There are, broadly speaking, five reasons as to why the NC was trumped by the Maoists in the negotiating table.[break]
First, the Maoists knew the NC’s key vulnerability that none of the NC leaders wanted to see the CA dissolved because of them, and at the same time an overwhelming majority of NC leaders feared that the party’s hard stance might inadvertently lead to dissolution of the CA. The Maoists had known this “mass psychology” of the NC leaders through wide-contacts among the NC and Maoist leaders at different levels. Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal had reached out to NC senior leader Sher Bahadur Deuba through his confidant, Shakti Basnet, who also hails from western Nepal and has natural bondage with Deuba. Basnet had reported to Dahal that Deuba wanted to win concessions from the Maoists on the peace process but was not willing to risk dissolution of the CA. Many youth Maoist leaders had also established rapport with NC young guards and had made similar assessment. “This may have provided the Maoists a psychological advantage when they came to the negotiating table,” said a senior NC leader. Minendra Rijal, NC’s representative in the Special Committee and a key leader in NC’s negotiating team admits that it’s possible that the Maoists knew about the broader sentiment in the NC about the CA because “we are an open party”.
So the Maoists hardly believed the hardball that NC President Sushil Koirala and General Secretary Krishna Prasad Sitaula were playing regarding CA extension. If Koirala and Sitaula, and even Rijal thought that the Maoists would blink if they held firm, NC leaders Deuba, Ram Chandra Paudel, Dr Ram Sharan Mahat and majority of the NC lawmakers were concerned that the NC’s tough stance may lead to CA’s dissolution and their party might have to take the blame for it. Maoists became aware of this vulnerability every time they met with the NC leaders informally and during one-on-one meetings. “Every now and then NC leaders would drop hints that their party would eventually vote for CA extension irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations,” said a Maoist leader.
Second, this difference among the NC leaders played out at the negotiating table sending contradicting signals to the Maoists. “Lack of coherent stance among NC leaders was very evident during the negotiations,” said a senior UML leader who took part in the negotiations.
There were differences on approach and even on stances on numerous occasions. For instance, Deuba favored an extension for six months with a detailed agreement on the peace process but Koirala, Sitaula and Rijal were in favor of shorter extension to complete the peace process during that time. Eventually, Koirala prevailed and the CA was extended for three months. Similarly, Sitaula kept on insisting on weapons handover but Mahat did not believe that was a part of the agreement. He privately argued that, according to agreements, Maoist combatants and their arms would remain under the Special Committee till integration/rehabilitation process was completed.
At one point, Sitaula thought that Mahat, Deuba and others were being too lenient at the negotiating table and he threatened that he would call CWC meeting to reiterate the party’s position on the 10-point demand. Mahat and others shot back saying that they might also convene the parliamentary party meeting where the overwhelming majority of the lawmakers were in favor of CA extension.
Mutual suspicions also played a part — Koirala and Sitaula thought that Dahal might have lured Deuba with a carrot of premiership while the latter doubted that Sitaula may have been influenced by India’s hard stance on Maoists.
Third, the cameo appearance of the Madhesi parties at the negotiating table distracted the NC from its focus on issue-wise negotiations. The NC had almost dropped the idea of demanding prime minister’s resignation and was focusing more on the peace process until the Madhesi parties entered the scene. Once the Madhesis stuck to their demand for prime minister’s resignation and threatened to quit the CA if their demands were not met, some NC leaders saw chance that they could actually force Khanal to resign immediately. During the four-party negotiations, Sitaula and MPRF (D) Chairman Bijaya Kumar Gachchhadar demanded that the prime minister resign immediately. “At the most, Prime Minister Khanal must resign within seven days,” demanded Gachchhadar.
The Madhesi and NC leaders also complain that despite promises they didn’t get enough support from the UML leaders, especially Madhav Kumar Nepal and KP Oli, to press Khanal for resignation. “The Nepal-Oli faction had told us that if we and NC stuck to our demand for prime minister’s resignation they would eventually throw their weight behind us forcing Khanal to resign,” said a Madhesi leader, adding, “but they remained mere spectators.”
The Madhesi parties, however, had their own problem and there was no way they could take firm stance on any issue risking the CA. Far from quitting the CA, many Madhesi lawmakers were actually in favor of voting for CA extension. The Madhesi leaders could not, therefore, raise their bargain beyond a point with the Maoists and the UML and left the negotiating table. “Like hurricane they gatecrashed the negotiating table and again left it like a hurricane, but without leaving much impact,” said an NC leader.
That’s, however, not entirely true. Had it not been for the cameo appearance of the Madhesi leaders the fifth point of the 5-point agreement probably would not have been there.
But what the Madhesi leaders’ appearance also did was distract the pace and direction of the negotiations.
When the Madhesi leaders entered the negotiating room, the Maoist, NC and UML leaders were debating on the nitty-gritty of the peace process and how much details should be included in the agreement. The Madhesi parties’ entry changed the whole course of negotiations and the parties lost crucial hours in dealing with them. “That’s probably one reason why we could not put so much in details in the agreement at the end,” said UML leader Pradeep Gyawali.
Fourth, by the time Madhesi leaders left the negotiating table time was running out and leaders were becoming very exhausted. Though Rijal was still in a mood for tough bargain, confident that the Maoists would blink at the end, Deuba had already left for the parliament hall much before midnight and even took along with him NC leader Bimalendra Nidhi, who was also taking a tough stance against the Maoists.
As if Maoist Chairman Dahal was waiting for the right moment, he then stepped in and proposed that they sign a basic deal, without details and specifics, to meet the deadline. He pleaded to have faith in him and said, “Let’s have gentleman’s agreement that we will implement all the details we have discussed so far regarding the peace process and I assure you that I will begin the process within five days and complete it in less than six weeks.”
The fifth reason why the NC ended up with such “an inferior deal” was that it was faced with a choice: Should it protract the discussion, which some of the NC leaders wanted to, risking CA’s dissolution or should it, for the last time, trust Dahal and sign the deal?
“We have taken a calculated risk but let’s not forget that we have forced the Maoists to agree to an extension of just three months to conclude the peace process which was what we said in our ten-point demand,” said Rijal. Mahat says, “Given the circumstances, this was the best deal that could have been possible.”
Lawmaker Nabindra Raj Joshi argues that Maoists will be exposed if they didn’t fulfil their promise and it’s their final chance. “International community as well as Nepalis are watching,” said Joshi.
So, with hope and leap of faith in the Maoists, NC signed the deal.
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