BIG BROTHER
India lies at the center of South Asia in every respect. It shares borders with all other states in the region except Afghanistan. None of these states share a common land border with each other. By virtue of its size in terms of both area and population, India dominates every sphere of life in the region. With a land area of close to 3.2 million square kilometers and a population of over a billion, India is almost four times the size of the other states of the region put together. Its economic superiority is unparalleled, larger than the rest of the region combined, and is growing incredibly fast. India is superior in terms of military too although Pakistan’s nuclear power has struck a balance.
India’s sees itself as a regional power, if not a hegemon as it neighbors would like to call it, and is striving to achieve a Great Power status. It has always played a role in domestic politics of the smaller neighbors. From creation of Bangladesh in 1971 to peace operation in Sri Lanka in 1987, and establishment of democracy in Nepal, India’s involvement in the regional politics is widespread. (The analysis is based on India’s relation with the three countries because India’s role in Afghanistan is limited to reconstruction because of the heavy presence of the US-led international coalition fighting insurgents; and India already enjoys a considerable influence over foreign policies of and provides extensive security support to Bhutan and the Maldives.)
Hardly any of India’s neighbors are democracies in the true sense of the term and most of them politically unstable. India worries that given the shaky governments and political instability in these countries and the long, porous border it shares with them, anti-India elements might exploit the situation to strike Indian targets. Although the past terror attacks in India, including the 2002 attack on parliament, did not originate in these countries, Indian leaders fear that instability in these countries may give rise to extremism and provide favorable condition for anti-Indian elements, most notably the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI, to act against India. Moreover, India also fears that its homegrown extremists and separatists might use the territories of these states to operate against Indian interests.
Although India has always cited its security concerns as justification for its involvement/intervention in the domestic politics of its smaller neighbors, it wants to engage its neighbors in a bid to prevent them from reaching out to external powers.
ANXIETY
Although India has always cited its security concerns as justification for its involvement/intervention in the domestic politics of its smaller neighbors, it wants to engage its neighbors in a bid to prevent them from reaching out to external powers. As Oxford University Prof. Kanti Bajpai says, “India lives in fear of its neighbors reaching out to outsiders to balance against Indian power. New Delhi would love to integrate the region under its leadership and keep the great powers out.” As stated above, India strives to achieve a Great Power status but it is unlikely to be considered a credible force unless it maintains its influence in the neighborhood. In a sense, India follows its own version of ‘Monroe doctrine’ and does not want the presence of other powers in its vicinity.
India is worried about the initiatives taken by its smaller neighbors to forge ties among themselves or with other states. It views such attempts as their steps to break or escape its sphere of influence and uses its diplomatic and economic leverage to thwart their ambitions. India was against the idea of establishing a regional organization when Bangladesh’s Ziaur Rahman proposed to form South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) because India interpreted this as its neighbors’ move to reduce India’s influence on them. India finally accepted the proposal on condition that the forum would not be used to discuss bilateral issues. This would leave enough leverage for India to deal with these countries on one-to-one basis. Farakka Barrage agreement with Bangladesh, for instance, explains why, in the words of South Asia expert Stephen Cohen, “Delhi has resisted Bangladesh’s attempts to be part of any larger international framework that might impinge upon its own regional dominance.” In the late 1970s, India rejected a US proposal to create an integrated river management system that included Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and possibly China. Outsiders’ involvement in management of the Brahmaputra and the Ganges was formally ruled out in 1996 when India signed a 30-year treaty with Bangladesh.
India also declined to support Nepal’s ‘Zone of Peace’ proposal although a large number of states, including world’s major powers had already endorsed it. This was Nepal’s own version of nonalignment, which India interpreted as Nepal’s attempt to free itself from India’s influence and extend its support base across the globe. Likewise, the real cause behind India’s blockade of Nepal in 1989 was not, though India said it was, the expiration of the Trade and Transit Treaty. India was, in fact, angered by Nepal’s purchase of Chinese weaponry. But there was no breach of agreements. First, according to the 1950 treaty, Nepal needs to consult India only when the arms are to be transported through India’s territory. Secondly, the argument that the weapons poses threats to 20 times bigger India is misleading at best. In fact, India interpreted the arms deal as Nepal’s attempts to reach out to China. As another South Asia expert Devin Hagerty argues, the tension resulted from “India’s displeasure with Nepal’s assertion in the late 1980s of a new spirit of independence in defense and foreign affairs.”
One of the reasons of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was driven by a design to forestall intervention of external forces, primarily the US and Pakistan. The then Sri Lankan President, JR Jayewardene, considered possibility of military assistance from the US, the UK, and Pakistan to control the violence ensuing the 1983 pogrom. But India warned these governments and others that it would not tolerate outside intervention in Sri Lankan affairs. An exchange of letters between then Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene in the run up to the 1987 accord reveal that in return for Indian pledge to stop supporting Tamil guerrilla in India, Colombo was required to consult with New Delhi about the employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel; prohibit the military use of the port of Trincomalee by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests; and review its existing agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations to ensure that their facilities are not used for any military or intelligence purposes. Such provisions effectively precluded military assistance from Pakistan and Israel that were hitherto selling arms to Sri Lankan government.
India has always involved in its smaller neighbor’s internal politics out of what it calls its own security concerns. Even when India is not directly participating, it casts its huge shadow over its neighboring states where political parties define their positions in terms of their relations with India. India has always tried to install pro-Indian governments in these states and punished those who went against India’s interests. India justifies its involvement by stating that instability in these countries leaves them vulnerable to extremism, which ultimately poses threats to India’s security. However, India’s involvement goes beyond its security concerns, with the implication being India’s fear of losing its influence in the region. India needs to keep its grip on the region before embarking onto the world stage, but alliances between its immediate neighbors and other powers might dash its hopes of maintaining its sphere of influence.
govindab@buffalo.edu
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