A quick overview of the years past appears unbelievable even from such a short distance in time. Twenty-first century of the Common Era had began on an eerie note in the night of Friday June 1, 2001 when almost the entire immediate family of King Birendra were wiped out in a shooting spree inside the Narayanhiti Palace. The then Prince Gyanendra had survived because he was away in Pokhara. Princess Komal was injured; her wounds healed soon after. Shahjyada Paras escaped unhurt. People have stories to tell, but nobody really knows for sure what exactly happened between the shooting and the declaration of death of victims by military doctors. Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala was held virtually captive throughout the night by the defence forces of the country over which he apparently had little or no control.
Over the next six months, events unfolded with alarming rapidity. In July 2001, Koirala had to resign when Royal Nepal Army failed to rescue policemen under the control of Maoists at Holeri. His successor in Singh Durbar declared a state of emergency in the country and gave the army whatever it wanted to end the armed insurgency in the country. Premier Sher Bahadur Deuba was ready to do whatever the royal-military wanted—he had the parliament dissolved in the middle of the night in May 2002 to give army a free hand in running the country. The decision turned out to be the death warrant of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.
DICTATORSHIP & DISCONTENT
Gyanendra took off his gloves, dismissed Deuba for incompetence in October 2002, and began experimenting with different permutations and combinations of government making. At one point, Deuba declared that he had received justice from the Gorkhali king and agreed to lead a government dominated by loyalists of the military in CPN (UML) ranks. Emboldened with his successes in duping every major politician with the exception of Koirala, the new king assumed the role of Chairman-cum-Chief Executive of the country on Feb 1, 2005. The effort of putting the clock back, however, turned out to be comical rather than scary. The people of Nepal and the international community saw that the pretending emperor had no moral clothes to hide his dictatorial ambitions when telephones were shut off, Internet was disconnected and soldiers were sent into the newsrooms. The game of fooling all of the people even for some of the time proved to be a huge mistake. Chairman Gyanendra never recovered from its aftershocks.
The Rhododendron Revolution of 2006 and Constituent Assembly Elections of 2008 fired the imagination of participants and onlookers alike: It appeared for a while as if Nepal would be offering a new template for peaceful political transformations to conflict-afflicted countries of the world. By 2009, the fatigue had already set into the system. It gave way when President Ram Baran Yadav overruled Premier Pushpa Kamal Dahal to restore sacked army chief Rookmangad Katawal in the middle of the night. No further proof was necessary to show that the political class had a long way to go before it could challenge the autonomy of the military. Dahal roared initially, but had to run out with tail between his legs as soon as the army barked back. Like NC strongman Koirala before him in the Holeri aftermath, the Maoist Supremo had to bow silently at the altar built by the praetorian guards of the country.
DÉNOUEMENT DELAYED
It was clear from the very beginning that the anti-Maoist coalition, cobbled after the resignation of Dahal under intense diplomatic, military and political pressure in May 2009, had no intention of completing the peace process, writing a new constitution or laying foundation stones for the transformation of Nepal into a truly secular, federal, inclusive and republican democracy. However, as long as Koirala lived, chances of institutionalization of gains of Rhododendron Revolution-2006 survived. His marginalization, debility and death meant that status quo forces at the helms of government had no challengers left except the Maoists. Madheshbadis had been co-opted, Janjati activists neutralized, and civil society campaigners defamed for good. The UNMIN was discredited for not doing things that it was not mandated to do in the first place—monitor the movement of armed combatants and ensuring good behavior of signatories to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Composition of the anti-Maoist coalition was telling. It was led by Madhav Kumar Nepal who had a history of petitioning the king for premiership and legitimizing the military rule with ‘half-corrected regression certificate’. His deputies were more known for their shenanigans than their political or administrative abilities. The main coalition partner Nepali Congress (NC) had deputed political lightweights in the hope of saving its credibility if experiments in confrontational politics failed. Within a few months, mice began to growl and NC began to lose its ideological, political, social and economic edge. It became an appendage of conservative wing of the UML and was forced to play the second fiddle. Madheshbadi parties were already ideologically weak; with their participation in the government of confirmed anti-Madheshis, they were enfeebled politically even on their home turf.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that were if it were not for the non-violent protests of Maoists, the ruling coalition would have allowed the Constituent Assembly to die a natural death in May 2010. The legislature extended its tenure by a year and gave enough time to its enemies to devise less obvious ways of undermining supremacy of the parliament. Eminent departure of UNMIN implies that the third leg of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been sawed. The peace process may yet stand on two legs, but the risks of precarious stability wobbling are much higher with both participants even more suspicious of each other’s intentions than they were ever before.
Though still being talked about in hushed voices, speculations are rife in the salons of Kathmandu that President Yadav would be asked to front for a military-backed rule in the event of CPA unravelling. Such a step would require that political opposition is made too weak to counter authoritarian experiments of governance in the country. Attempts have begun to divide NC, splinter Madheshbadis and confuse and confound Maoist cadres. As always, UML would be only too happy to offer ‘conditional support’ and be a part of whatever government is formed to bury the results of Constituent Assembly elections and level the ground for the politics of plebiscite. Those who consider themselves the arbitrators of the fate of 30 million people can then contemplate the return of the Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal-1990, with commas and full-stops suitably altered to create the illusion that the country was now a secular and federal republic, and begin to dismantle the infrastructure of peace put in place by late Koirala.
The defining decade in the history of modern Nepal ends on a disconcerting note as the fate of peace process hangs in balance, constitution remains to be written and utterly discredited coalition clings to the government with the determination of stopping the march of history. In 2011, there will be a fork in the road—one limping toward an uncertain peace process and another cruising headlong into the certainty of an authoritarian rule resulting in multiple conflicts. Ironically, choices that NC and its nemesis Maoists make would matter much more than decisions of any other political party.
cklal@hotmail.com
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