When combined, poverty, unemployment, corruption and mal-governance make perfect breeding ground for radicalism; Nepal was no exception. The rulers of democratic Nepal, who were the parents of the 1990 revolution, soon turned corrupt offering Maoists their desired mix. Instead of seriously diagnosing the root cause, nature, and methodologies of the Maoist rebellion along with its prognosis, all forces from Nepali Congress (NC) to royals to CPN-UML, tried to use the rebels against their inter- and intra-party opponents. The Maoists took advantage of this and consolidated their position by fooling everybody. The ruling elite’s calculation that as violent forces fighting from their remote hideouts Maoists were too unlikely to come to power (thus, no harm in using them) later proved wrong.
Communists in Nepal mostly remained as number two behind NC owing to the reasons of geo-politics, the domestic power shift, and the fight and factionalism that prevailed among them. Prior to the Maoists, the CPN-UML was the mainstream of communist movement. However, in a bid to change to the tune of time, it adopted a course of political transformation and pursued centrist policies. But the lack of a matching effort to educate or change its indoctrinated and hard-line cadres backfired; the party split and a large chunk later joined the Maoist ranks. This was a bonus for the Maoists.
Finally, the most serious challenge to Maoists lies within as two contradictory and equally powerful schools of thought prevail within its rank—one is the dogmatic school that wants to seize power through urban revolt; the other is the pragmatic school that wants to give peace a chance.
The Maoists have a large following among the poor and the working class, certain have-not groups like the homeless/landless people and some oppressed/marginalized communities, as the former had been advocating their cause and offering them representation and inclusion in every forum more than any other party has done.
Once in open politics, the Maoists successfully expanded their organizational base in the urban centers too. In rural areas, especially in the Hills, they have already displaced the poorly-organized NC and a slightly better organized CPN-UML during the 10-year-long rebellion; this they did with the blend of their energy, organizational efficiency, dedication to the cause of the poor and the oppressed as well as violence, terror and intimidation. Similarly, with suitable combination of hard work, muscle power, smart tactics and rigging, they secured 40 percent of the total seats in the 2007 Constituent Assembly elections thus emerging as the largest party.
Consequently, they formed the government, ran it for nine months, but chose to resign as a result of their own misadventures. They tried to sack the army chief to seize power. They also invited the wrath of India – the overbearing southern neighbor and their haven and mentor while they were underground – by trying to play China against it. Both moves back lashed, showing them the exit from power.
The Maoists never succeeded in wooing the ever mistrustful community of educated, middle class and urban people. A couple of years before, the Maoists enjoyed the support of many non-Maoists too, as they were the freshest force in the political landscape of Nepal who, unlike NC and UML, symbolized change and hope for many. Not anymore. Their support in their strongholds of the mountain region is waning; in Tarai they have almost lost to Madhesis. Foreign and domestic forces, including the army, are wary of them because of their disappointing performance in peace building and their designs to seize power. Their acts of ethno-linguistic populism once invented to weaken the state and the monarchy is taking a heavy toll on them.
Finally, the most serious challenge to Maoists lies within as two contradictory and equally powerful schools of thought prevail within its rank—one is the dogmatic school that wants to seize power through urban revolt; the other is the pragmatic school that wants to give peace a chance.
The ever-mounting adversities both within and outside has made the Maoists desperate. With no sign of an immediate return to power, mainly because of a furious India, now they are acting despondently and viciously. The recent spree of property capture, unilateral declaration of ethno-centric states, general strikes and increase in violent attacks are manifestations of such desolation. On the one hand, because of the domestic and international power-shift and some strategic reasons, they cannot revert to rebellion while on the other hand, their gains and successes seem to have ceased and saturated.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
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