The Armed Police Force (APF) is among the most notable legacies of the Maoist insurgency. Formed in 2001, King Gyanendra envisioned the force as a counterweight to the fast-spreading influence of the armed Maoists. But the rationale for this paramilitary force, now 35,000-strong, has increasingly come into question after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the then Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in 2006. So does a peace-time Nepal need a paramilitary force, over and above its 70,000 regular police personnel? There are no straightforward answers. In recent times the APF has largely been deployed for border security, for security of VVIPs and in the aftermath of big natural disasters. According to its charter, the force will also be deployed if there is an "armed rebellion" or "separatist activity" in any part of the country. Since the transitional Nepal is still a hotbed of armed groups, political or otherwise, and since incidents of cross-border crimes along the porous Indo-Nepal border are increasing, the APF has a vital role to play when it comes to safeguarding the country's vital interests.But there are some real risks in having a (functioning) paramilitary force. Compared to regular police tasked with maintaining law and order in normal times, a paramilitary force, deployed during emergencies, is more trigger-happy by its very nature. But after the end of the Maoist insurgency, only rarely has the APF employed the 'last resort'. This was because the sixth amendment of the APF Regulation (2003) categorically outlawed the use of lethal force under any circumstances. This put the APF personnel deployed in emergencies in a quandary. If they could not employ lethal force, how would they protect themselves against armed foes? The new APF Regulation (2015), published in the Nepal Gazette on Monday, thus comes as a relief for the APF top brass that had over the last few years been lobbying for more discretionary powers in use of force. The APF can now legally use lethal force as a last resort. The new regulation also gives the paramilitary force the authority to issue arrest warrants and makes it harder to initiate legal action against APF personnel if someone dies or is injured during its deployment.
These new powers for the APF could easily be abused without proper oversight. Another risk is a possible internecine turf-war between Nepal Police and APF. So, again, there are no easy solutions. But if Nepal is to have a paramilitary force, it does not make much sense to tie up its hands. If someone is trying to kill you in a field of battle, the only way you survive is if you first kill your armed opponent. There is also no point in only prosecuting police officials who open fire (sometimes to deadly effects) if their political masters higher-up who sanction the action cannot be held accountable for their decision. During the second Jana Andolan, many top police officials, both from Nepal Police and APF, were implicated in grave rights violations (including killings) but no charges were brought against the Home Minister who sanctioned their actions. Political actors across the political spectrum, it appears, colluded to protect one of their own. No wonder the APF wants more legal cover for its actions.
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