Sounds ironical, even puzzling?
Here is an explanation: The peace process will now move forward not necessarily because of the five-point deal but because the next three months are probably the last window of opportunity for the parties to redeem themselves, even more so for Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal. And also because the parties have already bridged their differences on the key issues. [break]
Conversations with NC leaders who were a part of the negotiating team on Sunday clearly indicate that they signed the deal not because of its contents but because “we felt that even if the Maoists, especially Dahal, were tricking us, this would be their last chance.”
“If the Maoists betray their promise, we can cast our vote against CA extension after 90 days,” says one NC leader.
Maoist Chairman Dahal played a key role in persuading the NC and UML leaders that he was sincere this time round. “You may not trust me but I will implement everything that we have agreed informally so far and will surprise you by concluding the peace process in less than two months,” Dahal said. Throughout the negotiations, says an UML leader, “We felt that Dahal was being serious and sincere. After a long time it felt like he meant what he said.”
As negotiations continued hours after midnight and it soon became a race against time, Dahal proposed a “plain deal”(without elaboration and agreement on specifics) and said, “Have faith in me. If we can’t accomplish things in the next three months, I know we can never trust each other again and people will also lose faith in us.” Perhaps everyone got the subtext of his plea: I know none of you will ever trust me again if I fail to deliver this time.
But not everyone was ready to buy Dahal’s word and at the forefront of this small group was Krishna Prasad Sitaula, the man who had trusted Dahal so much and for so long but felt “betrayed” every time.
Sitaula seems to have been emotionally exhausted with the Maoists, and he is no longer ready to accept written commitments from them, let alone verbal. That’s why he was little interested in any agreement and insisted on weapons handover before May 28.
When Dahal reached out to Sitaula last Friday in an attempt to soften his stance, he had bluntly responded: “Just think how many times you have betrayed me though I always fulfilled what I promised you. This time no words, I want action.”
It’s not easy to judge how sincere Dahal is this time or how serious he is about keeping his promise.
But one thing is for sure — time and space for Dahal in Nepali politics are rapidly shrinking and he must act quickly if he hopes to salvage himself. It’s hard to see any place for him if he is further discredited.
If there is a compelling case for Dahal to deliver, there is also good news on the peace front: a solid platform has also been set up for further progress.
The 18-point “Special work plan to conclude the peace process and constitution writing” that the Maoists sent to the Nepali Congress Sunday morning just before the final negotiations began, is a good document. On many issues proposed in the document, Maoist, NC and UML leaders see eye to eye. And they had a great deal of discussion, and made progress, on Sunday on areas where they disagreed.
In that document, the Maoists have proposed the integration of 8,000-10,000 combatants in the National Development and Peace Directorate proposed by the Nepal Army. They have also proposed to immediately begin handover of weapons used by PLA combatants for the security of central level Maoist leaders, and categorization and segregation of the combatants by the first week of June. Once the categorization and segregation process is completed (within a month) the weapons will automatically come under the control of the Nepal government. The Maoist proposal also says that previous agreements on the YCL and return of seized property will be implemented “immediately’’.
Integration numbers are not a problem. The NC and UML said during Sunday’s negotiations that they can agree to 6,000, but 7,000 seems to be an acceptable number for both sides. Since the Maoists have agreed to form a mixed force under the Nepal Army the modality issue is more or less settled.
There are now three major issues on integration/rehabilitation that needs to be agreed on: Rank harmonization of Maoist combatants to be integrated in the proposed Directorate, standard norms for integration and the work and responsibility of the Directorate.
Rank harmonization and setting standard norms won’t be easy given the low education level and competence of the Maoist combatants. The Nepal Army wants one of its major-generals to lead the proposed Directorate and integrate Maoist combatants at ranks not higher than major. The Maoists will surely bargain for much more than that.
Likewise, the Nepal Army wants to develop the proposed Directorate as its own special wing specializing in development work, relief and rescue operations and forest conversation.
“It will not be easy to persuade our combatants to join a Directorate that will have ‘non-combat’ responsibility only,” said a Maoist leader.
The Maoists want the Directorate to assume responsibility for border security also. But the Nepal Army thinks that’s too sensitive an area for the army to embark upon.
During his Nepal visit last March, Chinese army chief Chen Bingde requested his Nepali counterpart Chhatra Man Singh Gurung to mobilize the Nepal Army along Nepal-China border in view of the Tibetan issue. Gurung politely turned down the request, saying it wasn’t Nepal government policy to mobilize the army along the borders.
Generals argue in private that mobilizing the army along the Indian and Chinese borders entails huge risks. “A minor friction between the security forces across the border will draw the whole army into a potentially bigger conflict, which Nepal can ill afford with either India or China.”
Finally, there is one more reason why the peace process is likely to move fast. Dahal now has before him the carrot of leading a national consensus government; he can hope to become prime minister if he concludes the peace process. By involving Mohan Baidya, who leads the hard-line faction among the Maoists, in the negotiations process, Dahal is being very strategic in an attempt to forestall possible resistance from that quarter should the opportunity indeed arise to lead a national consensus government.
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