Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s impending visit is of great significance. The relationship of two countries goes back a long time. After all, Bipaswi Buddha and Manjushree, both of whose roots can be traced back to China, are believed to have created the Kathmandu Valley. Wen’s visit is going to be the first by any top leader of the world to the republican Nepal.
It has now become a norm to look at Sino-Nepal relations through the parochial Tibet prism. This view tends to see Tibet as a ground to shape and project bilateral powers, a rising trend among those who disdain Nepal’s espousal of “one China policy”, an unchanged foundation of the country’s international relations in the last 25 years. In fact, the policy has continued since 1950s and enunciates deep-seated geo-political necessity of close partnership with China for the stability of any regime in Nepal.
Nepal-China relations in the first decade of twenty-first century underline balanced mutual interest of the two nations. Nepal’s rationale for promoting relations with China hinged on it broader quest of national development as well as using it as a gateway to international prestige through greater connectivity with Tibet, Central Asia and East Asia. Started by King Birendra in 2001, and later pursued assertively by King Gyanendra in 2006 and Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal in 2009, the focus rested chiefly on bringing home some bacon of China’s rapid development and prosperity. An outstanding example is the Shigatse-Kerung section of the Quinghai-Tibet railway that will ultimately bring Kathmandu and Mt. Everest within few hours’ reach from northern border and open Nepal’s access to Mainland China and Central Asia. If the railway comes to Lumbini, two of the most important tourism sites in Nepal—Mt. Everest and the birth place of Lord Buddha—will be linked through a single transport line. This unprecedented development will unleash Nepal’s tourism potential.
There are other northward road networks being built. In the western region, Simikot-Hilsa road has been high on the government’s priority. Once completed, it can serve as a backbone for the development of geographically remote Karnali region. Lamabagar road in the central region started as an access route to Upper Tamakoshi hydro electricity project—the largest under-construction project in Nepal—with the road being extended as a new connecting line between Nepal and Tibet. When completed, the Mid-Hill Highway, running parallel to the East-West Highway, will further bolster Nepal’s efforts at greater connectivity, both within Nepal and beyond.
Together with the railway line, these transport links will help Nepal realize its dream of becoming a bridge between China and South Asia. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s is an affirmation that China is committed to supporting such connectivity links and a clear statement that China will stand by Nepal, in good times and bad.
But Nepal must also be willing to address genuine concerns of China. Nepal shares 1,500-km international boundary with China, which has, in the past, used by external elements to cause instability in Tibet. China frets that these so called anti-China elements can ferment instability in Tibet and destroy China’s goodwill in the region. Nepal’s presence as a buffer between China and India is a relief to the Chinese, but increasingly it is concerned that the buffer is being used to fuel Pro-Tibetan activities. These activities are often donor-driven support and China resents increasing engagement of the West in matters that are bilateral. Countries or organizations engaged in Nepal must understand and respect the delicacy of Nepal-China relations. They must be clear that Chinese interest in Nepal begins and ends with Tibet. It cannot remain silent if the issue of Tibet is ‘used’. Any attempt to poke at Tibet will have implications for the rest of the world too.
There are two dimensions to Nepal’s neighborhood policy. First, Nepal’s instability is seen as a source of problem by the outsiders. But China’s backing of the political establishments, irrespective of their ideological leanings, has helped maintain political stability in Nepal. But with the political parties fragmented and monarchy—a perceived stability factor—abolished, Nepal’s protracted transition unnerves it like never before, further adding to its apprehension that a political standoff may spiral into pandemonium offering fertile ground for rough elements.
Second, Nepal’s political leadership looks increasingly incapable of managing the transition, thus helping spawn extremist outfits. Political breakthroughs of late have renewed the hope of reconciliation and stability. The Chinese premier’s visit will embolden the centrist ground whereby local actors put their heads together to chart out a common ground. It is in the interest of Nepal to solve internal problems and present itself as a potential ally in realizing the neighbors’ larger national goals.
As we see, Nepal-China relations are not merely bilateral in nature. The two countries are working together for Nepal’s growth, for the propagation of regional stability and for achieving national security goals of both. It is important to nurture the ties on these grounds.
Nepal’s image in the in the international arena has been marred because of the seemingly endless power squabbles at home, underdevelopment and politicians’ apathy towards people’s will. Political leaders have tried to validate their actions on the pretext of transition. In such a situation, Nepal’s international prestige is contingent upon how soon the transitional period ends.
Jibao’s impending visit has already done its bit by giving out a message that Nepal is increasingly important in the regional context. Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s expected visit early next year will further bolster the argument that Nepal is no longer a footnote in regional balance of power.
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