The report published by the World Bank-sponsored Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP, 2006) writes that the urgency of disarmament and demobilization processes often results in delays to reintegration components. Countries do not pay as much attention to the reintegration phase as much as to disarmament and demobilization phases. Compared to reintegration, these phases are quick and visible, therefore saleable to the media. However, disarmament and demobilization phases consume from 6 to 10 percent of the total cost while the reintegration phase takes from 60 to 80 percent of the total cost.
Those who do not want to see “politically-indoctrinated” fighters spoiling the “purity, integrity and sanctity” of NA should better know that the cost of non-integration/non-rehabilitation on time is far greater to the society than the cost of integration/rehabilitation.
A survey report on DDR 2007, published by Spain-based School for a Culture of Peace, recommends for an execution of DDR in an integrated manner; not only chronologically. Peace agreements must include DDR and it must be implemented in a coordinated fashion, not as an isolated or a separated phase. The process must incorporate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation; it should be integrated with other related processes of peace such as transitional justice and security sector reform. In fact, DDR should be a part of a wider strategy of peace building. Juxtapose these global experiences and findings on DDR with what is happening in Nepal and one can fairly imagine the direction of our peace process; forget about its speed. The process is basically surviving on a borrowed time; the unfolding of political events can easily make it collapse. The peace process that moved so swiftly to the amazement of the outside world has come to a standstill.
When it is already agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and also written in the Interim Constitution that “the Council of Minister shall form a special committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants”; and further agreement thereto has been made in the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) that eligible combatants, fulfilling standard norms, will be integrated into the security forces; we are still debating on the issue whether the combatants should be integrated or not in the army. The proper issue for debate should have been on hows of integration – on their number, costs, timing and modalities. Instead of debating on the consequences of delayed reintegration, we are still preoccupied with the leadership position, composition of and representation in the Special Committee. With the committee itself in disarray, what is a technical committee supposed to do?
Conceptually, if Maoists are opposed to the idea of DDR, Nepali Army is equally opposed to the idea of SSR (Security Sector Reform). Instead of DDR, Maoists prefer to call CMR (Camping, Monitoring and Reintegration). Nepal Army is allergic to the phrase “army democratization”. The heavy debate on integration has overshadowed the issue of army democratization.
To drive the point home on the need for integration process, let us make two extreme hypothetical scenarios related to the debate on PLA integration. Scenario one: Suppose one fine morning, Comrade Pushpa Kamal Dahal and his associates decided to renounce violence and to repent over their past mistakes decided to disband PLA fighters altogether. PLA fighters too, in turn, voluntarily agree to this proposal and decide to return home and resettle peacefully. Many people will take this scenario as wishful thinking. Even if this scenario is realized, there will be no shortage of doubting Thomases – questioning the real motive and intentions of the Maoists.
If this scenario is not plausible, let us move to scenario two: Suddenly, one day the army honchos come to a great realization that Maoists too are Nepali brothers and sisters, they too have rights to works and survive in Nepal. So they plead the government for their unconditional integration into the army. What about this scenario? Forget about the others, even the Maoists will not buy this proposition. Given the fact that joining Nepali Army is only the third-best option (other two are British and Indian armies), PLA fighters will not subscribe to this cent percent integration into Nepali Army. The truth is somewhere between these two extreme propositions. This brings us to the fore of integrating the fighters. Unfortunately, the national debate has failed to take this into account.
Those who do not want to see “politically-indoctrinated” fighters spoiling the “purity, integrity and sanctity” of NA should better know that the cost of non-integration/non-rehabilitation on time is far greater to the society than the cost of integration/rehabilitation. Besides fulfilling the vested interest of those wishing to prolong the peace process and the transition period, the societal costs of non-integration is going to be unacceptably high. The issue here is not just of taming the Maoist party. It is about managing the whole process of peace. Even the donors coming here to support the peace process are deflecting the issue of reintegration by trying to address nebulous and equally ambiguous issue of public security. Yes, it is agreed that we have 109 armed groups disturbing peace and tranquility. But what is the root cause? Can we address security issues by allowing over 19,000 fighters to languish in the camps, like the Bhutanese refugees, for a decade to come? The above cited MDRP report speaks that the ex-combatants can very easily be drawn into criminal activities, violent political oppositions or re-recruited or re-mobilized as combatants or mercenaries, posing a greater threat to peace and security. The risk of non-integration or delayed integration is typically high as the fighters are familiar with the weapons and violence and, more importantly, they have the ability to re-organize.
The conventional DDR or SSR models may not be applicable to Nepal as we have a unique situation of our own. None of the two combating forces have been defeated in the war; the war was ceased due to the peace agreement. In the real sense of the term, there is no disarmament and demobilization of the forces. This is the reason why Nepal’s peace process is vulnerable. The R in DDR speaks of reintegrating rebels as a transition from military to civil life. In our model, we have conceived first of supervision of the army. This phase is over with the cantonment of the fighters and bringing the arms under UN monitoring. We are into the second phase of integrating eligible PLA fighters into the security forces, which obviously include the army. Those who are not eligible for integration into security forces will be rehabilitated into the society. This is the third and the final phase and the real challenge lies here, not in the integration of the fighters into the army. The debate on integration is so much pre-occupied at the centre and at the top that no one has bothered to go down to the field and ask the fighters what they really wanted to do and wanted to become in future and, for that matter, what kind of support is required.
A study by Sambanis, N and Glassmyer, K from Yale University (2008) argue that the integration of the rebels into the army provides a self-enforcing mechanism to prevent re-starting of civil wars. The due researchers found that civil wars are far less likely to end in peace agreements than international wars. More than a third of civil wars restart within a few years. This is because when the rebels are demobilized after peace agreements, they lose bargaining power and the government can renege on its promises. This makes rebels reluctant to stop fighting and quick to remobilize. Only a self-enforcing agreement like the integration of the rebels into the army could prevent this from happening. Have we given enough thought to this argument?
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