While there appears to be some superficial discussion on the value and content of the rehabilitation packages, any intelligent guess leads toward assumption that rehabilitation will be planned for and initiated at the eleventh hour through an ad-hoc process, unable to meet its intricate complexities and challenges. Learning from established literatures and institutional understanding, rehabilitation (reintegration) is a process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable livelihood, employment and income. It essentially is a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level as a part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, which often necessitates long-term external assistance to the individuals undergoing rehabilitation.
Literatures exemplify that when wars end, armed forces are generally downsized and armed groups disbanded and disarmed, as signs that peace has come; but more importantly because of the daunting costs of maintaining militaries. Rehabilitation of ex-combatants within the purview of broader national recovery strategy from post-conflict situation will undoubtedly underpin the restoration of political stability. If demobilization is poorly implemented, as is evident from the lessons learnt globally and personal observations, former combatants will become a major source of lawlessness, posing in turn a significant obstacle to long run socio-economic recovery and more importantly restoration of the rule of law. It is even more relevant in Nepali context to keep in mind the possibility of the ex-combatants being lured by the mushrooming armed groups. Rehabilitation is definitely time consuming and costly and for that reason is often neglected but it is important to consider that successful outcomes will have significant implication on the sustainability of any peace endeavors and sought after post-conflict peace and prosperity.
Based on the information in the media originating in particular from the Maoist quarter, it appears that the majority in the Maoist Army strive to be considered for integration. Despite the fact that there is an option for voluntary retirement ‘Golden Handshake’ for combatants not being integrated, studies and researches have shown that a significant number in the PLA, not just the war wounded and disabled, opt for and will need rehabilitation support, the fact corroborated by general understanding that there will be a ceiling as to the number for integration, anything between 5-10,000 and Golden Handshake for all is neither the viable option.
Irrespective of the context in which the rehabilitation of ex-combatants is envisioned, experts and experiences have demonstrated rehabilitation must be seen as a part of political process of consolidating peace and not merely as a technical activity; the need is to tailor the programs to local realities, critical factor being a credible and effective national ownership, leadership and responsibility. Success of any rehabilitation initiative demands accurate identification of target group, criteria and benefits to be offered. Also crucial for meaningful implementation are the importance of adequate sensitization and realistic appraisal of available local and external resources-support in terms of funding and technical capacities.
While the progress in integration and rehabilitation issues continue to be held hostage awaiting higher-level political negotiations making somewhat difficult for planning, it is imperative that concerted efforts are directed toward at least brainstorming over pragmatic national framework if not establishment of an implementing structure. It will not be wrong to advocate that rehabilitation faces more challenges than integration, which already has some form of institutional basis to be built upon, despite its apparent technical complexities.
Whatever the number, at the end of the day, rehabilitation of individual ex-combatants will demand much more than provision of lump sum one off gratuity payment, regular installments of monthly allowances, enrollment into some kind of training or setting up of a business. There will be a comprehensive need for creation of conducive socio-cultural-economic and political environment grounded in and at par with the existent national realities for the individuals to exercise and make best use the support/resources availed to them in charting their course of action for sustained livelihood beyond the pre-programmed certain years of rehabilitation programs.
Many rehabilitation efforts elsewhere have been modeled replicating past practices especially in the post-conflict contexts in Africa where there is a need to build the structures and systems from scratch. As in the case like ours where systems and structures already exist and are functional, process demands a different approach. Sri Lankan Government in 2009, well before the actual end of the conflict, undertook such initiative to develop a ‘national framework proposal for rehabilitation of ex-combatants’ through a broad participative brainstorming in thematic working groups and workshops involving experts and representatives from government ministries, relevant public and private stakeholders, UN and other international agencies. The initiative was conceived, coordinated and led by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights in conjunction with the Secretariat Coordinating Peace Process (SCOPP) and supported by ILO and UNDP.
A sound rehabilitation framework intended for ex-combatants should be planned consistent with the overall integrated post-conflict recovery strategy aimed at pragmatic attainment of socio-economic development, security sector reform, rehabilitation of conflict affected populace, transitional justice and reconciliation. The policy-makers should be wary of the need to seek a balance between managing the often very high expectations of ex-combatants and addressing resentment of “favoritism” among the rest of the population. Incongruent reintegration training packages, differing implications in urban and rural settings for the reintegrated ex-combatants and context specific national as well as local challenges faced are some of the valuable inputs from the lessons learnt applicable to any prospective rehabilitation programming.
While the political elites continue debating over the content or value of the ‘Golden Handshake’ and rehabilitation options, government through the national institutions mandated for rehabilitation like the ‘Secretariat’ and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, should ideally be exercising over developing a sound national rehabilitation framework, through a collaborative and participatory approach. A good start would be to reflect on the ongoing rehabilitation program run by UN for verified minor and late recruits. The exercise demands meaningful participation from all relevant ministries, public and private sector technical institutions, FNCCI, NGO’s, CSO representatives and experts as well as the targeted beneficiaries; where necessary support of UN and other specialized international agencies for expertise and best practices should also be sought. Else the process might move ahead; but results in the long run may be just one large flawed outcome of a yet another ill-planned program, with scarce resources invested into.
The writer has experience of working & researching on rehabilitation of former combatants in several post-conflict contexts
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