While talking about my experiences with Girijababu, I can recall my first direct conversation with him in the fourth or fifth year of the People´s War. After we met in Delhi for the first time (in 2059 BS), we came to know each other in person and began to understand each other´s feelings. We talked for one or one-and-a-half hours during that meeting. Without beating about the bush, he put his views in a straightforward manner and I also talked directly.
"Girijababu, you should agree to our agenda of a republic and we will accept multiparty democracy. We should move ahead together,” I told him. We discussed various issues and agreed that the country was not in a position to afford a protracted conflict. I think he probably began forming opinions about me and our party from that very meeting.
My views about him also changed considerably after I studied various aspects of his personality, inquired about him through indirect channels and especially after I met him in person. I found him trustworthy. We were in regular contact as long as the talks lasted (talks between the government and the Maoists in 2059 BS). But the talks between the government and the Maoist team led by Dr Baburam Bhattarai failed. Soon after that, Girijababu and I were in regular contact again.
We used to talk twice a day no matter whether I was in Rolpa, Rukum, Delhi, Mumbai or Noida. He was determined to merge the two divergent political currents (people’s republic and liberal democracy) into one, and we became sure that the cooperation would reach a historic conclusion.
The second meeting with him also took place underground (2061 BS). It was in Gurgaon, India. The meeting was also focused on combining the two political currents. We discussed the type of political current we should lead the country to. We, Maoists, had been waging a People´s War for a people´s republic while they were for a parliamentary democracy.
We could not completely accept their political philosophy, nor could they accept ours. We agreed that the country would slide into serious crisis if we continued the conflict with a “fight to finish” strategy. It was in that meeting that we agreed on the term “new political mainstream” for the first time.
New political mainstream means we had to accept competitive multiparty politics and step up our struggle against autocracy. The agenda of republic, which would be formed while intensifying our fight against autocracy, should be adopted in the new political mainstream. And that would mean both a republic and a competitive multiparty democracy.
While talking to him, it could be understood that he had already developed a wish to go for a republic, but he did not speak out his mind due to various constraints including the party´s formal statute and legal matters. He only said it would be difficult to go for a republic at that juncture, but it was obvious that he was approving it sooner or later.
He assured me that the country would slowly move towards a republic setup. That strengthened the trust between us. The gap between the two meetings was one-and-a-half years.
The third meeting took place in the context of forging the 12-point agreement (2005). He played the lead role in striking the deal. Sometimes the talks would not move ahead due to differences over terminologies in the agreement, but Girrijababu was against such disputes.
He would say that priority should be given to moving ahead together, rather than to words. That boosted our confidence and brought us closer to Girijababu.
After the 12-point agreement, we were yet to decide on the form of struggle against autocracy. Some of the political parties were against launching large scale protests. I don’t want to take their names now. They also did not believe that the mass movement would snowball to that extent. Girijababu asked us to chart out a comprehensive plan for a mass movement. At that time, the Nepali Congress and CPN-Maoist were in favor of launching the mass movement from Chaitra 13, while the other political parties were just for holding a demonstration on Chaitra 26 alone. Girijababu’s delegation and our party completed the ground work and charted out the plans. Then the other political parties also sat with us and agreed to call general strikes. It deepened our relationship and boosted our confidence.
Girijababu always worried that our party would remain a weak force during the 19-day mass movement (I have said this many times. But I don´t think it has been established yet). He told me that if the Maoist movement became weak, it would weaken the strength of the parliamentary political parties. “So don´t relax your activities, intensify them,” he said. I felt that Girijababu had become a revolutionary at that old age.
It is on his initiative that we were taken by helicopter from Sikles of Kaski to Kathmandu via Pokhara and then back to BP Nagar of Doti (While signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006). He was afraid that something bad could happen to us.
Should we take it as a great historic coincidence? In the past we did not like him at all; we would take on him as a staunch anti-communist. In the beginning of the People´s War, we had fought against the Tanakpur treaty and other anti-national moves. But our views about Girijababu underwent massive changes at that stage.
As he was concerned over my security, I took it as love bestowed upon a child by its guardian. I felt that he was a different kind of person; his was a great heart. When we reached Baluwatar for the first time, he told Krishna Situala to arrange special security for us. In the past we thought that the old man must be a narrow-minded, but he proved it wrong.
We then met very frequently while striking deals on Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants and Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Once we met, all complex matters would be settled. It was during those meetings that we informally talked about numbers of combatants to be integrated into the Nepal Army, which we still have been talking about.
He convinced me that we could easily settle whatever difficulties we had. I was convinced that he would not push for anything that would put the Maoists in difficulties.
When the interim constitution was being finalized, we held talks well into the night, till 11 pm or 1 am. While the other parties were pestering us with different things, Maoists were very clear about the roadmap of peace, constituent assembly and republic. Girijababu was also converging on the roadmap. Once he was very angry during an eight-party meeting and said that the party that came through an armed revolt was cooperating with him while the parliamentary parties were putting him in difficulties.
