It does not seem irrational then that Dahal had a change of heart to turn to India to cultivate trust, earn legitimacy, and get backing for their brand of government that holds promise for a lasting peace and prosperity for the country in a more convincing manner than has been the record of previous regimes which, Maoists claim, practiced a sort of bourgeoisie democracy that worked against the national interest and failed to tackle the problems of poverty and backwardness. Most likely, despite the subsequent denial, this is the intent of Dahal’s remarks and, indeed, is a very sensible thing to do: If you cannot win, compromise!
Nepal shares the common fate of countries overshadowed by large and powerful neighbors, which they believe to be as risky as having to sleep beside an elephant. It is just the nature of things juxtaposed together that makes the smaller country uncomfortable either getting too close to or staying too far from the powerful neighbor—there is always this dilemma of finding a safe distance and avoiding any action that can wake up the elephant or, worse, make it unfriendly and hostile.
Changing the geographic map of Nepal is not possible and the best alternative for Maoists would be to try to live with India and accept its larger presence—even dominance—as gracefully and as honorably as possible.
Despite the assertions of sovereignty and independence, Nepal’s rulers of all shades and persuasions have been keenly aware of the limitations they face in confronting India. Irrespective of a perception of injustice, unfairness, subjugation, and exploitation they have in their dealings with India—not necessarily in sensitive areas of defense and foreign policy matters but also on trade, transit, and border security issues—all governments in Nepal have felt helpless bargaining with the regional superpower on fairer terms and have opposed its heavy-handed approach to solving a myriad of bilateral problems.
Reportedly, the late King Birendra confronted one such incident first hand while on tour to the western part of the country in 1988. He observed some Indian Air Force jets making forays towards the Chinese border, apparently as part of its routine surveillance of the Himalayan region that also included Nepal. When he inquired if the Indian government had taken permission for the use of Nepal’s airspace, he was told that no such permission had been sought and, as matter of fact, India had always behaved as if Nepal’s defense was its responsibility and needed no consultation with Nepal. The king felt outraged at India’s arrogance and, according to some aides who were with the king at that time, he ordered obtaining defense weapons from China to deter violation of Nepal’s airspace. When India was alerted of Nepal’s weapons deal with China, it reacted to Nepal’s defiance of the 1950 Treaty by putting a trade blockade against the country in March, 1989, the political fallout from which is still being felt in Nepal some 20 years later.
DANGEROUS RHETORIC
If the Maoists had some magic to relocate Nepal geographically, then probably their anti-India rhetoric would have been sensible, even credible. Changing the geographic map of Nepal is, of course, not possible and then the next best alternative for Maoists or other claimants to political power in Nepal would be to try to live with India and accept its larger presence—even dominance—as gracefully and as honorably as possible. Looking elsewhere, one cannot conceive, for instance, of a Mexican or Canadian political party or government getting mileage out of showing hostility towards the US. In the same vein, Mongolia cannot hope to be safe and prosperous by being unfriendly towards China or Russia, despite the fact that Mongolians would like to be anywhere else except next door to China or Russia!
It is then irrational or even insane for the Maoists to go against India and accuse it for Nepal’s troubles, real or imaginary. It is hard to imagine a situation when India could expect to benefit from inciting troubles in Nepal which, surprisingly, appears to be a well-entrenched belief among Nepalis living at some distance from border areas with India. For example, quite a large segment of ruling ethnic groups in Nepal continues to believe that Maoists got India’s backing for creating instability in Nepal and that India conspired with the rebels to overthrow monarchy. They cite, as evidence, that Maoists fighters operated freely from the Indian territory; that Maoist leaders assembled for high-profile meetings in Indian towns with full knowledge and protection of Indian security forces; that India allowed arms smuggling by Maoists to fight a guerilla war in Nepal; and that India never accepted Nepal’s request for labeling Maoists a terrorist group and arrest their leaders accused by Nepal for launching attacks in its territory and carrying out mass murders.
