This political pitch, lashed with economic logic, did help unite the young intellectuals of the world who were angered seeing the exploitation of workers by undeserved and, in most cases, hereditary rich. Marx and Engel’s Manifesto—and later Marx’s Das Capital—provided political legitimacy in a very grand manner for the establishment of proletariat states.
Communism reached Nepal a century later, in 1949, when The Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) was established in Calcutta under the leadership of Pushpa Lal Pradhan with the help of some prominent Indian communist party leaders. It is not clear why Pradhan saw the need for an ideology-based party at a time when Nepal was being ruled by a medieval Rana oligarchy. The preferred option would have been to join hands with Nepali Congress (NC) that had established itself as a credible democratic force. One explanation for communists establishing a separate front against the Ranas was the perception that NC was too dependent on India’s support and that would lead them to compromise on Nepal’s sovereignty and that NC was not progressive enough to challenge the feudal, social and political structure that was the hallmark of Rana regime.
ROYAL COMMUNISTS
Although Nepal’s communists started with the ideology of change and progress, they were badly exposed just a decade later when the party refused to oppose the royal coup of 1960. Later that year, the then King, Mahendra overthrew a democratically-elected government with the clear intention of restoring a Rana-type regime under a different name, marked by extreme intolerance for electoral politics and democratic norms of governance. Despite the universal ban on political activities and outlawing of political parties, Mahendra allowed communist leaders much more freedom than he did to their democratic counterparts, especially NC. Indeed, many of the communist leaders supported the royal coup enthusiastically and many even joined Panchayat.
It is unclear why communists supported Mahendra’s coup despite the conclusive evidence of a return to medievalism and feudalism that the coup represented. The major reason for communists’ tolerance—even acquiescence—of king’s rule then was their stronger commitment to nationalism and keeping Nepal a sovereign country in a situation when the ruling NC seemed closely aligned with India and was untrusted for standing up to India to assert independence and sovereignty.
Indeed, during subsequent months following the royal takeover, all opposition to new Government established under King’s leadership came to be labeled as anti-nationalistic and anyone not supporting the change was castigated as anti-national.
This slogan for anti-nationalism was targeted almost entirely at NC’s closeness to India—of its leaders as well as the political philosophy it propagated. As such, communists were found to be the right mixture of authoritarianism and anti-India euphoria to be drawn into the royal camp. In some smaller measure, communists’ support for the king also reflected in their embarrassing defeat in the 1959 election in which they managed to win just four seats, out of a total of 109 parliamentary seats contested.
Communism in Nepal not only survived but prospered during king’s direct rule lasting over three decades, which was focused, in large measure, on nationalism and sovereignty and, by association, keeping Nepal at a distance from India. Such commonality of views between communists and the king probably worked to put restraint on the use of army to suppress the Maoist rebellion that started in 1996, which was read by late King Birendra as a front against NC and its close relations with India. If not intervened by the Royal Massacre of 2001, Maoists would have prevailed over democrats and worked with the king to save Nepal from being pushed into India’s arms!
THE LOST HALF-CENTURY
More than any one single factor that has worked to derail Nepal’s development efforts over the past half-century—right from the start of Mahendra’s coup in 1960 up to this day—would be India-phobia nurtured by the late kings and the communists. Looking at the grim history of Nepali politics and economy, as this has evolved since the end of Rana regime in 1950, it would be difficult to ascertain as to when Nepalis have had good times in terms of shared peace and prosperity and a hopeful outlook of the future. Yet, I would like to maintain that this period was the 1950s during which a number of landmark progressive steps were taken to institutionalize democracy and lay the foundation for a modern economy that accompanied a sensible planning for development, with the whole-hearted support from international donors and, most specifically, generous offer of help from India.