If we had not developed that kind of relationship with Girijababu, there would have been no Comprehensive Peace Agreement, no election to the constituent assembly, nor would the country turn into a republic. In retrospect, I think these have been of historic importance with far-reaching consequences.
He had not thought that we would become the largest political party. Frankly speaking, Sitaula suggested that making Girijababu the first president and a Maoist leader the prime minister would make it easier to settle all the issues. The negotiation went on for one-and-a-half months. We inclined more towards the ideological aspects and analyzed it more through class struggle perspectives. We won the elections unexpectedly, and thought that we could win everything in the days ahead.
In retrospect, we think we could have easily led the country to a solution if we had compromised at that time. Now this is a matter to be evaluated by the people and the history.
Now Girijababu is gone. And it is a matter of debate: Would the scenario have now been different had we compromised at that time? It was obvious that the proposal was from Girijababu himself. But he did not frankly tell me about his wish. Perhaps his self-esteem and the contradiction between his personality and a “make me president” stance might have inhibited him. I think the debate about it will last for many years, though it is a thing of the past.
Meanwhile, I led the government. I always maintained good relations with him. I readily agreed on anything he seriously proposed to me. When I headed the government, he frequently called me whenever he wanted some support from me and I also helped him as far as possible. "I have no problem recognizing this government," Girijababu would say.
When we entered the army chief row, he continuously suggested to me that I should not get into that controversy. He telephoned me in the morning and in the night. He called me every hour. He telephoned me many times in the day when I took action against the army chief. But we had already readied the plan against the army chief. He said that the move would backfire. He also sent Sitaula to my place to communicate the matter properly. "We should be careful. He may take the move any time," I heard him saying.
At present, when I recall those days, I realize that he was worried as he was like our guardian. He time and again advised me not to get into controversy since the army chief was retiring in three months. Many times he tried very hard to convince me. "I know everything. You don´t need to worry," he told me. He said asking him for clarifications was enough. "You have asked for clarifications. This is enough for now. You can also send him a warning letter," he told me. At that time, we looked at the matter only from the perspective of the party´s struggle. When I recall it, I now feel that it requires a review.
My resignation came as a shock for him. I couldn’t share with him my decision to resign. It was 4 am when I decided to step down. I had made up my mind that stepping down would be in the interest of the peace process and the nation. He sensed that I was going to do something. He then sent me a message saying "by the way, never think about resignation". He was shocked when he suddenly heard about my resignation.
Next day, he told me that I took an unnecessary step. I gave several arguments about internal as well as external factors, but he was never convinced. "It was a mistake" he always said.
"You were about to create an image like Nelson Mandela. You missed an opportunity to become a Mandela of Asia. If you had completed the task of constitution writing and the peace process in time, you would have established yourself as a Mandela" he told me many times. I found that his guardianship and his greatness were reflected in those words. It was not once or twice, but many times that he advised me sincerely.
When I met him last time, his health condition was not sound. His face and body language indicated that he was getting weaker. "It seems that you are not recovering. I think you should have stayed in the hospital for two to four days more," I told him. But he preferred to go home. He talked to us -- Sitaula, Shekhar Koirala and me -- briefly. "Now you have to shoulder the responsibility.
You have to lead the country." He gave such an important statement. One can say such things as a formality. But it was not so. I have taken it more seriously now because he said it in his last days. I have already shared this matter with the public.
When we were launching protests for national independence just before the formation of the HLPM, his trust in us increased. I think it has a symbolic meaning. I never felt that he was trying to weaken our party. Our party men would advice me to be careful with the old man. But he never let me feel that way. I felt deeply that he was a nationalist. Yes, he had other beliefs because he had faith in parliamentary politics. When we launched a struggle for national independence, he liked it. It was not as useless as others thought.
Taking these things into consideration, we had a deep relationship during these seven/eight years. Sometimes I used to have doubts. As a communist, it is quite natural to have the dialectics of doubt and trust. It could be our weakness. Nowadays, we discuss this issue in the party meetings. In some compartments of mind, I always had the feeling that the old man might betray us.
People would say that we had believed in him too much and he could stab us in the back. I myself did not think that way, but when others told us to be careful of him, I would have doubts. Now, the things he told me in the hospital and his demise have removed all the doubts. History proved that wrong.
Following his death, we have serious challenges. But looking at things differently, negative events sometimes lead to positive outcomes in unexpected ways. There are such examples in history. Girijapabu was serious about constitution-drafting and ending the political transition; this is something that might bring the parties closer. I have begun looking at things from that perspective. It has generated new feelings and sensibilities across the country. All of us have respects for Girijababu, and this may pave the way for a new understanding for peace and constitution.
This is a very tragic moment for all of us. But it may lead to a new understanding and a new political consensus to bring the incongruous political strands together. Taking into account my last talks with Girijababu, I feel that the Maoists themselves should analyze their role thoroughly and assume a new role to turn the peace process into a success.
There is widespread concern about the future of the peace process. We should address this concern. Now I think the other political parties would also be serious to reach an understanding. There are still 70 days to go for constitution drafting. I believe we will find a solution by then.
(As told to Republica’s Post Bahadur Basnet)
Related story
Heart to Heart with Malvika
