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China, India & Nepal's Maoists

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Subsequent to a series of crises, self-incurred or else, the Maoists stepped down in May 2009 after leading a coalition government for nearly nine months. While in office, they irked the coalition partners with their one-upmanship and antagonized the Indian establishment – the most powerful force in Nepal’s realpolitik – by trying to be closer to China. Furthermore, they decided to sack the army chief as a first step of their secret plan (which was later leaked to the media) to seize power, sending shock waves across the political spectrum, both domestic and international.



However, it was overturned by the president at the behest of 18 political parties, which included parties in the ruling coalition as well. Consequently, an isolated prime minister chose to resign from office. Now in opposition – despite being the largest party in the legislature-parliament – the Maoists obstructed the proceedings of the House for nearly six months before letting it function for three days in order to pass the budget. Since they resigned, they have also continuously launched street protests to oppose the president’s ‘unconstitutional’ move and, of course, to return to power.



Inviting China to counter India will be a blunder. What our leaders should understand is that if kowtowing to Indian pressures will undermine our nationality, inviting the Chinese to counter the Indians will endanger it.

Thereafter, the Maoists tried to play China against India alleging that the latter was behind the president’s move. Their calculation that China, the country deemed able to counteract Indian influence in Nepal, will support them on grounds of ideological brotherhood, proved wrong. First, because China’s foreign relations are not guided anymore by Marxist affiliations; in post-Mao China they are determined by national, economic and business interests. Under a communist identity, China has paradoxically been pursuing free-wheeling capitalism since the past 30 years and the experiment has been a great success bestowing tremendous benefits upon her. As such, she is no longer interested in fraternal alliances.



Sino-Indian relations, too, notwithstanding periodic disagreements, have come a long way since the sixties despite unresolved border disputes. The two nations are no longer the warring enemies of 1962. China’s favorable balance of trade with India has been bulging every year, so have investments between the two. China wouldn’t risk losing those and other benefits just for the sake of Nepal’s Maoists.



The smoothness of terrain, stronger ties of geography, history and culture, the scale and intensity of people-to-people contacts and economic linkages and open and active borders, apart from being Nepal’s only viable passage to international waters and skies, are geopolitical advantages India enjoys over China vis-à-vis Nepal. The Maoists knew this. That is why they maintained excellent rapport, albeit discreetly, with the Indian establishment all the while they were underground and even afterwards despite their anti-Indian rhetoric, a favorite of all Nepali communists. Covertly, both used each other, especially to get rid of Nepal’s monarchy—their shared enemy. That is why, no later than their ‘China card’ went astray, the Maoists tried to mend fences with India by sending feelers and paying visits. The effort continues.



As a strategic buffer between India and herself, who shares the second-longest international border of her politically sensitive province of Tibet, China wants Nepal to contain anti-China activities of Tibetan exiles within its boundaries. She also wishes that Nepal maintain a somehow balanced relationship between the two neighbors. That is all the Chinese expect from Nepal. On her part, Nepal too has always taken care of Chinese interests no matter who is in power. Even if Nepal wants, it cannot do otherwise. The military offensive against (Tibetan) Khampa rebels 35 years ago is a case in point.



Before 2006, the northern neighbor regarded monarchy as the most stable force and permanent friend of China in Nepal and counted on its support. Now, with monarchy gone, they have changed the policy of relying on a single ally. The CPN-UML during their first stint in office in 1994-1995 tried behind closed doors to present itself as an ideological ally but the Chinese did not oblige.



Naïve in international diplomacy, Nepal’s communists often mistake the invitations for visit and other goodwill gestures from China as affirmations of political affinity. The Chinese, who believe only in state-to-state relations, keep inviting party leaders for goodwill or familiarization trips irrespective of international links or ideology of their guests. Recently, during one such trip, Maoist leaders tried to ‘discuss’ about the Indians but the Chinese side preferred not to reciprocate.



Nepal needs to build her capacity to act independently of Indians. This may be a slow process like nation-building, yet this is the only right process and also a part of nation-building. Inviting China to counter India will be a blunder. What our leaders should understand is that if kowtowing to Indian pressures will undermine our nationality, inviting the Chinese to counter the Indians will endanger it. Rightly equated by our wise forefathers as a yam between two boulders, Nepal cannot afford to play our two giant neighbors against each other.



jeevan1952@hotmail.com



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