However, looking at the evidence and rationality of it, allegation of India’s involvement in aiding Maoist insurgency in Nepal is silly and plainly outrageous, and does not have more validity than, reportedly, accusation by late Indira Gandhi of American CIA causing monsoon failures in India! Such allegations reflect the instances of sheer desperation, attempts at hiding self-generated problems, and effort to shift blame for failure onto someone else. Droughts and famines plagued India well into the 1970s, which largely was the product of misguided planning that ploughed huge investments in showcase projects and in heavy industries at the cost of agriculture and rural development. Similarly, the then Government of Nepal had its own reasons for nourishing Maoist insurgency or, at the least, taking a softer stand containing it. Most notably, the rebellion flourished because of monarchy’s coolness towards democracy and its reluctance to use the army, which it controlled, to confront Maoists.
Looking at the background of Maoist sweep of Nepal, this undoubtedly ensued from the weakness of domestic policies, which neglected development at the grassroots; failed to build local institutions in support of democracy; encouraged patronage and favoritism that let a chosen group of people amass personal wealth and sustain political authority; and, most importantly, instituted an autarchic trade and investment regime that blocked meaningful contacts with the country’s larger neighbors, for the unfounded belief that a closer economic ties with large neighbors would compromise sovereignty.
MAOISTS’ SECOND CHANCE
It seems inconceivable that Maoists would so quickly fall out of public favor and get pushed to the fringes of Nepali politics, from the mainstream status they had gained just a few years ago. The reason may be that those who supported their revolution—and many who did not oppose it—wanted a fundamental shift in the country’s governance structure that is focused on improving government efficiency, stemming corruption, building infrastructure, creating jobs, and putting the country on path to sustained growth, whatever the Maoists’ professed ideology. Probably, people believed that Nepal’s Maoists will have the same type of vision as that of China’s reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping, who is credited to have spoken these words: It does not matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice...
It is true that China’s transformation did not start with Deng’s reforms carried out from the early 1980s. Seeds of reform had actually been planted much earlier, by the success of Mao’s Revolution in1949 that saw the abolition of private property, communal ownership of farmland, mass mobilization of labor at meager wage to build infrastructure, and a government-led industrialization. However, records show that such initiatives directed at forced modernization of the Chinese economy did not produce much growth or alleviate poverty for as long as it lasted—for some 30 years from 1950 to 1980—but this did help soften opposition to reforms from traditional elite groups and landed aristocracy who had exercised tight control over people and resources for the benefit of cronies and courtiers.
It is difficult to deny that the drastic change in social and economic structures precipitated by Mao’s heavy-handed push for reforms played a catalytic role in China’s capitalistic revival decades later and economic successes that we observe today. However, it is unwise, even dangerous, for Maoists to emulate Mao’s reforms as a prerequisite for addressing the problems of poverty and dispossession that Nepali people face today. This is because the world situation has changed dramatically since Mao’s days and Nepal’s geopolitical constraints are such that any serious attempt by Maoists to make a clean break from the past to reshape society and the economy is likely to meet stiff resistance from local elites and ordinary people alike, and also risk drawing outside attention and intervention.
There is no denying the fact that a lion’s share of credit for the dissolution of monarchy and making Nepal a Republic goes to the Maoists, irrespective of the methods they used to achieve it. They needed an ideology to justify their revolution and they found it in Maoism. While the force of this ideology helped them emerge as the most powerful political force in the country but considering the challenges they face in implementing it, it is high time that they distance from it or, more wisely, abandon it. After the repeated failures of past administrations and erosion of public trust in old-fashioned leadership, people are now prepared to take a chance with Maoists, provided that they tone down their ideology and suggest realistic solutions to problems people face in their daily lives and remain unsolved for generations. Unfortunately, there is no evidence yet that Maoists are ready to make this transition.
sshah1983@hotmail.com
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