The million dollar question is: Which of the three options will the Maoists opt for eventually? Let’s analyze each of them.
Dr Baburam Bhattarai recently talked about unilateral concessions and argued that if his party goes to the next election as an opposition party, it’s likely to return to power with a bigger public mandate.
The Maoists are currently in the second phase of their protest programs and till now their protests have been largely symbolic and peaceful. If they want to step up pressure on the ruling coalition, Maoists must intensify the protests in scale, frequency and intensity, which will unmistakably prepare ground for a showdown with the ruling coalition. Maoists seem willing to take this road so long as it scares the ruling coalition to submission or at least forces it for a compromise. As this tactic has limitations, it is also fraught with danger. What if the Maoists fail to mobilize masses for a long and a sustained protest? What if the ruling coalition refuses to budge and decides to take on the Maoists confident that it will have the backing of the international community?
In the face of Maoist protests, there seems to be a greater unity among the ruling parties. “The fissures that we had seen among the ruling parties in the beginning is disappearing fast as the parties show unity of purpose to face the Maoist challenge,” Shankar Pokharel, Minister for Information and Telecommunications said last week. Some of the ruling parties had even proposed to pass a resolution that the Maoist leadership was not acceptable to any of the coalition members unless they renounced violence and the PLA issue was sorted out.
Given the domestic political environment and the regional geopolitics, the Maoists are unwilling to resort to violence or take up arms for a protracted war. If you have heard a theory from Baluwatar – I certainly have – that the Maoists have assembled most of their militant cadres in Kathmandu and have withdrawn two billion rupees from various banks in preparation for capturing the capital city, don’t lose your nerve. Either Baluwatar is unnecessarily scared or is deliberately engaged in scare-mongering. Dr Baburam Bhattarai told a gathering of editors last week that should the Maoists take up arms again, it will invite foreign interventions making Nepal another Afghanistan. “We don’t want that to happen,” he said. Partly, this is why the Maoists have put an effort to keep their protests peaceful. With music, dance and fun, the Maoist protests seem more like a celebration and less like an agitation.
Since the confrontational path seems unfeasible, Maoists have lately focused more on a negotiated settlement. The Maoists have two issues on the negotiating table: Civilian supremacy and a national unity government under their leadership. Agreement on either of these issues seems difficult if not impossible. The parties were close to a deal when the taskforce, several weeks ago, had almost agreed on a draft of the joint resolution to be tabled in the parliament. But the Maoist party spoiled it, at the last moment, insisting that the resolution must unequivocally state that President Dr Ram Baran Yadav made a mistake in staying the then army chief sacked by the prime minister.
Just for the record, let’s see what the constitution says on this matter. Article 144(2) of the Interim Constitution says: “The President on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Nepal Army”. Similarly, Article 144(3) of the constitution says: “The President on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepali Army in accordance with the law”. It’s not that the Maoists misread these Articles; they knew what exactly they meant. If they had followed the constitution, they were needed to send their recommendations to the president on either case – sacking of the army chief and appointment of a new one. But the Maoists suspected, rightly, that the president might delay the implementation of their recommendation and the other parties, including the ones in the government, would move a no trust motion against them in the parliament. So the Maoists chose a shortcut and tried to place their man at the helm of Jungi Adda before the president or the other parties could make their moves.
The president, already suspicious of what the Maoists were up to, used a good excuse that he hadn’t received any recommendation from the council of ministers and told the sitting army chief to stay put. Who made the mistake?
Maoists privately concede that it was their mistake not to send the recommendation to Shital Niwas but insist that the president made an even bigger mistake by overruling the decision of the elected prime minister. But they don’t want to mention their mistake in the joint resolution and want to put the blame only on the president. Negotiated settlement is unlikely on the issue of civilian supremacy also because the ruling coalition is unwilling to concede even an inch on the second issue – national unity government under the Maoist leadership.
Some Maoist leaders have fumed in private: Why do we have to become flexible on the issue of “civilian supremacy” if it doesn’t lead to the formation of a national unity government?
As the first two options look improbable, the Maoists are increasingly gravitating towards the third one: Making unilateral concessions for writing the constitution and focusing on the next election.
Dr Bhattarai recently talked about unilateral concessions during a meeting with a group of editors and argued that if his party goes to the next election as an opposition party, it’s likely to return to power with a bigger public mandate.
He is probably right. The Maoist party will have a number of advantages should it focus on constitution writing and holding the next election. First, it doesn’t have to reach a compromise on the issue of civilian supremacy with other parties and can use it as a major campaign agenda during the next poll. Second, having given up its claim to power, it will be in a better moral position to dictate the constitution-writing process and will have a better say on its content. Third, the anti-incumbency factor will work against the ruling coalition in the next election. And fourth, having pursued peaceful politics and having led the constitution-drafting process, it will increase its mass appeal. There is no reason why the electorate would not want to hand Maoists a mandate for a full term.
ameetdhakal@gmail.com
Related story
British lawmakers reject all four Brexit options in second roun...
