As we went to press on Saturday, PM Baburam Bhattarai was all set to reshuffle his cabinet to accommodate Nepali Congress and CPN-UML into what will be a ‘consensus government’ although technically, even with all the major parties on board, it will still be a majority government. According to the five point agreement between the four major political factions on Thursday, Bhattarai’s expanded government will be replaced by another NC-led consensus government before the promulgation of the new constitution. The NC-led alliance, according to the agreement, will lead the coalition government until the next general election to be held within a year’s time.
So far so good. The major political entities huddling together to finalize the most important document in the country’s history, what’s there not to like about the latest turn of events? Moreover, the parities have rightly agreed not to dissolve the government altogether, which would have been a foolish exercise just weeks before the constitution deadline. There are some troubling signs though.

Apparently, NC´s participation in the Maoist-led government makes it easier for the Maoists to join a future NC-led government. The Maoists were reluctant on a Congress-led alliance since the Grand Old Party had never joined a Maoist-led government in the post-2006 dispensation. Thus, it is argued, the participation of NC in Bhattarai-government holds great ‘symbolic’ value.
Be that as it may, just the fact that such symbolic gestures hold such importance for the political class is a sign that intra-party faith, particularly between the Maoist and non-Maoist forces, is still pretty low. Otherwise, instead of inducting a new cabinet, and within a matter of 20-odd days, replacing it with another government, the Maoists could simply have agreed to join NC-led government on the eve of the promulgation of the new constitution, as had been decided during previous agreements.
This might sound like fussing over a non-issue. What does it matter if the country has two or three governments before May 27 if it gets a constitution by the date? But a no-less important question is: What happens after May 27? Even while Nepali Congress and UCPN-Maoist might talk up their spirit of compromise on the eve of the constitutional deadline, it is a clear sign that there is still a lot of mutual suspicion between the two primary actors of the peace process.
This could be potentially dangerous. Now, it is the fear of public backlash and the Supreme Court’s directive that has forced them to close their ranks on important issues. But post May 27, this mutual suspicion is likely to re-emerge strongly. Of course, a lot depends on the kind of constitution the country gets. But it is also becoming clear that irrespective of the content and form of the statute, there are likely to be major disturbances post May 27 from disgruntled forces. In this situation, as the political actors jockey for position on national polity, and look to shore up their constituencies ahead of the general election, the polarization between Maoist and non-Maoists forces will further increase. And not just between them. No matter what is written in the constitution, Madhesi leaders are sure to ratchet up their rhetoric against anti-Pahadi centre establishment. The old guard will fight back, tooth and nail, against what it sees as an unjust attempt to extract tough confessions from the current generation for the fault of their forefathers. The dalits, janajati and other indigenous communities will thunder that plans are still afoot to deny them their legitimate rights.
These disagreements are likely to center primarily on state boundaries as the model proposed in the new constitution is contested from various quarters. In such a fluid environment, holding of general elections will be no mean task. How should the Election Commission prepare for elections when it doesn’t even know the boundaries settled on the constitution will hold one year down the line? Also, maintaining law and order and creating a secure atmosphere for the polls will be a tall order, for there is little doubt that the elements unhappy with the changes will try to disrupt the first major democratic exercise of republican Nepal.
Let us for a moment ignore the impact of emergence of new political forces and alliances (which is bound to happen in a fractious transition polity). Just an extrapolation of the impact of the current forces arrayed against the new constitution into the future gives us a measure of complexity post-May 27.
A split in the Maoists is only a matter of time. Right now, the Badiya faction is biding its time. It will time the split so as to extract political leverage. That might be right on the eve of promulgation of the new constitution, which is sure to have some effect, if not a catastrophic one, on the constitution process or right after May 27, when it will have the added ammunition of the collective wrath of the disgruntled forces. As the Baidya faction’s opposition to even the most well-established Maoist agenda (presidential government form, for one) shows, it is ready to descent to any depth to discredit the peace and constitution agenda of Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Baburam Bhattarai. The ex-monarchists will likewise play up the chasms in Nepali polity that has emerged as a result of a ‘misguided federal agenda’. The extreme Tarai outfits could intensify their struggle for One Madhesh, as could the ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups who believe they have been hard done by an unjust state restructuring and unequal power arrangements.
But all’s not gloom either. Nepal’s political history has gone through some remarkable twists and turns in the last six years. No matter what the political actors claim now, there were times when the peace and constitution process that started in 2006 looked in serious jeopardy. The 2007 Madhesi Uprising; the fallout of PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s sacking of former CoAS in 2009; the once growing affinity between Dahal and Baidya on the plank of their radical line; the overblown suspicions of NC and UML about Maoist intent; each could have delivered a potentially lethal blow to the political process. The political class, somehow, managed to muddle through all this. Again, the hope is that important compromises can be worked out at the eleventh hour, which in turn will guarantee a semblance of stability after May 27. This in turn will entail major concessions on vital issues like identity, governance and right to self determination understood as the right to group autonomy.
But make no mistake: Whatever the shape of the new constitution, post May 27 scenario will call for a level of trust and spirit of compromise and accommodation (among multifarious actors from vastly different political and socio-economic backgrounds) that is unprecedented in the history of Nepali polity. If Nepal survives this as yet its toughest test, the much maligned political actors, for all their past failings, will deserve a big pat on their back.
biswas.baral@gmail.com
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