I have no illusions. If India decides to directly intervene in Nepal (through an economic embargo or even militarily), no one will come to our rescue, certainly not China.Desperate for international recognition, Chairman Mao wanted to accept King Mahendra's 1955 invitation to open a residential embassy in Kathmandu. But he still sought Jawaharlal Nehru's go-ahead. It was a straight quid pro quo. If India was ready to accept Chinese sovereignty in the newly conquered Tibet, China would recognize the Indian 'sphere of influence' that spanned Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. The regional geopolitics hasn't changed much in the last 60 years.
As economic linkages between India and China deepens—India is now China's biggest business partner, with bilateral trade worth US $71 billion in 2014, four billion more than US-India trade for the same period—China is all more unlikely to upset India over small fries like Nepal. The two countries completely bypassed Nepal over Lipulekh, a crucial trade link in the Himalaya for the small landlocked country. China's reluctance to directly challenge Indian primacy in Nepal was also evident at the post-earthquake donor conference: the Middle Kingdom committed less than half the Indian pledge of US $1 billion.
Nor was it a coincidence that the Chinese statement welcoming the new constitution in Nepal came only after the first of the three now-famous statements from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The statement had hinted that India, despite some of its reservations, broadly welcomed the Nepali constitutional process (an erroneous reading, as it turned out). So China followed suit. Whether we like it or not, China, and the rest of the world, continues to see Nepal as India's backyard. It's a different matter that we need not have been reminded of it so bluntly.
This is why I think the Indian political and foreign policy establishments have badly botched the constitution end-game in Nepal. If India wasn't happy with certain provisions in new constitution, it could have quietly leveraged its vast network of backchannels in Kathmandu to wring out more concessions for Madheshis and Tharus. If the past is any guide, India would have had its way. India successfully defanged Pushpa Kamal Dahal in 2009; it as successfully engineered a divide in the Maoist party in 2012; and it was under its aegis that an improbable government under a sitting Chief Justice became possible in 2013—on and on goes the list of successful recent Indian interventions in Nepal.
For most of the two-odd months the Tarai belt was smoldering, India chose to look the other way. (If anything, India was accused, wrongfully in my view, of instigating violence there.) Kathmandu's political elite was given to believe that even if India was unhappy over Tarai-Madhesh, it would let Nepali actors settle outstanding issues. But somewhere down the road, it decided that a more muscular response was warranted.
After the Constituent Assembly had already started clause-wise voting on new constitution, India issued a press release in the middle of the night, expressing its oblique displeasure with developments inside CA. When the message didn't have the desired effect, it then sent a special envoy to Kathmandu to publicly excoriate Nepali leaders. And now the first hints of an economic embargo. This last-ditch diplomacy smacks of desperation and plays right into the hands of top Pahade leaders who had until recently been at the beck and call of New Delhi. They can now proudly pose as ardent nationalists courageously standing up to the Big Brother.
Yes, Nepal has to recognize India's legitimate security worries over Tarai. Continued instability in Tarai will, sooner or later, spill over the open border. India's concerns for the rights of Madheshis of recent Indian origin are also well placed. But it's strange that the Indian establishment believes browbeating Nepali political establishment and in the process alienating millions of common Nepalis is the way to go about it.
So if India blocks the border, could we turn to China for help? Not really. First of all, China doesn't want that role, not at the cost of alienating India. In any case, China's one and only concern in Nepal continues to be Tibet. Any regime in Nepal that can effectively silence Free Tibet activists and can assure against the creation of purely 'ethnic states' next door to Tibet will do. Since the new constitution didn't in anyway jeopardize these twin goals, the Chinese had no problem embracing it. But just on that basis it would be unwise to assume that they will come to our aid if India imposes an embargo (or more), as seems more and more likely.
Chairman Mao used to say that if Tibet was China's palm, Ladakh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim and North-East Frontier Tracts were its five inseparable fingers. Three of the five regions are now Indian territories; the fourth, Bhutan, is a de facto Indian protectorate. That leaves Nepal.
This is not to imply that Nepal will also soon be absorbed into India, a highly unlikely prospect even when Indo-Nepal relations are at an all-time low. I only hint at the Chinese modus vivendi in the Himalayan region. Mao's rhetoric notwithstanding, China has always accepted Indian primacy south of the Himalayas. If this is true of China, it is all the more true of the US, the Europeans or any other country which wants to expand into Nepal.
This is why India's recent temper tantrum is surprising. The world follows its lead on Nepal and the entire political class in Nepal is beholden to New Delhi. If KP Oli becomes the prime minister tomorrow (India willing), I am sure his first foreign stop will be to New Delhi, just like his predecessors bar one; Pushpa Kamal Dahal went to Beijing instead and had to pay with his prime ministership. In other words, given the broad range of diplomatic tools in its arsenal, there was no need for New Delhi to muscle in at such a sensitive time.
But what's happened has happened. After the saber-rattling of the last few days, both New Delhi and Kathmandu need to come back to their senses. India should dial down its pressure tactics so that Nepali leaders can be seen trying to reach out to the Madheshis on their own. Big Three leaders, too, must realize that accommodating Madheshis and Tharus is, ultimately, in their own interest. The stakes shouldn't be raised so high that it becomes impossible for either side to back down. China substituting India as the primary supplier of vital necessities in Nepal is more wishful thinking than a credible policy option.
@biswasktm
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