The public has singled out the Maoist party as the major player although all the political forces are equally responsible for the current political stalemate. The peace process is moving but in fits and starts. The Maoists sit squarely on the process. They remain inflexible in their stance on rehabilitation and or integration into the national army of the former combatants, central to the peace process; and they are unwilling to disband or demobilize the semi-military structure of their thuggish youth wing, the Young Communist League, and to return people’s property confiscated during the conflict. Other major political parties who accuse the Maoists of reneging on their past agreements are wary of their intentions. The parties have ruled out negotiations with the former rebels until they demonstrate credible commitment to settling these issues.
The Maoists have earned a reputation of being a party that frequently, and sometimes to the point of self-contradiction, changes its decisions. So, what’s gone wrong with them?
The underlying problem is the Maoist party’s failure to reconcile their revolutionary past with their present political responsibility. On the one hand, they are desperately struggling to retain their fading image of being fierce (international media have translated their leader’s nom de guerre, Prachanda, as ‘the fierce one’), and on the other hand, they are striving to get to power and establish their political legitimacy. The two things cannot go together.
The Maoists fought a guerrilla war for 10 years (1996-2006) challenging the legitimacy of the ‘old regime’. Their armed movement gained momentum in a short period of time, thanks largely to rural poverty and social repression exacerbated by state apathy, and quickly turned them into a formidable force. Despite the thousands of lives lost and property worth billions of rupees damaged, the greatest achievement of the 10-year insurgency was that it helped rupture the feudalistic social structure, awaken the disadvantaged, and instill political awareness into the public at the grassroots level. It was typically, however, not without repercussions.
The Maoists are desperately struggling to retain their fading image of being fierce and at the same time striving for power. The two things cannot go together.
The Maoists aided and abetted various ethnic groups to fight alongside them. Many of such groups have now split and are operating independently on their own. They set a culture of violence that is now emulated by the mushrooming armed groups, both political and criminal, operating in almost all parts of the country. These outlawed outfits follow the same hit-and-run tactics that the Maoists used during the war. They extort, kidnap, torture and kill people just like the Maoists did and, to some extent, still do.
The Maoists agreed to join peaceful politics after they signed the 12-point agreement with the seven-party alliance back in 2005. After they realized that it was impossible to win the war, they were looking for a safe landing that the historic agreement offered them. The greatest fear the rebels harbored, while climbing down the ‘safe landing’ steps, was the risk of losing their revolutionary image. But why do they continue to hold on to their revolutionary image of the past even after entering peaceful politics? There are at least four reasons.
The first is to justify the war that was waged to turn Nepal into a socialist republic. Now that Nepal is a republic, they are ‘half way’ through their mission. They say that the battle is not over although they know that, given the internal and international circumstances, it is almost impossible to achieve their ultimate goal. However, if they leave an impression that they have abandoned their mission (they say they haven’t), they will have no justification for the thousands of deaths.
The second reason why they still want to put on a rebellious face is to appease their cadres who are now confined in UN-monitored cantonments. If the former militants believe that 10 years of fighting was only a ladder for their top bosses to climb up to what they call ‘bourgeios’ club, they might stage a counter-revolution against their own leadership.
The third reason is to get an upper hand in a bargaining, be it with the government or individual political parties. Every time their demands are not met, they threaten to launch fresh protests in the streets. And the fourth one is to coerce people into submission. In the absence of government in rural areas, Maoist cadres continue to extort, torture, and kidnap people just like they did during the war.
Brandishing their image as warlike has done them more harm than good. In fact, this has had a reverse effect. As a result, they are gradually losing their legitimacy which broadly entails acceptance by the public. To some extent, the Maoists received legitimacy to rule by being elected as the single-largest party in parliament. Once in power, however, they failed to realize that they were stepping on a shaky ground which, if not treaded with caution, would collapse in no time.
The public accept the governing authority only when they believe that the leaders have followed socially-accepted procedures as well as political and moral values to acquire and exercise power. Legitimacy is earned through peaceful means, not by force. Maoist’s demand to lead a new coalition is genuine. But for that they first need to credibly prove that they are serious and cool-headed this time.
govindab@buffalo.edu
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