For Maoists, means always justify the end. Their end is absolute power, and they are desperate to have it. Any means- from violent war to indefinite general strike- that can achieve the goal is okay for them.
There are many reasons behind such desperation for power. Ideologically, the political-socioeconomic changes they want to bring are not possible without being in power. Strategically, integration of maximum number of their combatants into the national army is possible only when they have dadu-paneu (serving utensils) [Ed.
Note, total control?] in their own hands. Dahal’s lust for power is an equally strong reason. His desire to tighten the hold of the party through manipulation of the state power is another driving force as factional and ideological cracks and challenges to his leadership are gradually surfacing within the party. Most importantly, if successful, ousting of the CPN-UML-led government and a possible defection of remaining CPN-ML/anti-India faction of that party to UCPN-(M), the latter would become a force to reckon with even for the Indian establishment- this is what the Maoist leadership should have assessed and wished.
Intellectuals belonging to the liberal democratic camp often criticize Maoists for not playing the rules of the game. They say, it is unconstitutional to topple a legitimate government through street protests and general strike, without ever trying the floor of the House to do so. Certainly, the act is wrong when judged by conventional definitions and standards; but, Maoists are not a conventional force. They will never limit themselves to the norms of a bourgeois democracy such as tabling no-confidence motion against the government, especially when they know that such motion will be defeated.
Not only the norms of liberal democracy, Maoists have been under-complying or misinterpreting even the 12-point agreement they signed with other political parties four and a half years ago under the Indian auspices, mainly riding on other parties’ weaknesses. In fact, the much-hyped peace accord was so flawed that it did not contain any concrete and workable blueprint regarding the future of the Maoist combatants— one of the most sensitive issues. It also lacked any common roadmap regarding issues like restructuring of the state or the political system to be adopted and its modalities- the most serious topic of the future constitution. If the truth to be told, the peace deal offered no vision and plan beyond the removal of the king which made the document vulnerable to arbitrary interpretations and disagreements and the Maoists took every advantage of the imperfection.
As the peace deal cannot be rewritten now, the democrats who criticize Maoists should also blame their leaders for the lost opportunity. A thousand security checks are conducted before opening a flood gate, but not a single safeguard was taken into consideration while bringing the rebels into mainstream politics. As late Girija Prasad Koirala (GPK), the key person of the peace process was in a hurry to become the first President of the new Republic of Nepal, which never happened thanks to the Maoist’s betrayal, he lacked interest and patience besides intellect and understanding required to work out the essential details.
Similarly, as most of the ‘liberal democrats’ were obsessed with the worries of the then king’s despotic rule taking roots and as NC members were not used to question their autocratic leader GPK, drawbacks of the 12-point deal went either unnoticed or unquestioned. Until very recently they hailed the document the way emperor’s ‘magnificent new clothes’ were praised in the timeless story by Hans Christian Anderson.
Even the ‘know-all’ Indian establishment could not understand and analyze the ramifications of the deal or the nature of the Maoist rebellion itself in proper perspective. It was knowingly or unknowingly misguided by its communist coalition partners and also by the intelligence agency RAW- as such agencies often fail in jobs that require ideological, political and social insights.
The Indian authorities wanted Nepali Maoists to become a mainstream political party as part of their political experiment. They wanted to make a point to their own Maoists how ‘wise’ the Nepali rebels were so that the former would follow suit.
Some commentators argue that Maoists are changing and as such they should be given more time and a benefit of doubt. But the question is have Maoists changed their belief (doctrine) or have they only changed their strategy (karyaniti)? So far, the latter seems to be the case. The tactical shift was essential because despite enormous gains the Maoists were nowhere near victory after a decade long bloody rebellion that claimed over 15 thousand lives plus other colossal damages. Thus they needed a much-easier and short-cut route to power.
Once in the political mainstream, taking advantage of the freedom, they expanded and consolidated their support base in a lightning speed. With their declining strength and popularity NC and the CPN-UML could neither counter the Maoist wave nor stop its election rigging.
After emerging as the largest single party in CA polls the Maoists led a coalition government for about 9 months before realizing that the radical changes they wanted to bring about were almost impossible within the existing power set-up. Thus they decided to ‘fast forward’ their long term plan of power capture by taking control of the army; however, the move was foiled by the combined power of the President, the then Army chief, the 22 parties and above all India- the ‘kingmaker’. An upset Prachanda resigned impulsively only to repent later. One year after quitting the government, when all their tactics and protests to return to power that ranged from House obstructions for 5 long months to hoisting of black flags to stone pelting to marching along the Indian border failed, they opted for the harshest ever method to topple the government.
Unfortunately, recent highhandedness of the Maoists has only re-enforced two things; one, the Maoists haven’t changed their violent and autocratic methods and mindset. Two, the non-Maoist parties have neither learned any lesson from their past wrongs andweaknesses nor they are capable to counter the Maoists with popular and political measures.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
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