In our current system, even in instances where the ruling party has a majority in the government, the PM serves at the behest of his party members. As we have seen, like in any other country, there are groups among the party members, and they will appoint someone who will benefit them, not the public.
This causes problems.
First, the PM always remains indebted to those party members that help appoint him. Often he is forced to appoint them as a minister of a “plum” ministry. If one of his influential party members asks for favor, he has a hard time refusing. Failure to keep them happy can cost the PM his job. This scenario can occur even when the PM has a strong influence on the party. It happened to Girija Prasad Koirala in 1994.
Second, it eats time that can be devoted to serving the public better. From day one, the PM is faced with two challenges, one is to keep his party members happy, and the second is to keep the public happy. And, by the design of the system, the former always gets priority than the later. What is worse is that the former is the genesis of corruption.
If a cabinet member embezzles money allocated for development, it is difficult for the PM to seek his resignation. And if the corrupt cabinet member has shared his loot with other important party members, it becomes impossible for the PM to even seek an explanation. Instead, there is a strong desire to look the other way. By doing so, the PM encourages corruption at the very top. When the ministerial offices themselves are corrupt, it is unrealistic to expect honesty from the bureaucrats at the lower level.
Contrast this with the following situation. The premier is directly elected by the people. He chooses who he wants as ministers, and can fire them at will. He can only be removed in case of corruption via a 2/3rd majority in the parliament. And in addition, he is allowed to serve as the premier for only two terms.
This set-up would put an end to many problems that we see today. It would put an end to the constant plotting by the opposition to bring the government down. It would put an end to discussion about which party member should be in charge of which “plum” ministry. It would put an end to a situation where the minister stays in the cabinet but criticizes the policy of the PM. It would put an end to a situation where the premier is held hostage by the important members of his own party. It would put an end to a situation where the party’s priority comes before that of the public.
Direct election would encourage the PM to speak directly to the public and keep them sufficiently happy. Failing to do so means he would not be re-elected. Overall, this scenario would give better incentives for the PM to serve the public, and increase the possibility of cleaning the corruption racket.
Like any system, direct election of the PM is not perfect. Critics of the system argue that this system could create massive deadlock in passing new laws. That is partly correct. The premier may not always find support to pass the bills he wants, because he may be at odds with his party members. But at least, he could implement the existing laws without fear. At least we could move on from the discussion about who should govern to how we should govern.
There would still be horse trading, but the horse trading would be to pass new laws. Horse trading would never be to change the government.
The other criticism is that this could make the PM very powerful. Well, this maybe the case, but there would be checks and balances in place. There would be a provision to impeach him. Besides, he would not be allowed to be in power for more than two terms.
Is this reform likely? Any leader who sees a better prospect of becoming PM in the status quo will oppose it. So I would not expect the top leadership of NC and UML to support it. Girija Prasad Koirala had vehemently opposed the possibility of electing the PM directly from the public. Lower-ranking politicians of these parties may support it though. The Maoist party may support this model. Their leadership is more articulate, charismatic and their electorate is dispersed, therefore they stand a better chance in direct election.
Whether the regional parties will support this agenda is not that clear. It works in their favor because it is more meritocratic and cuts down barriers for the top post. It works against them because their voters are concentrated. Regardless, a member of a regional party can never become PM in this model unless he changes his rhetoric and agendas to benefit all Nepalis rather than a particular community or region.
Overall, there is some possibility that we may end up with direct election of the chief executive. I certainly hope that it does.
Writer is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance at Texas A&M International University in Texas, US
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