Expressing NA’s commitment to the peace process and the peace agreements, including the Interim Constitution (IC), Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), and the government’s new Special Security Plan, he said NA is “committed to national policy and government’s plans” and that the government’s policies and programs will be “reflected in the activities of the NA.”
Highlighting the need to maintain “discipline, motivation, self-respect and high-moral” of the army personnel, General Gurung laid stress on identifying areas for peacetime military engagement in development activities, introduction of welfare schemes, more funding for improving basic facilities and imparting advance training to his men.
Moreover, he stressed on developing a “balanced” civil-military relationship through respect and promotion of democratic system and civilian supremacy, and to abide by the international humanitarian and human rights laws and the rule of law. He added that the NA “will give creative suggestions to the government if sought.”
Ironically, however, he left out the issues of integration and democratization of NA stressed upon time and again by security analysts and by the opposition UCPN-Maoists. As controversial as both the concepts are, the reality is that General Gurung will have to face the legacy left behind by his highly tactical predecessor Rookmangud Katawal who resisted stiff pressure from the Maoist-led government while maintaining the integrity, hierarchy and independence of the NA intact. In the same line, General Gurung is faced with the most challenging task of maintaining the army’s autonomy but by remaining within the framework of constitutional norms.
Internally, the new chief has to deal with three major challenges. Primarily, he will have to lead a national army currently divided on policy and priority lines. The divisive nature came to surface during the Katawal row when groupism gained ground and two clearly separate groups – one led by Katawal himself and the other by General Kul Bahadur Khadka, who was the Maoist pick for the top post – surfaced. Resorting to disciplinary action against the violators of military rules and regulations will be vital in keeping intact the already fragile unity of the institutions. Especially, the focus must be on bringing the human rights violators to book which will be a step in the right direction.
Second, it will also be a Herculean task to fulfill the logistical needs of the institution that will ultimately require import of both legal and non-lethal weapons to give continuity to the NA’s training requirements. Close to this is the need to give continuity to its recruitment drive as a national army cannot endlessly function without additional manpower. But, at a time when Defense Minister Bidya Bhandari’s ongoing negotiations with India to bring in the weapons is perceived as a violation of the peace agreements and an impediment in the conclusion of the peace process, it will be equally challenging to convince the decision-makers to comply with its requests for arms import. For this, the army will have to negotiate a deadline with the government, which has to now specify a timeframe for conclusion of the peace process if it is unwilling to compromise with the country’s security interests.
Third, as a long-term strategy, the new leadership will have to concentrate on developing counter-terrorism policies to deal with the rising terrorist threat and separatist forces. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the government already feels the need to mobilize the army to fight the armed factions in the Tarai and Hills that now pose an internal security threat to the country. As per the new Special Security Plan, it is clear that the government is headed for a major crackdown on the armed groups. This will also require the NA to strengthen its DMI (Department of Military Intelligence), which is vital for curbing terrorist activities.
On the other hand, important external challenges will finally determine the success of his tenure. As important as it will be to maintain the cohesiveness of the institution, and as correctly pointed by himself, NA will have to be more receptive to public opinion and the media. For this, General Gurung will have to delve into the theory and politics of civil-military relations. An objective military control will evolve precisely from such a partnership with the society. As the famous American writer Samuel P Huntington said in his book, ‘The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations’, “Any system of civil-military relations involves a complex equilibrium between the authority, influence and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence and ideology of non-military groups, on the other,” the NA has to come out of the cocoon that was built around it by the past monarchs who led the institution.
Although General Gurung avoided using the words ‘integration’ and “democratization” from his directive, it would be better for him to understand from the beginning that the changed political context in the country dictates the need to address both these issues by the military and the government authorities at the earliest. It is still a challenge to democratize NA in the sense of detaching the institution from the long held chain-of-command associated with the institution of monarchy. And, if the NA is committed to the peace agreements, it will have to address ‘integration’ within the framework of CPA, AMMAA and IC. Before General Gurung is thus the challenge of abiding by the guidelines to be soon laid out by the Special Committee while resisting pressure emanating from outside the peace agreements.
akanshya@myrepublica.com
Great Leadership: A Road Less Traveled