A dramatic resurgence of the concept of civil society was identified both in political theory and practice since the 1990 pro-democracy movement, when the large sections of the population, particularly the urban trade unions, workers, and the middle-class teachers, students and professionals joined the people’s movement against authoritarian regime. They were at the forefront of the struggle for the restoration of democracy despite all the efforts of the regime to silence or co-opt them. The success of the people’s movement causing the collapse of the royal authoritarianism had given opportunity to the northern donors to mobilize aid for ‘strengthening democracy’. The autonomous association of civil society was identified as a rich source of energy, which had the potential not only to promote the idea of free market but also to guard authoritarianism.
The conceptual ambiguity on civil society has also given birth to various new definitions, which are actually quite opposite from its idealized philosophical concept. Civil society has directly been equated with highly-bureaucratic NGOs and its highly-paid professional staff.
Donors’ approach largely resulted in increasing the number of NGOs that suddenly started claiming the label of civil society while the quality and the real agent of change was left behind. The higher and the proper-middle classes’ educated elites were identified as potential actors who could best fit into this framework to further donors’ agenda of neo-liberalism. This new group that claimed themselves as civil society acting as a technical instrument to donor’s democracy rhetoric replaced the former radical civil society, which was committed to undertaking an emancipatory approach through a social movement. The popular societal practices, led by the lower-middle classes and the lower classes, are largely being overshadowed and, to some extent, have been hijacked by the hierarchically-organized activisms by the privileged higher-middle class, which facilitates international influence for its own particular economic-political ends. Seira Tamang questions this trend saying that ‘there is no sense of culpability of how foreign aid has led to and has ramifications on how the present conflict in Nepal has emerged’.
In the post-conflict scenario, a long-established reputation of civil society as a public watchdog has gradually been declining to a political co-option and ethnic divisions. Neat ethnic divisions of civil society such as Pahades vs Madhesis, Bahauns vs indigenous people and Dalits, Tharus vs other Madhesis, Muslims vs Madhesis have been raising tensions within and among civic arenas that are feeding into the dynamics of the post-conflict complexity rather than building peace. The post-conflict production of civil society networks such as Madhesi civil society network, Tharu civil society, Muslim civil society network are a few examples of civil society having ethnic lines. Similarly, the triangular political polarization of civil society into radical left, moderate left and right wings has not only weakened the civic movement but also raises a question about the concept itself. The civil society faction of radical left appears as pro-Maoists; moderate as a close ally to the UML, and rightists as the Nepali Congress (NC) supporters.
Generally, some clients within civil society cooperate with the government while others remain in the opposition. The cooperation and the opposition are always influenced by the political alliance of civil society with the government. Politics within civil society is very competitive, similar to the high politics among the political parties; particularly it reaches a climax in a post-dictatorial period. The competition is often underpinned and designed by political parties offering a nomination to a high-level, government-sponsored post. The practices of party manipulation and cooption have gained public legitimacy as civil society usually draws power from political society rather than from their social bases. This trend has devalued both the concept and the actual movement. There is a wider acceptance that this political division of civil society is because it is ‘civil in name but political in purpose’. The post-conflict polarization is only a continuity of a historical legacy. ‘The formation of five open forums, Democratic National Unity Forum, National People’s Forum, Civic Rights Forum, People’s Right Protection Forum and Human Rights Protection Forum in 1985 by the Communist Party of Nepal (ML), later renamed as UML, was an example of overlapping between civil and political society. The civil society discourse lacking a neat boundary between civil and political society resulted in a practice of carrying the flag of a political party on the one hand while a civic banner on the other.
The conceptual ambiguity on civil society has also given birth to various new definitions, which are actually quite opposite from its idealized philosophical concept. Civil society has directly been equated with highly-bureaucratic NGOs and its highly-paid professional staff. What constitutes a civil society? What does not? Who are the constituent members? What purpose does it have and how can those ends be achieved without external financial support in a poor country like Nepal? How and to what extent does it differ from NGOs? The conceptual confusion and unresolved and debated issues have problematized the civil society concept. It has also resulted in further reduction to the practice of community-owned and community-governed concept of NGOs and created communication gap between the insiders and outsiders. This is clear evidence of how the conceptual dichotomy has a direct impact on empirical location and the actual problems faced by civil society in Nepal while taking on a peace building role.
Empirically, lack of internal democratic structure has further created a sense of doubt among the common people to question the credibility of civil society organizations. The civil society organizations in the developing world often lack the internal democratic procedures though they claim themselves as promoters of democracy. A weak mechanism of financial transparency and a lack of accountability towards the social constituencies have badly damaged civil society’s reliability. The people have started questioning the source of funding before accepting the programs designed. Moreover, treating people and community as ‘a hopeless object’ has detached them from the grounded socioeconomic reality in which they are rooted. The diverse actors working in this sector with their self-serving agenda of economic benefits and acquiring political power perceive themselves as highly-prestigious because of their strong public voices. However, the reality is quite different. People outside the civic arena often perceive civil society activities as alien efforts that do not take into account social reality, and its members as dollar brand, hotel habituate and working for high salaries and luxurious living standards.
At the macro-level, there are many who believe that those with greater access to socioeconomic resources find it easier to organize effectively and those who are economically-weak and socially-deprived cannot contest on an equal basis. It reinforces unequal social relations. It provides the fuel for generating wider perceptions that the concept of civil society in Nepal is merely based on the elite theory of democracy that favors the wealthy and the higher classes avoiding the classical model of participatory democracy in which the masses from below collectively make decisions. In this context, the question is not limited to build a civil society movement against the authoritarianism of the state, but more importantly to initiate a counter-hegemonic resistance by the relatively-deprived social forces that can break the hegemonic nature and hierarchical relations existing within the civic arena.
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