Overall, Nepali economy then drew much of its support from unhindered access to Indian market and Indian imports freely entered Nepal, and given that Indian currency circulated in Nepal side-by-side with national currency, Nepal’s economy was, in fact, an extension of India’s. Because Indian economy offered a vast market for Nepal to specialize and send its surplus to India—food, forestry and light manufacturing, all based on the country’s comparative advantage—this would have provided a solid foundation for the country’s long-term growth.
Unfortunately, all these economic advantages and democratization efforts came to a scratching halt after the coup of 1960 and national policies became heavily skewed toward warding off India’s influence on the country’s economy and politics. The policies that followed during subsequent periods essentially meant that Nepal was sealed off from international trade and specialization, and functioned essentially as an autarkic enclave, just like North Korea and Cuba!
We cannot over-emphasize the fact that Nepal is an isolated country from the rest of the world despite its appearance of being otherwise. The most convincing proof of this isolation is that the country has not been able to benefit from the double-digit economic growth being experienced by both its large neighbors—India and China—with Nepali economy stuck at subsistence rate of growth since its opening to the world in the 1950s.
IDEOLOGY & PRAGMATISM
Maoists’ ascendance to popularity and position of power is unlikely to be a short-term phenomenon, despite recent setbacks to regain political authority it lost just a year ago. Such inevitability of Maoist staying-power in nation’s politics for the foreseeable future ensues from the poor record of governance by previous regimes and much less the people’s embrace of Maoists’ ideology and vision which, in most parts, seem other-worldly and impractical. For good or bad reasons, Maoists now must govern the country and other claimants to power would need to join in or stay on the sidelines. The reason is that in the absence of a record of Maoists’ untested mandate, there is hardly any chance for political situation to normalize now or in the foreseeable future and, as a consequence, the country’s economic prospects would continue to remain grim.
However, Maoists gaining public mandate may be the necessary condition for it to legitimize its rule, if it comes to power, but this will not be sufficient. Given the experience of its humiliating exit from power a year ago and repeated failures over the last few months to force its comeback; Maoists must have understood by now that they cannot override India’s concerns about its rule in Nepal. Nepal’s geopolitical reality is such that India must feel comfortable with whoever rules the country and how it gets ruled for the obvious reason that any slippage in bilateral relationship is bound to affect its vital interests, in no small a way than its relationship, for example, with Pakistan. Most specifically, Maoist Chairman Dahal presenting himself as an ideological front for China, and he seeing India’s evil designs in all sorts of relations it maintains with Nepal, make it abundantly clear that a Maoist rule of the country would be perceived as a foreign policy nightmare in India.
Given India’s reservations about Maoists’ credentials and intent, it is unlikely that they would be allowed to wield government power in Nepal and, even if they do, it will not last long. No government in Nepal from Ranas onward has functioned without India’s support and blessings, and Maoists cannot do it differently.
Maoists then must change course and tone down their rhetoric which, in most parts, is based on holding India accountable for all of Nepal’s troubles which, for most observers, look as nothing more than diversion tactics.
The first requirement for Maoists for making themselves acceptable to India and to most of the civilized world would be for the party to adopt a different name, which is less ideological and less threatening than the one they have now. Second, they must switch their priority from ideology and politics to improving the economy, with plans for turning an agrarian subsistence economy into one that is based on industry and finance, taking advantage of opportunities available in the international marketplace. Third, Maoist must pledge that, should they come to power, they would open the country’s borders for unhindered bilateral trade with both of its large neighbors, inviting them to compete for developing transport infrastructure that helps Nepal connect to markets in both countries. And, finally, that a Maoist government would adopt the rule of law and offer unlimited protection to private enterprise and respect private property rights, under international supervision.
There is little doubt that India and the rest of the world would welcome Maoists’ change of heart, which promises good life for the Nepali people as well as contribute to world welfare. The other option for the Maoists is that they stick to their current course at the risk of making themselves irrelevant or, at best, operate as a subversive and criminal element in society and become an international pariah.
Maoists of Nepal, change!
sshah1983@hotmail.com
Change of Guard and OBOR