Maoist’s relation with India was the warmest four years back when they entered into an alliance with the then seven parties at India’s behest. The alliance was formed to fight the direct rule of King Gyanendra who, defying the dictates of geo-politics and common sense, had antagonized India.
In retrospect, the Indian establishment had provided safe haven to Maoist insurgents, albeit covertly. Indian policymakers knew that Nepali politicians were too weak, divided and inept to politically counter the Maoists. So, it was only prudent to recognize and use a force that was bound to emerge in the backyard rather than to confront, reject or ignore it.
One may ask why then did India publicly tag the Maoists as terrorists. Well, that was to preclude international shame. The fact that the “terrorists” barely harmed or sabotaged Indian business interests in Nepal when they spared no other during their decade-long guerilla war speaks for itself.
During their offensive, Maoists needed sanctuary as well as availability and safe passage of arms and ammunitions and India was the only country that could provide both. Anti-Indian rhetoric aside, the Maoists also realized that Indian cooperation was vital to reach and remain in Singha Durbar; thus the marriage of convenience. India had its own reasons to broker peace back in 2005; the main objective behind the 12-point peace accord was to bring the Maoists into the peace process, which was also anticipated to create a favorable demonstration effect on the Indian Maoists. Indian policymakers rate Maoist insurgency in India as the #2 security threat after Kashmiri separatism-Islamic terrorism nexus. They envisaged and analyzed that because of the socio-cultural homogeneity, politico-economic similarity and geographical proximity – success or course of Maoist movement in Nepal was bound to have significant impact on its Indian equivalent.
Therefore they decided to steer Nepali Maoists on the road to peace and democracy with the expectation that their Indian counterparts would follow suit. When stronger and far more successful Nepali insurgents would switch to peaceful and democratic methods, the much weaker and less successful Indian equals would have no choice other than to follow the example, thus envisioned the Indian leaders.
Despite their earlier successes, Nepali Maoists in the later stages craved for a dignified exit from their ‘people’s war’ as they were losing the battle to Nepal Army. On the other hand, weakened by their own incompetence and witch-hunted by King Gyanendra, leaders of Nepal’s seven mainstream parties were willing to join hands with Maoists to avenge the monarch. But this was not possible without Maoists renouncing violence, thus the signing of the peace accord between seven parties and the Maoists through the good offices of India.
The Maoists were in the good books of India till they formed the government one year back. That they are not anymore and that they are out of power is not a coincidence. Meanwhile, many explanations, most of them China-centric, have surfaced with regard to India’s unhappiness with the Maoists—China’s increasingly active role in Nepal, closeness between China and the Maoists and the latter’s distancing from India are the popular theories doing the rounds. However, the most prominent theory – the demonstration effect – has not been properly discussed so far.
Even after being voted to power through free elections, the Maoists continued their effort to seize absolute power. They made no secret of their mission to establish a one-party communist rule. Indian leaders did not like the course which was against the deal and democracy. Although anti-democratic regimes in neighboring countries are not unwelcome for Indian policymakers (for instance, Bhutan and Myanmar), one with a radical ideology is. For fear that extremism would transcend to Indian soil through porous borders, a communist takeover is always the last thing India wants in Nepal. Perceived ‘demonstration effect’ backfired in two ways. On the one hand, Nepali Maoists turned their back both on democracy and India. On the other hand, Indian Maoists not only condemned Nepali Maoists for ‘surrendering’ but also escalated their violence.
CPI (M) leader Sitaram Yechury and other erstwhile mediator’s weakened position in Delhi’s power equation since the last parliamentary elections and similar changes of intelligence, security and diplomatic personnel are cited as reasons for the now changed relationship between the Maoists and India. However, they are secondary factors only. Strange but true, unlike in other issues of security or foreign policy, political mainstream in India is now sharply divided over the issue of Nepali Maoists into different camps of BJP, Communists and the Congress-led coalition. Anyways, whatever it is, the India-Maoist honeymoon is over, at least for now.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
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