to the role it played during the regime change in 1950.
Maoists’ fate will be sealed if India gets convinced that their presence is harmful for Nepal and problematic for the region as a whole. Then, there will be sufficient reasons for India to back Nepal’s security forces to assume an offensive posture against the Maoists.
Sovereignty at Risk! Looking at the events that have unfolded since the monarchy was first side-lined--later abolished--some four years ago, India must be regretting the fact that it didn’t act wisely in response to the evolving situation in Nepal to ensure a more predictable and, hopefully, more favorable outcome to it and for Nepal. During the period of decade long Maoist rebellion, India had no special grudge against the rebels whom it considered a nationalist force opposed to feudalism and concerned about development and modernization. India, then didn’t figure out that Maoists’ nationalism would come down to a narrow and disturbing focus, ie, to settle score with India as its first priority, and deal with other national issues after the battle against India has been won!
In all likelihood, India would just ignore Maoists’ tantrums and not prepare for any actual battle. Nonetheless, it may consider Maoist belligerency as too destabilizing for the region; disincentive for productive enterprise; and an obstacle to restoring normal life for the people in affected areas. It may perceive the risk that longer such a situation is allowed to persist, wider would the spread of poverty and lawlessness, which would eventually spill over into the adjoining regions of India.
Maoists’ fate will be sealed if India gets convinced that their presence is harmful for Nepal and problematic for the region as a whole. Then, there will be sufficient reasons for India to back Nepal’s security forces to assume an offensive posture against the Maoists.
Other affected parties observing this showdown will just remain observers, as they had during the early years of Maoists insurgency, for the reason that their vital interests would not be involved and, more likely, they would be gaining an advantage if the Maoists cease to exist as a major political force. India would observe from a distance how a post-Maoist administration is managed.
How would the world react to India’s action saving Nepal from communism? Most likely, it will get an approving nod of all. There is no evidence that Maoists have earned international goodwill for its electoral success in Nepal. Indeed, world opinion—China included—has been against communist rule anywhere and, looking in this way, India is likely to earn much goodwill for stopping communism’s comeback in the Himalayan republic.
The only loser in this battle for ideology and supremacy will be Nepal itself, assuming that it survives the battle against Maoists. There is a danger that it would revive monarchy justifying Maoist threat—real or imagined—and would not be afraid of public backlash for poor performance, as long as it enjoys India’s goodwill. Absent India, panchayat rule was not much different than what may be in store for Nepal.
sshah1983@hotmail.com
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